

Marine Corps Gazette

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FEBRUARY 1960
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
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 Camp Pendleton

Camp Pendleton

Our artist's-eye view (cover) is no road map or firing chart. Distortion brings out detail. AMSgt John De Grasse's painting will remind the Old Breed, brief the New.

A Key to Places and Areas on the Cover

Place	Key	Place	Key	Area	Place	Key
Back Gate	8.0-I.7	Central Community Facilities	7.5-H.1	11	Central Community Facilities	7.5-H.2
Basilone Road	7.3-G.7 to 6.8-H.2	Christianitos Road	0.9-E.6	12	Camp Ozbourn	7.5-H.4
Boat Basin	4.9-J.0	DeLuz Creek	7.3-E.3 to 7.3-G.1	13	Central Community Facilities	7.5-H.1
Camp Anderson (Las Pulgas)	4.5-H.7	DeLuz Housing	7.9-H.5	14	Camp Thomas, DeLuz Homes	7.9-H.5
Camp Bailey (Vado del Rio)	6.8-G.0	Golf Course	6.5-J.8	15-16	Junior Officers' Housing	7.5-H.0
Camp Cannon (24 Area)	6.8-H.0	Highway 101	1.2-F.0 to 5.0-J.0		Football Field	7.7-H.3
Camp Christianitos	0.8-E.5	Lake O'Neill	7.4-G.0		Hostess House	7.8-H.5
Camp Foster (San Mateo)	1.4-E.0	Las Pulgas Road	4.0-I.7 to 5.0-G.2		Rattlesnake Road	7.2-H.5 to 7.4-H.5
Camp Julian (Chappo Flats)	6.6-I.7	Main Gate	5-J	17-18	Senior Officers' Housing	8.0-I.9
Camp Kraus (Del Mar)	4.9-J.0	Mock Village	6.8-G.2	20	Wire Mountain Homes	5.3-J.3
Camp McCard (Las Flores)	4.3-I.5	Naval Ammunition Depot	8-F to 9-G	21	Camp Kraus (Del Mar)	4.9-J.0
Camp Mitchell (Horno)	3.2-G.8	Naval Hospital	7.4-G.3	22	Camp Julian (Chappo Flats)	6.6-I.7
Camp Moreland (San Onofre)	2.3-F.2	San Mateo Road	1.5-F.9 to 1.8-F.2	23	Auxiliary Landing Field	6.4-H.0
Camp Ozbourn (12 Area)	7.5-H.4	San Onofre Beach Recreation Area	1.7-G.5	24	Camp Cannon	6.8-H.0
Camp Phillips		Santa Margarita River	9.2-F.9 to 5-J	25	Camp Bailey (Vado del Rio)	6.8-G.0
(Santa Margarita de las Flores)	6-H	Vandegrift Boulevard	5.1-J.0 to 8.0-I.7	27	Naval Hospital	7.4-G.3
Camp Talega	0.8-E.8	Wire Mountain Housing	5.3-J.0	31	Camp Christianson (Stewart Mesa)	0.8-E.6
Camp Thomas (14 Area)	7.9-H.5			33	Camp Phillips (Margarita)	6-H
				34	Mesa Loma	6.8-G.0
				41	Camp McCard	4.3-I.5
				43	Camp Anderson (Pulgas)	4.5-H.7
				52	Camp Moreland (Onofre)	2.3-F.2
				53	Camp Mitchell (Horno)	3.2-G.8
				62	Camp Foster (San Mateo)	1.4-E.0
				63	Camp Christianitos	0.8-E.5
				64	Camp Talega	0.8-E.8



MajGen Alan Shapley
CG, MCB, Camp Pendleton



Camp Del Mar is one of several camp sites at MCB, CampPen




Front view, Division Headquarters. Base Hostess House in background.



1stMarDiv Headquarters, CampPen



Mainside, MCB, Camp Pendleton, California, home of 1stMarDiv.



Main Gate at MCB, CampPen



Camp Pendleton's Base Headquarters Building sits in 24 area.



Man-made Lake O'Neill fronts US Naval Hospital at CampPen.

Marine Corps 1960

Professional Notes & Comment

An Unofficial Analysis

22d Commandant's Policies: What Do They Mean to You?

Most Marine leaders have by now read or heard parts of Gen David M. Shoup's policy statement. Key extracts in his own words can be found on pages 58 and 59 of this issue. What our new Commandant has said drew wide attention, even outside the Corps, as a revelation of his way of doing business. For professional Marine leaders, it is more than a news item; it is also a guide and a personal code. It will bear study and restudy. Here, then, is an unofficial summary and analysis of these stated policies as they may affect you:

Your Corps

You can expect the Marine Corps to stay in business. It encourages, and does not fear, forming of ready forces in all services. The Corps has no need to fear criticism, will not criticize others, will state its views frankly on national defense matters. The Marine Corps mission is to be an elite amphibious force-in-readiness. It will emphasize that mission. It will increase emphasis on its corollary mission to develop landing force doctrine and equipment. The Commandant plans no change in the Marine Corps position on merger, one service, a single chief of staff, or a national general staff.

Your FMF Duty

You can expect to have less than you'd like to have with a 175,000-man ceiling. Your job: "think and work hard to get as much fight from our plight as we possibly can." On the bright side: planning won't be limited by negative thinking, expect to get a better cross-section of skills, plan for a quick backup by the best Marine Corps Reserve yet. The IG will look more at readiness, less at administration. What the Commandant wants in your training plan:

Use of both helilift & surface lift.

Training to fight as well as in how to get there.

More small unit training, more night training.

Realistic training missions to exercise all parts of the team. Noted: communications, intelligence, supply.

► Also, you can expect more personnel stability, particularly in officers. Desired by CMC: a shorter tour in WestPac.

Your Career

Simply stated, put down a realistic choice of duty on your fitness report. This, your CO's recommendation, and the good of the Marine Corps will decide what you get. Take it and do the best job you can. Don't rely on personal letters, visits, or looking for a "team" to join. For commanders: do the job with the leaders and "average Marines" you get. Train them yourself. Don't pad your T/O, ask for individuals, or quietly transfer non-producers with an inflated fitness report. Do try to trim your T/O. The average Marine cannot expect an "outstanding" fitness report. CMC wants a return to time-tested values of personal and moral conduct: "selfless-service," irreproachable conduct in public and personal money matters.

► You can expect more emphasis on evaluation of actual performance, less on tests. Aim: to reward the deserving, weed out those a small, elite Corps cannot "carry."

(See Commandant's Policies, page 2)

*An unofficial digest
of news of interest
to the Marine Corps*

Division Lift in '63?

Navy-Marine Corps doctrine of amphibious operations now is firmly in the hardware stage. Time scale for more amphibious helicopter lift now looks like this:

► HQMC has asked Navy to convert two CVS (*Lake Champlain* and *Valley Forge*) to LPH. If approved, one would be available Jan 1961, second in May 1961. Planners report CVS works well in LPH role, but LPH handles logistics better.

► Delivery schedule for three LPH now building reads: one in FY 1962,



LPH

two in FY 1963. With three LPH now in fleet, a two-RLT lift by 1962 looks probable, with a near-division lift possible by 1963.

► Two 20-knot LPD now building are for FY 1963 delivery. These partially increase platform capability; could land by chopper, for example, an artillery battery. Main purpose, however, is logistic. Pallet "elevators" (two) operate like an escalator, avoid dead time. Key design "compromise" cuts well deck to



LPD

one-half capacity possible in LSD; uses space for vehicle stowage. The ship thus carries less landing craft, replaces them with choppers, and carries more means of ground mobility.

► Logistics results and recommenda-

tions of all Brigade LEXs to date under study by both HQMC and Stanford Research Institute. Efficient use of LPH requires close attention to detail in design, planning and operations.

New Engineer Gear

Marine Corps engineer equipment will get a new look in next two years. New families of equipment in Engineer, Service, Missile battalions and Force Service Regiments will be:

Sectionalized for heli-lift.

Multi-purpose.

Three to six times as fast (20-30mph).

Easier to maintain.

The run-down of key items includes:

► Procurement by June 1961 of *Tractomatic* front-end bucket loader. This fast, rubber-tired machine can lift two tons as a forklift, one ton as a crane. Sectionalized, heaviest lift weighs less than one ton. It will replace some *Hystaway* cranes, some TD-18 bulldozers.

► Procurement of sectionalized 'dozers.

► Procurement by Jan 1962 of *Anthony* 3-ton crane. Rubber-tired and sectionalized, this replaces some *Hystaway* cranes, some *Bay City* cranes.

► Procurement by July 1960 of 3-ton *Yale & Towne* rough-terrain forklift to replace present "smooth terrain" item. This can lift its own weight. Replacement of 7½-ton forklift is not yet firm.

► Hottest new item: Delivery for test this month of first of ten **CLARK EQUIPMENT** 3,000-pound rough terrain forklifts for test and evaluation. This should lift own weight. If it passes tests, it could reach troops in FY 1962.

Here to Stay

Rumored changes in the "new" rank structure are scuttlebutt. G-1 says system will stay as is. First to fill new MGySgt rank will be selected by E-8, E-9 board this month. Approximate quotas for board: 100 MGySgts; 55 Sgts Maj; 220 1stSgts; 600 MSgts.

► Recent Defense Department okay allows for increase in percentage of NCOs from 37.4 to 40% in FY 1961. This means there will be room for some 4,000 more in ranks of Cpl and above by the end of FY '61.

► Promotion testing period for E-5s, E-6s has been moved up. Tests will be given in March and April instead of usual June-July period. Also, it will be the first time the entire testing procedure will be handled through MCI. Ref: MCBul 1418.10.

Logistics Study Underway

Logistics for the modern doctrine continues to get high priority with both G-4 and MCLFDC. Also assisting: Stanford Research Institute, with a full scale

study. Phase I on the BLT has been completed. Phase II on the RLT-MAG is due in March. To follow late this summer will be Phase III on Division-Wing logistics.

Some areas of attack:

► The family of high-speed, rough-terrain, sectionalized material handling devices described elsewhere this issue.

► Study of palletizing to fit helicopter, vehicle, and ship lift.

► Study of "containerizing"—factory packaging of material for field handling. Example: a foam plastic artillery ammunition package planned for test late this month. Two simple molds band around two rounds of ammo. Waterproofing would be by heatsealed plastic.

► Study of robot helicopters and highspeed amphibian vehicles.

Younger Faces

► Next fall's students at Quantico will be younger. A new policy, recently announced, will send to Senior Course junior LtCols and Maj's who have 14-18 years of service. Going to Junior Course will be junior Maj's (12-14 years of service) and Capt's who have 8-12 years.

► The January Gazette "Report" on the Volunteer Reserve included a chart showing "language" VTUs. Wrong! They were deactivated 30 Nov. Getting language specialists remains a big problem. It's being studied closely by both G-2 and DivRes.

Commandant's Policies . . .

► CMC will stress necessary housing. He appreciates value of Women Marines. He wants economy of personnel, material, and money. Watch maintenance of Classes I and II property. You can plan now to brush up on supply and fiscal matters. CMC feels they are a responsibility of unrestricted and LDO's, too. Plans to ask law to end SDO system. Look for shorter school tours.

Your Top Command

CMC promises closer integration of HQMC staff functions, will not reduce coordination between Marine-Navy aviation. He will follow broader policy in assigning general officers. Specifics: use of Navy procedure of giving more officers temporary tours in three-star billets, wider use of aviation and supply duty general officers in command and staff jobs, upgrading top billets at Albany and Barstow. You can expect HQMC to decentralize more functions, to follow up by fewer staff visits with smaller parties. Two quotes to paste in your cover:

- "Don't try to keep bad news away from me."
- "I believe or I relieve."

You Should Also Note

- Financial planning is a direct challenge to all.
- CMC wants forward planning for future missions, organization, equipment. He asks field commanders to consider views of the young, officer and enlisted.
- He plans to institute no non-combat uniform changes; combat uniform needs will get high priority.
- The swagger stick "shall remain an optional item of interference. If you feel the need of it, carry it."
- You should emphasize a good inspection system.
- R&D program is vital. Expect scrutiny and emphasis of "organization, procedures, goals, plans, and programs."
- CMC wishes to keep public fully informed, stresses the wisdom of letting "all privates" know what you're trying to do. He says public relations is an "all hands" job.
- Take a look at your squad bays. CMC asks a "resounding whack" at improving inadequate lounging spaces for off-duty relaxation.

As We Go to Press

On 22 Jan, CMC told Senate Armed Services Committee:

► Personnel savings from unit rotation will let Corps reactivate "at least two" BLT; also, activate one Hawk Battalion.

► Enlisted Ready Reserve will drop from 194,000 to 90,000 by end of FY 1963. Reasons: limit on 6-mo trainees, less Marines RELAD from smaller regular forces, end of obligated service.

► Growing fleet obsolescence is "as much a matter of concern to me as it is to the CNO."

Marine Corps 1960

Research & Development

HYDROPHIBIAN

"... The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force tactics, techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps."

Section 206(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The Marine Corps is stepping up its program to find the fastest, cheapest way to move men and gear from ship to shore.

Item: The sea echelon concept avoids traffic jams in busy beach areas.


Item: The sea echelon concept calls for dispersion up to 50 miles.

One solution: High speed amphibians.

There are four lines of approach: 1) ground effect machines 2) planing hulls similar in design to WWII PT boats 3) a combination of these two called an anti-friction hull and 4) hydrofoils. Corps planners say they will court all four—may wed the one proved most compatible.

Since the hydrofoil project is farthest along, it's drawing a big share of attention.

Hydrofoil: A coined word meaning roughly "water wings." Specifically, a wheeled or tracked amphibian



that scoots over water on stilts, or foils.

Avco Corporation's Lycoming Division, pioneers in hydrofoil development, have offered a 5-ton, wheeled craft named "Hydrophibian." It's powered by a marine version of Lycoming's T-53 turbo-jet helicopter engine.

The Marine Corps is hopeful that tests can be arranged by the end of 1961.

Here's what Lycoming expects to show them: 33 to 45 mph 'flying' speed; 30 to 35 mph on the ground. Range, expressed in hours: 5½ "flying," 12 over land. Also, a craft that adapts nicely to present transports—KAs or PAs.

In a nutshell: A landing craft that can move fast at least 50 miles from ship to shore, across the beach and inland... then back for another load.

Heavyweight

On BuShips drawing boards is a 30-ton amphibian (not hydrofoil) with pneumatic tracks. This LCA is designed to fit wells on the new LPDs like a glove. CNO is reportedly pushing the project.

Helicopters

An all-new turbine (GE T-58) helicopter has been picked by Bu-Weap to replace the Navy's SAR fleet. It's Kaman's HU2K-1, forerunner of some 300 utility 'copters slated to join the fleet. Standard gear:

- Communication—Lightweight 1,750 channel UHF transceiver, plus MHF transceiver for low altitude work over water.

- Navigation—Coordinated dead reckoning system (ADRN) which cuts down headwork, instrument scanning needed to translate flight dope into control action for IFR operation.

- ASE—Kaman built its own which supplements manual flight: 1) relieves pilot of making constant





The HU2K-1

Helicopters—

control trim corrections; 2) is fully automatic.

● **Maintenance**—Built-in crane brackets to accommodate lift hook for removing engine. Timed performance: less than eight minutes.

Fixed Wing

Bendix Aviation's Bendix-Pacific Division has come up with a braking system described as a major advance in controlling high speed landings. Grumman is putting the anti-skid device on its new low-level attack plane, the A2F. It will retrofit planes now in operation.

● OEs can look to getting ashore earlier in the game if an idea of Goodyear's works out. King-size, low-pressure tires (35-in. diameter) are the answer, says the rubber company. So shod, Grasshoppers could land in the sand, in mud; on rock-studded terrain.

On Land

A target tracker developed by Kollsman Instrument Company is the "front sight" on Jam Handy's tank trainer now in use at Camp Lejeune. Present range of the trainer can be increased to 5,000 yards to fill the bill for the M103A's hard-hitting 120mm gun.

● Believed to be the biggest of its kind, a 50,000 gallon fuel storage tank is being tested. Empty, the Nylon, rubber-coated "pillow" can be rolled and packed in a canvas-bag. Goodyear built it.

● Hydraulic cranks have been deep-sixed as possible replacements for present electrical starting systems (Delco-Remy) for diesel engines. MCLFDC found hydrostarters cost more, couldn't beat DC systems.

● After exhaustive tests, MCLFDC has okayed a test kit developed by USNEES for determining life span of engine oil. The kit passes on acidity, dilution and contamination—saves oil by keeping any that's still good. Using the kit, one tractor (TD18A) was driven through eight normal oil change cycles.

● Close support weapons contenders—the new 115mm and the Italian 105mm pack howitzer met at MCLFDC 21 Jan. Both are under test.

Chemical Fronts

The Marine Corps is getting a super tear gas (CS) for handling riots. More potent than the tear gas now on hand, it works doubly fast in producing the familiar symptoms: extreme burning of the eyes, coughing, nausea; it can cause severe vomiting if ingested. Dispensers: burning or bursting grenades; larger doses via man and 'copter-carried dispensers.

● NRL chemists have discovered a new agent that puts out gasoline and oil fires twice as fast as any now in use. It's "Purple K Powder"—nothing more than finely ground potassium bicarbonate. By reducing heat fast it lets fire fighters work closer to flames.


● *Military Review* notes recent tests with a non-lethal chemical reported to be 1,000 times stronger than the best pain relievers on the market. Said to be a truly humane weapon for use against densely populated areas (See *Atoms or Gas*, GAZETTE: Jan '60), the drug makes it impossible for victims to move.

There is an antidote in case friendly troops are exposed.

Missiles and Rockets

Curtiss-Wright Corporation has developed a cheap, target drone that could make better shooters of Marine missilemen. Designed mainly for Sidewinder, it can be tailored for Hawk and Terrier, too.

A \$2,000 price tag make it expendable.



● USMC has found an unexpected bargain in its SATS landing strips. Slightly modified, the aluminum mats, product of Fenestra, Inc. (Phila.) have proven ideal for catching missile backlash. Idea of using M-9 landing mats for missile blast pads germinated at MCLFDC. The Marine Corps GMTU did the testing at NOTS, China Lake, (Calif.) using 2x12-ft. sections of M-9 landing mat, spread 36 feet square around a Terrier base.

Solved: Faster, easier reloading of Terrier.

The problem: Backblast dug deep craters making it difficult to position missile loader.

Recap: Concrete is out, aluminum in at the launching site for Terrier; likely for most of the Corps' missiles and rockets tuned for mobility, rapid setting up.



FOR "SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ABLE LEADERSHIP"

On October 5, 1959, the Army's Distinguished Civilian Service Award was presented to Dr. James W. McRae, Vice President of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.

The award was given for his aid in directing the creation of a family of small, tactical nuclear weapons while he was president of Sandia Corporation—a non-profit Western Electric subsidiary under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Dr. McRae is presently A.T.&T.'s co-ordinator of defense activities.

The citation was read by Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief of Army Research and Development, and said in part: "His scientific knowledge and able leadership have contributed materially to the development for the Army of small, tactical nuclear weapons, thereby significantly increasing the Army's capability to carry out its combat mission."

Bell System people everywhere are proud of Dr. McRae's recognition. And they are proud, also, that the skills and experience they apply in telephone work are also useful in the nation's defense.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



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Marine Corps Gazette

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Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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Free Gazette Writer's Guide on request giving rates, style, procedures.

To track
in trackless
space...

Philco has designed and built the world's largest 3-axis tracking antenna

The world's largest 3-axis tracking antenna was recently completed at the Philco Western Development Laboratories in Palo Alto. It will be used at one of the world-wide satellite tracking stations to receive vast amounts of scientific information from outer space. By employing the unique design feature of tri-axial mounting, this extremely accurate and complex instrument, designed and built by Philco, has complete flexibility of movement and can provide continuous coverage of telemetered information and data from satellites and missiles during any phase of flight.


At Philco you will find the skills that come from close association with the involved problems of planning, developing and implementing advanced space communications programs... experience that includes the design and construction of antennas of many types. Each fully meets the stringent specifications of the military and various scientific research organizations. Philco stands ready to fill your specific needs.

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This Philco 3-axis antenna stands 80 feet high and weighs over 130 tons. One of its most unique features is the 60-foot reflector—a solid aluminum skin paraboloidal structure manufactured to a tolerance of 65/1000 of an inch over its entire surface to provide maximum reception under the most severe environmental conditions. The antenna maintains its accuracy in winds up to 60 miles per hour and its mechanical efficiency in winds up to 140 miles per hour.





MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words. Rates: up to \$20.

NCOs: Front And Center

... Kudos to 1stLt O'Connor on his many fine points in regards to assigning two SNCOs to the rifle platoon (OBSERVATION POST: Nov '59).

Too many jobs in the O3 field that could be filled by sergeants or corporals are being handed to staff sergeants. As the lieutenant stated: if a sergeant can't hold down platoon guide he doesn't belong in the USMC, let alone being a sergeant.

There has been a lot said about SNCO prestige. This is all well and good. Now I feel it is time to notice junior NCOs.

ASgt W. T. Shearer

MP Co, HqBn 1stMarDiv
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Better Than "Playboy"?

... I have been impressed again in the past year by the high standards ... of your fine Marine Corps GAZETTE. Each issue is not only worth reading but, due to the interesting contents and problems posed, is to be studied with passion.

I am sorry that in my present capacity and being over here in Germany, I do not have the chance to talk to some officers of your famous Corps.

Maj Helmut Dürr
German Army

Bad Godesberg
17 Schumannstrasse

Calling All Characters

... Robert Asprey's *Butler* piece in the Dec issue was a masterpiece. Would like to see him do some more using other Corps characters. Capt Clapper's *Haversack*, *Hava Yes* has the endorsement of all Marines, less the MCEB.

Capt J. W. Dion

MB NA&ND
Seal Beach, Calif.

Quiz

... On page 33 of the Dec '59 issue of the GAZETTE is a picture of Commandant Neville and MajGen Smedley Butler. Also in the picture is a box, mounted on a tripod, that looks like a radar speed control device such as used by the highway patrol. What is it?

ASgt T. R. Carroll

MCS Quantico Va.

Ed: Our guess: a microphone. Anyone know?

A Bird In Hand

... A belated reply to Mr. Philip Barker's comments (MESSAGE CENTER: Dec '59) on my piece *Employ the Ontos* (GAZETTE: Sep '59):

Mr. Barker took exception to the statement that the Ontos could "out range a heavy tank." Possibly this reflects on my choice of words. The term was intended to denote cruising range due to better fuel economy rather than gun range. Later in the article I gave full credit "to armor with its high velocity and longer-ranged guns."

The fact remains: The Ontos is our best

antitank weapon until the Cobra, SS-10 or a reasonable facsimile becomes operational.

As a modern Marine I'm put out by all the weapons I read about and have yet to see in the field. My philosophy: To believe absolutely in the ability of my men and unit to fight with weapons on hand; to never cease trying to improve them; to never allow my men or myself to look for that "better weapon" until we have mastered the ones we have—and may well have to use.

Capt C. G. Cooper

Tactics Group
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Language Lesson

... Marine Corps 1960 is something the GAZETTE has needed for some time. It puts points of interest before the readers.

More fine articles of current interest and less of ancient history should net a sharp rise in subscriptions.

Capt J. L. McWhirt, Sr.

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Ed: Ojalá: Translated from the Spanish, this means we need more money to give you the magazine we hope you want.

Clearcut View

... Page 44 of the Nov '59 GAZETTE included a rather hazy picture of the underside of the rainpouts of New Hall. Since this building has been specifically restored to serve as the Marine Corps Museum, and will be an important feature of the Independence National Historical Park, I think you should publish a picture of the complete building as it stands in relation to Carpenter's Hall.

LtCol J. H. Magruder, III

Dir Marine Corps Museums
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Ed: For a new look at New Hall see cut.



New Hall (right) in Philadelphia

Optical Illusion

... Looking at the January cover of the GAZETTE prompts me to ask: What's the object by the Commandant's right elbow. Is it a pen? Or ... a swagger stick?

1stLt J. J. Chemlik

MB, NSA

Ft. Meade, Md.

Ed: A pen set (optional).

Tilt!

... In the Jan '59 Message Center Maj W. L. Traynor took vitriolic exception to a phrase or two in an article I wrote for the Nov '59 issue of the Gazette (Missile Report—1959).

The disputed passage as quoted by the Maj: "It is [Bullpup] comparatively inexpensive, highly accurate, simple in design" and "is now being introduced into Marine attack squadrons."

Said Maj Traynor cordially: "It would be difficult to stray further from the truth. ... It is my considered opinion that it [Bullpup] has no tactical application in the foreseeable future."

The major went on to say: "Let's leave the eyewash to the more commercial publications, and content ourselves with the facts."

Let's do.

Fact: In response to a press query 7 Jan '60, CMC had this to say: "The Bullpup missile has now completed the test and evaluation phases and is being introduced into Marine squadrons as necessary hardware is produced. West Coast VMAs have already fired limited numbers of the missiles and the missile is programmed for all attack squadrons in the Marine Corps."

To call a spade a spade—as the major urges—it's pretty plain who's playing the hand, who's got the most trump, and who's vulnerable.

Capt O. D. Newton

HQMC

Departed Friends

... In your unofficial digest of orders and news of Marine leaders, I would like to see a listing of deceased officers—and perhaps SNCOs—with details, if possible.

Capt Pat Morqan

163 Hylton Ave.
Woodbridge, Va.

(Continued on page 10)

VOICE OF THE DEEP

Neptune, the mythological ruler of the deep, had all the waters of the earth as his domain. Triton, his son, was assigned the vital task of communicating his father's commands to submarines in all parts of the ocean.

The U. S. Navy has need of a counterpart for Triton. RCA is now assisting in this role through development of a communication link to our

new nuclear powered Polaris-carrying submarines, anywhere on the seven seas.

RCA, in addition to its Polaris developments, is also working on many new Undersea Warfare systems such as detection, classification and destruction of enemy submarines as well as coordination of our friendly air, surface, and subsurface effort.



RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS

CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY

(Continued from page 8)

Sloppy Joe

... In re-reading the Oct issue I caught one item in the article *Prestige And Your Office*: Get that cup of joe away from the SRB—"It's just as easy to have that cup of coffee while perusing the PRAM, auditing a SRB..."

Old chief clerks and top sergeants are losing their hair fast enough without worrying about having records fouled up with spilled coffee.

AMSgt L. Slepín

AC "B" Sch, NATTU
Olathe, Kansas

Hooray For The Beret

... The best solution to our head-gear problem is the beret. It could be made in three thicknesses: one side forest green; the other side brown camouflage; in between, some sort of waterproof and insulating fabric.

This way our beret would be reversible for year-around wear. It should be of good material insuring long life and serviceability. It should be smart enough looking to be worn on liberty as well as in the field. A small eyelet would provide for attaching the cap ornament.

ASgt P. E. Duffy

Oceanside, Calif.

A Ray Of Light

... Lately there has been much talk among our officers about the way regular officers are assigned relative position on the Combined Lineal List.

Some believe that class standing in Basic School is the sole factor, others hold out that only college averages count. Several seem to think that many factors are considered. No one, however, really seems to know.

Can you shed some light on this?

Capt N. W. Spencer, Jr.

1st TkbN, FMF
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Ed: We are anxious to get many more articles on such subjects. Authors with an article idea can send a postcard, an outline or a rough draft. We're glad to comment. Our free GAZETTE Writer's Guide explains our rates, procedures and style. Our aim: More articles about you and your problems; less about problems the Commandant must solve; very little about problems of past years unless they point a lesson for 1960.

Capital Punishment

... Each year the qualified and unqualified move off the firing line. Next year they all shoot again. Included are unqualified shooters who carry a primary 0300 or 0311. No doubt they return to their units and continue their duties in the infantry field. A division has about 4,900 E-3s and below (0300 or 0311). These men are the division's strength—its riflemen. Therefore, those who fail to qualify should get special attention.

No one would consider letting a man drive a 6x6 who had not passed the necessary tests. Why should a rifleman continue as such if he fails to qualify with his rifle? And if he stays in the field, why should he be promoted until he is qualified?

If the rifleman doesn't qualify, let's "shoot" him again and again. Let's give him extra coaching. Let's make the rifleman truly a rifle man.

1stSgt H. C. Manion

MB, USNCT
Great Lakes, Ill.

New Dress Approved

... Greatly enjoy and admire new cover layout, new professional notes and comments and, especially, new digest of orders. Keep up the good work!

LtCol N. L. Hamm

MCS, Quantico, Va.

... November, December '59 and January '60 issues best ever. Keep up the good work. We want and need a truly professional magazine.

Capt D. H. Graff

416 Decatur
Jacksonville, N. C.

... Recent addition of professional notes and comments particularly effective. Please continue.

1stLt J. P. McNicholas

285 Gundry Dr.
Falls Church, Va.

... Jan '60—An interesting issue. The "yellow pages" are outstanding and should be continued.

H. I. Shaw, Jr.

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10.00			10.00
10.00			10.00

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FOR LOANS

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
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DEMOCRATIC CONTROL IN A TOTALITARIAN AGE

By Arnold Toynbee



ALL OVER THE WORLD TODAY, PEOPLE are rather sharply conscious of differences between present-day regimes. These differences are 'ideological': that is to say, they are differences in the principles on which the different regimes are at least professedly based. The questions of principle that are at issue are questions about freedom and justice, and the current 'ideological' differences in the understanding of what freedom and justice mean obviously coincide with practical differences in the political conditions under which the citizens of different states are living today. These differences look as if they were the dominant feature in the present-day landscape so long as we keep our eyes fixed on the present situation exclusively. This, however, is an unrealistic way of looking at human affairs. It is characteristic of these that they are always on the move; and from this it follows that

we cannot ever size up a contemporary situation unless we take some account of its antecedents. Suppose, then, that, after surveying the political situation in the present-day world, we glance back at the previous situation, as this was, say, two or three hundred years ago. Immediately, our picture of the present situation will change. By comparison and contrast with the past, we shall see that there is at least one important feature that almost all present-day regimes have in common. Under all regimes today, there is a vast network of direct relations between governments and private citizens in their tens of millions.




This uniform feature of present-day political life hits a traveller's eye. In one continent after another, he finds in every considerable city a block of recently erected colossal buildings, with new blocks in the same style going up beside them. The builders, even with all their modern apparatus and technique, can hardly keep pace with the demand. These are the new government office blocks; but they are not confined to the hundred cities that are political capitals; in the United States, for instance, not only Washington, D. C., but every major city now contains a federal services building, as well as one for state services and another for the municipality. And it is the same in Latin America and in Asia. Indeed, the erection of these new mammoth government buildings is more conspicuous, just now, in Asian countries that have recently acquired political independ-

ence. Usually the biggest of the buildings in the new bunch is the tax-office's. This is an ironical monument to the achievement of independence. Human beings dislike being taxed by their fellow-countrymen almost as much as they dislike being ruled by foreigners. But there is no help for it. Eternal tax assessments are included in the price of liberty nowadays.

Taxes, Compulsory Service

These expanding cubic feet of public bureaus give, in three-dimensional terms, the measure of the growth in the network of direct relations between the governments and the governed. A large and increasing percentage of the world's citizens pay direct taxes to their governments now. Remissions of tax for the lowest income-brackets are constantly being offset by the depreciation in the values of currencies and by the accompanying rises in incomes reckoned in terms of taxable money. But the tax-office building is only one of a number; for modern governments exact not only money but compulsory service. They compel all children to go to school and they impose on all physically fit male adults a liability to undergo military training. In modern states, as in ancient Sparta, the government's hand comes down least heavily on the grown-up women; but their privilege is precarious; it is only for peace-time. In Britain during WWII, married women with small children were 'directed' into war-work away from their home towns, and their children were parked in public crèches. In peace-time a modern government may not find it worth its while to give compulsory military training to all its able-bodied grown-up men; but, with an eye to a possible future war, it will keep track of all its potential 'man-power'—and 'woman-power' too. It will keep card-indexes of all the kinds of ability on which it might, one day, wish to draw; and this will include most of the ability that there is in the nation; for, in a total war, few kinds of ability are superfluous. The manpower department of the bureau of labor is not only an integral part but a key part of the government's war-machine. This department's build-



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Karl Marx

ing will register its importance by running to as large a number of stories as the bureau of education's, or as the aggregate height of the state education buildings in a country with a federal constitution under which education is a regional affair.


Welfare Activities

This is not the end of the list of giant public buildings; for the modern state gives away with one hand what it has taken with the other. The 'welfare' activities of the modern state are increasing everywhere, even in states that are anti-socialist in their professed ideological principles; and the business of giving things to people by the hundred million requires as much office-space as the business of exacting things from them in the same large numbers. Watch the buildings of the bureaus of pensions, health, and agriculture; as you look, you will see them grow. This huge increase in the volume of direct relations between governments and citizens is going ahead today in all countries, irrespective of their ideological la-

bels. Whether the country in which one happens to have been born is labelled democratic or autocratic or free-enterprise or socialist or communist, every living human being in every one of them will have been conscious of an increasing pressure on him from the government during his lifetime. If the government has not gone to the length of putting him into the army, it will certainly have made him fill up forms, and will have insisted on his previously receiving at least an elementary education in order to debar him from being able to plead illiteracy if he is convicted of having neglected to make the required returns.

Impact is Modern

The point to notice here is that this compulsory intimacy between citizens and governments is something new. Public pensions and public health services for the benefit of individuals are innovations that have been introduced within our own lifetime. Compulsory universal education is no older than our grandparents. Even compulsory universal liability to military service, combatant or non-combatant, goes back no further, in the modern World, than the *levée en masse* in France in 1792. In fact, all facets of this new compulsory direct relation between citizens and governments are younger than any of the various regimes under which the human race is now living. The youngest of these is communism; but Marx's ideology had already taken shape more than a hundred years ago, when effective totalitarianism, even in the military field, was still in its infancy. Marx, like the makers of the British Reform Bill of 1832 and the makers of



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Signing of the US Constitution

the United States' eighteenth-century constitution, was thinking in terms of a state of affairs that was radically different from the present world-wide dispensation. Marx may have wanted to put us where we now find ourselves; but even Marx did not really think in totalitarian terms. No nineteenth-century imagination could run to that. After all, Marx's ultimate objective was 'the withering of the state'; and today the state, under all regimes, is flourishing like a green bay tree. So all the World's present-day regimes are in the same boat. They are geared to a system of relations between governments and citizens that has now become legendary. The growing network of relations has entangled them, all alike, in a situation with which none of them was designed to deal. All of them today are therefore wrestling with a common problem: can they find their feet again in the new and unforeseen predicament that has overtaken them?

Problems of Government

This common problem of the present-day regimes is a tough one. One can see how tough it is if one can think oneself back into the political and social circumstances of the Western World in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These circumstances are so different from ours

today that it requires quite an effort of imagination to call them back to mind and enter into them imaginatively. This is worth attempting, all the same. It is worth while because this vanished antediluvian world was the world in which all our present-day regimes, of all ideological brands, originated. This past situation, not our present situation, is the one that all our traditional institutions were intended to cater for.

The outstanding feature of political life in this now outmoded 'early modern' age was the fact that the contacts between governments and citizens were then not maximal but minimal; for this meant that most of the citizens for most of the time did not feel the government's pressure. There are, of course, some things that any government must do in any circumstances if it is to survive. It must, for instance, make at least some provision for national defense and for internal security; and, to pay for this, it must raise some money from the citizens in some way. There have been governments—no doubt, rather primitive ones—that have managed to exist without taking the law into their own hands. In the Icelandic Republic in the tenth and eleventh centuries the execution of even the criminal law was left to private enterprise. This degree of anti-socialism was obviously




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**Brigadier de dragons,
18th Century**

excessive, and indeed the medieval republican regime in Iceland died of it. The social consequences were so awkward that the government of Iceland was eventually taken over by the Norwegian Crown. Seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Western governments had, of course, long since got past that stage. By this time the administration of the law was already a public affair. Yet this did not bring more than a small percentage of a country's citizens into personal relations with their government. Most people live and die without ever being involved in civil litigation; and to be either a victim of crime or a criminal is a rarer experience still. In our day, parking offences are bringing respectable citizens into collision with the law in increasing numbers; but we should hardly single this out as our most significant experience of the present-day octopus-state. Our income tax assessments and our military call-ups make deeper dents on our lives. Even in the automobile age, the law is a comparatively minor channel for contacts between citizens and the state. Eighteenth-century governments did administer the law. On the other hand, they did not do most of the things that make the present network of relations between citizens and governments so close-knit and the present pressure of governments on citizens so heavy.

Eighteenth-century governments did not, for instance, touch the individual directly by forcibly enrolling him in the army. Till within



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Impressment of American sailors by British naval officers

living memory the armies of the two classical parliamentary countries—Great Britain and the United States—were still tiny forces staffed by professionals who had voluntarily taken up military service as their career. In this, the English-speaking countries were old-fashioned. They were able to keep to professional armies till after the turn of the century, thanks to their good fortune in being insulated from continental Europe by what was then still a sufficient breadth of sea-water to give security to a nation that was willing to maintain an adequate navy. The continental European countries had already gone over to compulsory military service in some degree. These two overseas armies of professional volunteers were, however, survivals of the kind of army that had been the standard type in the eighteenth-century Western World, on the continent as well as overseas, and under autocratic governments as well as under parliamentary ones. In the eighteenth century only a small fraction of the citizen body met the government through becoming its soldiers, and only a small fraction of those who did become soldiers did so compulsorily.

Press Gangs

Governments did resort to coercion for keeping up their cadres in times of crisis. The British Admiralty, for instance, sent 'press-gangs' round its ports to kidnap civilian seamen during the Napoleonic Wars. Its refusal to recognize that American citizens were no longer British subjects for this purpose was one of the causes of the War of 1812. The Prussian Government, again, exacted quotas of agricultural serfs from landowners when it was building itself up, by a tour de force, into a first-class military power—and especially when it was fighting with its back to the wall in the Seven Years War. Yet all but a very small percentage of Frederick the Great's able-bodied male subjects lived through his reign without ever serving as soldiers. The real maker of the Prussian army was Frederick's father and immediate predecessor, Frederick William I; and in one of Frederick's books—entitled *The Manners, Customs, In-*



Camera Press—Pix

Dr. Toynbee is a historian who believes history is too vital to be shelved for 100 years to gather historical objectivity. If it is to be of value today—if there is a way to avoid the "mistakes" of the past—events occurring around us must be weighed in the light of human relations of the past. Dr. Toynbee is the author of a 10-volume, "A Study of History." More recent works include "Civilization on Trial" and "World and the West."


dust, and Progress of the Human Spirit in the Arts and Sciences under the Hohenzollern Dynasty—Frederick tells an illuminating story of his father's early excess of military zeal.

"*This regime,*" Frederick records, "*was wholly military. The size of the army was increased; and, in the ardour of the first enrollments, some artisans were taken for soldiers. This spread terror among the rest; a number of them ran away; and this unforeseen accident did considerable damage to our manufactures. The King (Frederick William) stepped in to remedy this abuse, and he devoted himself with particular care to the re-establishment and the progress of industry.*"

In other words, the eighteenth-century Prussian industrial worker was a freer man, in his relations with the government, than his present-day American and British opposite numbers. The freedom to run away when he thinks he is in danger of being called up for military service is not one of the human freedoms that has been enjoyed since WWI by any citizen of the United States or the United Kingdom—not even if he happens to have been an industrial worker. Just imagine him trying to vindicate his right to liberty by the simple but effective means to which the eighteenth-century Prussian artisan resorted. Frederick William I's mouth would have watered if he could have had a preview of the present-day American or British system of passport-control or the present-day physical fence round the territories of the Soviet Union and its satellites. But such engines of totalitarianism as these were beyond an eighteenth-century Prussian

military autocrat's dreams. So an eighteenth-century industrial worker who objected to being conscripted could just walk out and retaliate by transferring his skill to the service of a rival kingdom. It was as simple as that. And as for conscripting the middle class—the shopkeepers, merchants, and professional men—even Frederick William does not seem to have thought of doing that. At any rate, his son Frederick makes no mention of it. In Prussia before the War of Liberation against Napoleon in 1813, the only people who were conscripted were a few of the wretched serfs.

The standard eighteenth-century army was not only not co-extensive with the able-bodied male population; so far from being 'the nation in arms,' it was a little insulated world of its own, without much contact with the principal classes of the population that were the mainstays of the community and the




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Frederick the Great

state. The soldiers were largely recruited from misfits and bad characters who preferred to earn their bread in this way, in spite of being kept in order by a ferocious discipline; the officers were mostly aristocrats. Officers and men alike were drawn from superfluous elements in society. Productive citizens were not considered to be expendable and were therefore not required to serve.

An army of this kind was relatively easy to control. Its links with the civilian community were slight, and it enjoyed little popularity or prestige. If it had tried to start a revolution, the people would not have followed it. But these eighteenth-century volunteer armies did not have political ambitions. They were content with the professional career that their service gave them.

Today we are aware of the existence of our country's armed forces even if we have not ever been called upon to serve in them. We are aware that we are paying the bill for them every time that we pay an installment of income-tax. Direct taxation is a powerful and impressive compulsory link between the present-day citizen and his government. It did not, however, loom very large in the eighteenth-century citizen's life. In the eighteenth-century, direct taxation, like conscription for military service, was regarded as an emergency measure for meeting a crisis. Landowners in Britain groaned when the government levied



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Oliver Cromwell

even a temporary land-tax to pay for the War of the Spanish Succession; and, more than a hundred years later, the parliament of the United Kingdom celebrated the news of Napoleon's fall by joyously abolishing the income tax that they had reluctantly voted in war-time as a lesser evil than risking the loss of their country's independence. Till far on in the nineteenth century, it was one of the recognized rules of the art of government that taxation should, as far as possible, be 'invisible': that is to say, indirect. Direct taxation—which in our eyes is the most equitable kind—was eschewed as being a dangerous provocation; and indeed in most countries, right down to WWI, the income-tax was only a secondary source of revenue, and was levied without tears at a rate which, today, would seem fabulously low.

Government Remote

Thus, in the 'early modern' age before the deluge, governments demanded little from their citizens, and gave them less; and this kept the network of compulsory relations between the two parties loose-meshed. The government and the people were, in fact, remote from each other. This, in turn, made the armed forces and the other instruments of government comparatively easy to manage. We have noticed that any seventeenth-century or eighteenth-century autocrat did not have much difficulty in keeping his army under control; and he did not bequeath an insoluble problem to

his successors if and when his power was taken out of his hands by a parliamentary regime, as it was in England and Scotland in the seventeenth century.

Seventeenth-century England did have, under the Commonwealth, a brief experience of army rule. The army that the parliament had raised to fight the king eventually took hold of the government by a *coup d'état*, and for a few years England was divided into districts administered despotically by major-generals. But this regime did not outlive Oliver Cromwell. After his death, public opinion was strong enough to insist on the holding of a free parliamentary election, and the electors' will then promptly expressed itself in a restoration of the monarchy on a parliamentary constitutional footing. The English electorate had now become so suspicious of a standing army that, from the time of the restoration of the monarchy onwards, the army was placed, at least in theory, on a year-to-year basis. Of course, in practice it was a permanent force. It it had literally been disbanded and reconstituted once a year, it could not have held its own against the professional armies of the continental European powers. The legal limitation of the army's life to one year at a time was a symbol of the parliament's constitutional authority and a warning to the army never to attempt again to do what Cromwell's New Model Army had done to the Long Parliament. The real sanction was the electorate's opposition to military rule. The parliamentary regime in Britain has not been challenged by the army again; nor, in the United States, was it challenged by the army after the Revolutionary War, though the situation in America then was not unlike the situation in England after the seventeenth-century Civil War there.

In the countries in which the parliamentary system of government es-



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Cromwell at Marston Moor, 1644

tablished itself, the electorate that stepped into the former absolute monarchy's shoes proved able to control the organs of government no less effectively than these had been controlled by its autocratic predecessor. In England, at any rate, the parliamentary regime was more of an oligarchy than a democracy down to the parliamentary reform of 1832; and, even after the enfranchisement of the British industrial workers in 1869, half a century passed before these made a practical use of their voting-power by voting a Labor Party into office. De facto, the authority of the electorate, acting through parliament, was exercised by a small fraction of the population which was willing to leave the active conduct of public affairs to a still smaller handful of leaders. In the pre-Jacksonian United States, political leadership was left, with the people's acquiescence, in perhaps almost as small a number of hands as it was in nineteenth-century Britain. This was not democracy in the literal sense. On the other hand, it was a regime under which the government was effectively controlled by at least a part of the citizen body. The control was effective because the men who exercised it had the necessary standing and experience and self-assurance.


US Constitution

When the United States Constitution and the British Reform Bill were drafted, their makers had in mind a particular kind of citizens who were to be the ultimate repositories of political power. They were thinking of the people who were, in fact, the typical citizens of that time. They were confident that, if political power were placed in these hands, they would be able to exercise it effectively; and this confidence was not unreasonable. The electorate for which the United States Constitution and the British Reform Bill were both designed was one composed of men who, in the economic field, were their own masters, and who therefore might be expected to have an experience of business, an independence of mind, and a sense of responsibility that would qualify them for keeping a tight control over the government if the

reins were placed in their hands. The electorate for which our democratic institutions were devised was an electorate composed mainly of farmers, storekeepers, self-employed artisans, and professional men (e.g. lawyers, doctors, surveyors). Men of this standing were indeed fit to run a democracy. Self-employment was the common feature in their economic position; and this word gives the measure of the change since then, in the social composition of the electorate in countries with democratic political constitutions.

The Electorate

The electorate for which our democratic political institutions were designed was, as we have just now noticed, a pre-industrial-revolution pre-business-corporation electorate. The typical elector was a man who stood on his own feet economically. In the language of that day, he 'had a stake in the country.' In the United States and Britain today there are still some self-employed persons left; but they are no longer the typical kind of citizens. They have come to be a minority. To be employed by someone else is now the rule; and, in Britain, at any rate, a self-employed person is looked askance at, nowadays, by the government's employees, who have come to be one of the largest groups of non-self-employed persons in the land. These governmental officials think of the self-employed person as an exceptional kind of creature and a tiresome one, because dealing with him gives the official more work than dealing with the employees who are now the standard kind of citizens. When a government official is dealing with an employee, he can make the employer do part of the government official's work for him free of



18th Century Spinner

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Louis XIV

charge. For instance, he can make him collect and transmit to the government the employee's contribution to the funds of a national health or old age insurance scheme. The employer will usually do this efficiently, even though unwillingly, because the employer will usually be a corporation that commands the services of an expert organizational staff. The self-employed person, who cannot provide the government official with an employer to suit the official's convenience, has become something of a pariah in official eyes. The self-employed have, in fact, become a depressed class, and they are also rapidly declining in numbers.

Menace to Democracy

This change in the social composition of the electorate is as great a menace to the effective working of democracy as it is a convenience for government officials. The employer—particularly the impersonal corporation which employs labor on the grand scale—is useful to the official in more than one way. The employer can not only be made to do part of the official's work for him; without any compulsion or even suggestion, the employer also 'conditions' his employee to be a docile sheep in the official's hands. A citizen who earns his living under discipline, by working for a large corporation, is accustomed to being a mere cog in the wheel of economic

affairs, and this experience in his private life disposes him to resign himself to playing the same passive role in public life as well. Having been broken in to being pushed about by managers and foremen, he will accept the same treatment at the hands of the girl-clerks in government bureaus. These, in their legions, have now stepped into the shoes of the eighteenth-century autocratic monarch and can say 'L'état c'est moi' with greater justification than Louis XIV ever could. The old electorate of self-employed men did not let itself be treated like that by its public servants. The self-employed were as unmanageable as camels, mules, or goats, and their refractoriness was democracy's sure shield. Their present-day successors


tion in Congress or in Parliament. Today, public business is so complicated that even an experienced congressman may not be able to see what is the right question to ask in order to elicit the desired information. As for the official forms that we are now required to fill in, even a papyrologist would be hard put to it to decipher them, and a mathematician to read their riddles. The best that an ordinary citizen can do with them is to hand them over to an expert to deal with them on his behalf for a fee, if he can afford to pay it. Official forms have become nightmares, and, among them all, income-tax return forms are the worst. When, part way through the nineteenth century, the income tax became, like the army, a standing

come the football with which the two teams of experts play their highly professional game.

Loss of Democratic Control

Thus the ordinary citizen's situation, both in relation to his employer and in relation to the government, has become a depressing and demoralizing one. He feels himself to be helplessly at the mercy of gigantic forces that he cannot even understand, still less control. Mankind may be in danger of committing mass-genocide by atomic warfare; but what, the men and women of the world, ask themselves, can they do about it? In countries with a complex industrial and business organization, even if they are officially democratic countries, there is a tendency today for the electors to succumb to a sense of helplessness, and therefore to sink into a condition of apathy. And this is the state of mind that we Western would-be democrats used to think of as being characteristic of the Asian peasantry under arbitrary autocratic regimes. If the electors in a professedly democratic country did come to believe that there was nothing that they could do about anything in public affairs by their own personal efforts, that would be the end of democracy, whatever the text of the constitution might continue to say. The increasing complexity of both economic and political life has, in fact, brought the electors in countries with democratic constitutions face to face with one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and religion. The question is whether a human being does possess a freedom of will that makes him able to influence his own neighbor's fortunes, even if only to an infinitesimal degree. In the philosophical field, the dispute over this question will probably continue to be inconclusive and interminable. The belief in the effectiveness of man's free will, which is the presupposition of all institutions for self-government, is really a religious act of faith. Our future depends on whether we preserve this faith or lose it, and, if we lose it, whether or not we can recover it.

We have to do our utmost to preserve or recover our faith in at least the partial freedom of our wills. For,



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18th Century carriagemakers

have been transformed into sheep, and this metamorphosis of the electorate threatens to leave democracy defenseless.

More Complexities

Democratic control of government has also been undermined simultaneously by the increasing complication of public businesses. The American and British constitutions presuppose that public affairs are simple and straightforward enough to be understood, and therefore to be controlled, by a farmer or an artisan of average education and intelligence. If anything turns up that is beyond his comprehension, he can commission his elected representative to clear it up by asking a ques-

institution in Britain, the uneasy income-tax payers were reassured by being told that the assessment and the raising of the tax were going to be placed in the hands of commissioners who would be representatives of the tax-payers, not of the government. Self-taxation certainly sounds like the next best thing to no taxation; but the growing complication of income-tax laws and regulations has long since made the tax-payer's liabilities an incomprehensible mystery to the tax-payer himself. His liabilities have to be determined by a wrangle between his tax-expert and the government's. He must pay whatever sum his own adviser may succeed in agreeing with the government's representative. The tax-payer himself has be-

without this faith, human beings cannot lead a human life of any kind, not to speak of managing their affairs democratically. We cannot believe in our power to exercise some control over our destinies unless our belief is confirmed to some extent by experience. Experience demands practice, and practice requires education. At the moment, the paramount aim of education in all countries is to produce the maximum number of physical scientists and technicians; and it is true that science and technology are the keys to material well-being, and also to military power in the current competition between countries dedicated to conflicting ideologies. Yet, for the preservation of democracy, scientific and technological prowess is not enough. Essential though these are for the protection of democracy against attacks from outside, they will not avail to preserve democracy against decay from within. The preservation of democracy hangs on our success or failure in managing human affairs, not in exercising control over non-human nature; and this means that, in education, we cannot afford to neglect the humanities. We need to study the art of human relations, and this not just academically, but for the practical purpose of producing citizens capable of playing an active, responsible, and effective part in public life under present-day social conditions.

Government by Citizens

In a highly mechanized and complex society, such as ours has come to be, the control of the government by the citizens is evidently more difficult to achieve than it has ever been in the past. Our political organization has been mechanized, and the choice, that this leaves us, between casting our votes for this party or for that is the shadow, rather than the substance, of political freedom. The citizen's participation in the government needs to be much more personal and more pervasive than that, if—under present-day con-



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Constitutional Convention, 1787

ditions—democracy is still to be a reality. In order to save democracy, we need not only to preserve our traditional democratic institutions but to supplement them with new ones that will enable them to work effectively in circumstances that were not foreseen, and not provided for, at the time of their invention two or three centuries ago. This is going to be difficult; but our predecessors' achievements should give us confidence and hope. Our predecessors did succeed in devising institutions that made democracy practicable under the conditions prevailing in their day. It should not be beyond the wit of man to do the same again under the more complex conditions with which we have to cope in our age.

Individual Efforts Needed

In this age of more and more massive and crushing mechanization, we cannot afford to leave any possible recourse untried if we are to save our human society from becoming regimented like insect-life in the ant-heap or the beehive. An advance in the development of democratic institutions is one possibility, an advance in the development of education for citizenship is another. In both these fields, there are openings for new pioneering enterprises which might be highly serviceable to the cause of human freedom. But educational and institutional developments are not enough by themselves, even in combination, to uphold freedom against the present formidable threats to it. Freedom can be saved only if institutional measures are seconded by the individual efforts of the millions of

men and women whose relations with each other weave the web of our social fabric. Even the greatest, and apparently most impersonal, public events are the results of what human beings, in their millions, have done or left undone. Each of us, at every moment, is producing an effect on the course of human affairs. This effect is genuine, however minute and obscure it may be in any particular case. This individual effectiveness of ours, for good or evil, lays upon each of us a responsibility and at the same time offers each of us a hope. The responsibility is to do what in one lies, however little this may seem to be, to save the cause of freedom from going by default. The hope is that our efforts will not have been in vain. This hope and this responsibility, together, call upon each of us to take his role as a citizen of a democracy no less seriously than this was taken by our ancestors in a simpler situation than ours.

The private citizen has his part to play as an elector and as a candidate for office. But it is important, nowadays, that the public servant should be, at the same time, a citizen in feeling, thought, and act. In our highly organized society, an ever increasing percentage of the citizens are neither 'self-employed' nor employed by private fellow-citizens of theirs, but are employees—civilian or military—of one or other of the fast expanding organs of government. It is in the public interest that the citizens serving in this official section of the citizen body should play a part as citizens, and not as officials only. Both they and their fellow-citizens in private stations ought to recognize that, for an official, to feel and act as a citizen as well is an inalienable part of his social duty. In the present struggle for the preservation of our inheritance of freedom, the key-positions are those inside the walls of the government bureau. If freedom fails to maintain itself in this area, it will be in danger everywhere else. US MC

Rigged Inspection

AFTER THE ARMISTICE IN KOREA MY BATTERY was standing a much-prepared-for CG inspection. "How's the chow?" the inspecting officer asked one man. "Fine, sir," came the extremely enthusiastic reply. Surprised at such fervor, the officer pressed, "You get all the food you want?" "Yes, sir!" "No complaints at all?" "No, sir!" Obviously perplexed, the officer changed the subject. "What's your job, Marine?" "I'm one of the cooks, sir."

Maj R. J. McNicholas

SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS ANALYSIS



Russian Armored Amphibians (background)

Russian Navy Stresses Need for Elite Troops in Beach Assault

IN POST-WAR YEARS, THE US Navy, which considers landing operations one of the most important types of combat operations, has paid special attention to development of methods for the conduct of landing operations. For that reason, it is interesting to examine certain features of training and the conduct of landing operations as described in the American press.

The first echelon of the landing force consists of units of the US Marine Corps, whose mission it is to seize a beachhead on the enemy coastline and protect the landing of succeeding echelons, which usually consist of US Army units.

Training of the landing force is conducted in an area with military-topographic conditions similar to the actual landing area. The training area is organized with a defensive system comparable to that which intelligence indicates is present in the landing area. For purposes of security this area is isolated, personnel of the landing units are prohibited from contact with the local population, correspondence is restricted and other security measures are effected.

After training for the operations ashore in the above described area and rehearsal for the embarkation and debarkation of the landing force, landing force units are embarked on transports, landing ships and landing craft. Dependent upon the distance to the landing area, the landing force is embarked either on transports and landing ships for movement by sea, or directly on landing craft, if the sea journey is short. Landing force units designated for landing by helicopters can be embarked on helicopter aircraft carriers. American newspapers and military journals often state that, as

a result of the introduction of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, the embarkation of troops should be dispersed among many ports, and, at times, must even be carried out from unimproved coastal areas.

Movement of the landing force is usually conducted by several landing ship units, whose formations should insure the anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defense of the transports and landing ships. The enemy airfield system and his routes of communication are destroyed to great distances from the landing area. Trawlers, under cover of aircraft and

LANDING OPERATIONS

(A Translation)

An extract from the chapter "Fundamentals of Naval Science" in the book *The Navy*, written by Capt N. A. Nevski, Soviet Navy, published by USSR Ministry of Defense, 1959.

surface ships, sweep the landing area of mines.

Preparatory fires are conducted prior to the debarkation of the landing force. Air strikes and naval gunfire destroy the enemy defensive installations, combat forces and equipment on the shore, disrupt the command organization, and impede the movements of reserves. The duration of the preparatory fires may vary from one to several hours. Americans envisage the employment of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction for preparatory fires.

The transports stop 10-15 kilometers from the beach and commence the transfer of troops to landing craft. Landing ships with infantry and tanks head towards the beach by the most direct route, in order to land, in the shortest possible time,

the first thrusts which capture a foothold and protect the first echelon of the landing force. The first echelon must seize and hold the beachhead, insuring the landing of the primary forces of the operation for further operations ashore. The landing itself and the operations of the first and subsequent echelons of the landing force ashore must be continually supported by naval gunfire and air strikes.

Just prior to the landing of the Marine assault waves, or simultaneously with their landing, Americans conduct air landings for the seizure of air fields and important enemy defense lines on the coast. For this purpose, a part of the landing force is helicopter landed from aircraft carriers.

Americans maintain that large numbers of amphibious tanks, land tanks and armored personnel carriers must be landed in the first echelons. Antitank operations of the landing force are considered to be extremely important.



Foreign experts believe that, under conditions of atomic warfare, landings will be conducted on greater fronts than ever before. According to the foreign press, the average front for a Marine regiment will be 4.6 kilometers; for a division 8-12 kilometers; and for an army corps 25-30 kilometers.

Americans are striving, as rapidly as possible, to increase the numbers of landing troops and build up the amounts of arms and equipment for landing operations; it is for this reason that the landing area, especially in the first days after the landing, will contain a significant concentration of troops, cargo and vehicles. Naval communiques indicate a special concern in regard to landing operations.

US MC



NOW...“PACKAGED” EARLY WARNING RADAR



Easily transported to tactical areas by land, sea or air it is quickly readied for long and short range action

Easily transportable and quickly operational—that's the new “TEW” (Tactical Early Warning) radar system developed by Sperry's Surface Armament Division for the Marine Corps. Only one-fourth the size and weight of conventional radars, TEW—designated MPS-21—is easily carried to tactical areas by helicopter, cargo plane, truck or amphibious vehicle. Within two hours, an 18-man crew can erect the system and put it into operation.

Designed to detect both close-in and distant supersonic aircraft and missiles, TEW also determines their height—combining the functions of two present radar systems. Operation is almost completely automatic. Only one operator is required to monitor the control console. Radar console and rotating antenna are housed in an inflatable radome, which can withstand the rigors of arctic or tropical climates.

With its very long range and portable

construction, TEW provides the means to extend the nation's defense perimeter and insure added protection for key installations and outposts. TEW is another important Sperry contribution to our growing power to deter aggression.

SPERRY

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REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

THE 1st MARINE DIVISION (REINF)

PART
ONE

READY TO FIGHT

By Staff, 1stMarDiv

Next month's Report from the Ready Forces covers the 2dMAW

THE MISSION OF THE 1stMARDIV can be simply stated in four words, "Be ready to fight." To accomplish this, the 1stMarDiv took part in over 60 exercises of battalion or larger size between September 1958 and October 1959.

Camp Pendleton has terrain for training in almost all types of warfare. Rugged mountains, dense wooded areas and miles of beaches are used constantly by Division elements to perfect their readiness. Within less than a day's motor march to the northeast lies 29 Palms, the Marine Corps' desert training center. In the High Sierras, near Bridgeport, California, is the Cold Weather Training Center, where veterans of the bitter Korean winters teach 1stMarDiv Marines mountain and cold weather warfare.

San Clemente Island, 60 miles to the west, is an easily accessible impact area for live bombing attacks and shore bombardment spotting for naval gunfire personnel. The lack of appreciable rainfall and extremes of temperature permit training the year round. Because of the diversity of training facilities, the division has sometimes been referred to as "the laboratory of the Marine Corps."

The division draws many of its enlisted Marines from the Second In-

fantry Training Regiment at Camp Pendleton. There the Marine gets basic instruction as a member of a combat team. Capitalizing on this fine training, the division makes him an integral part of the Division's team, in either a combat or support unit. The success of the intensive training can be in some part measured by the results of the last annual unit combat marksmanship competition at Quantico. There, squads from the division captured first, second and fifth places out of a possible nine in the Marine Corps.



Formal Schooling

The division sends about 1,100 officers and men to CMC-directed formal schools annually. About 400 go to schools directed by CG, FMF Pac. The latter are primarily at the Cold Weather Training Center. In addition, the division has extensive, division level, formal schools. These

schools are divided into two general categories: those at the Division Schools Center, and those held by division units themselves. The Division Schools Center conducts continuing courses in NCO leadership, ABC defense, infantry weapons repair, and for ammunition technicians, field radio operators, radio telegraph operators, field wiremen, and radio supervisors. Some 4,000 students graduate annually from these courses. The NCO Leadership School is typical. Three levels of instruction are taught—Pfc and LCpls, Cpls and Sgts, and Staff NCO's. Normally 50 students attend each three-week class.

Those courses offered by division units include a scouting and patrolling school, conducted by the Reconnaissance Battalion, and a Land Mine Warfare Course, given by the Pioneer Battalion. A variety of other classes are supervised by division staff sections such as intelligence, communications, legal, and embarkation. These are held periodically, based on the needs of the division and the training commitments. About 1,400 Marines graduate from this type of school annually.


The nearby Landing Force Training Unit at Coronado, California, helps in the officer schooling program. Convenient use is made of



BGen T.F. Riley
ADC



MajGen H.R. Paige
CG



Col R.E. Honsowetz
Chief of Staff

their Mobile Training Teams. Team presentations are tailored to meet the exact needs of the division. The staff planning course for company grade officers, for example, normally requires three weeks attendance at LFTU. By modifying the course, a mobile training team can train 100 division officers in one week at a cost of \$400, instead of the \$10,000 required to train the same number of officers at Coronado.

Altogether, about 8,000 officers and men attend some type of formal schooling each year in this division.

The Transplacement Program

The transplacement program, begun in January 1959, rotates infantry battalions as units between the 1st and 3dMarDivs. Battalion unit integrity is thus preserved. Not even the battalion designation is changed. The 1stMarDiv provides the outgoing battalion at T/O strength. Marines remain with their battalion until its return to the Division some 15 months later. Upon return, half the battalion is replaced, mainly by recent ITR graduates, for the rest of the 30-month cycle. Six weeks prior to departure and six weeks after the transfer back to Camp Pendleton, each battalion begins an uninterrupted intensive training schedule which permits them to integrate the new Marines. Thus, there are always three battalions of the Division involved in the Transplacement Program.

The latest unit to leave the United States as part of this program was 3/5, with 1/7 soon to follow.

Although the program has presented several problems for the Division, the Division hopes to benefit from the system when 1/1 returns from Okinawa in April 1960. Personnel stability and progressive training improve the readiness of the infantry units involved.


Manpower cutbacks complicated the incipient transplacement program. By July 1959 two infantry battalions, as well as supporting artillery, pioneer and antitank units had been placed in a cadre status. With three battalions of the Division always committed to the transplacement program and two in cadre, only four infantry battalions are available at any one time for major field exercises.




Col J.B. Sweeney
G-1




Col A. Arsenaault
G-2



Col B.T. Kelly
G-3



Col R.M. Wismer
G-4



Col A. Walker
CO 1st Marines



Col T.A. Smoak
CO 5th Marines



Col H.S. Roise
CO 7th Marines




Col E.J. Rouse
CO 11th Marines




Col H.B. Meek
CO Service Bn



LtCol G.E. Martin
Hdqts Comdt



LtCol M.J. Sexton
CO AT Bn



LtCol J.J. Butler
Engineer



Col C.R. Schwenke
Inspector



Col R. Hall
Comm-Elec Officer




Col A.D. Gomez
Air Officer




Col H. Stiff
Director, ECIG




LtCol J.C. Johnston
Adjutant



Capt R.W. Coe
Chaplain



Capt R. Lawrence
Surgeon



Capt J.R. Justice
Dental Officer

Major Exercises

During the period discussed in this article, the Division has participated in three Brigade Exercises and one Division-Wing Exercise. The first of these was PHIBLEX 2-59 held in September 1958. Some 12,000 Marines and naval personnel took part in this amphibious assault on Pendleton beaches.

The Brigade, with the 1st Marines as its nucleus, was commanded by BGen Alpha L. Bowser. A second similar exercise was held during February 1959. Commanded by BGen T. F. Riley, the Landing Force was composed of the 5th Marines, reinforced by 3/7. The rest of the 7th Marines were aggressors. The pre-assault phase included a rehearsal of the landing at San Clemente Island. Coordinated naval gunfire and aerial bombardment softened up the island.

The Camp Pendleton assault began with a diversionary thrust by helicopter-borne Marines from the deck of the USS *Thetis Bay*, the Navy's first helicopter transport (LPH). The brigade, by vertical envelopment, struck deeply into "enemy held" territory, disrupting communications and supply lines. Their mission: prevent aggressors from reinforcing coastal defenses and divert defending forces from the main effort of surface assault forces attacking from the sea by conventional means.

By far the largest, and the culmination of two years of training exercises, was Operation TWIN PEAKS. This was a major fleet amphibious exercise by units of the Pacific Fleet and the Royal Canadian Navy.

The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, commanded by LtGen V. E. Megee, was composed of the 1stMar Div (Reinf), Force Troops, and the 3d MAW. Embarkation, a CPX, a FIREX, rehearsal and movement preceded the assault. Assault landings, including helicopter-landed forces, were made on D-Day in the Camp Pendleton area.

The over-all purposes of this exercise were to improve fleet readiness and to further the evaluation and development of modern fleet amphibious warfare tactics, techniques, and doctrine. Particular emphasis was placed on:

1) Improvement of amphibious

techniques in the conduct of modern amphibious assault.

2) The technique involved in the use of multiple platforms in helicopter assault operations.

3) The early development of airfields in the objective area.

4) The logistical support of a division/wing in an amphibious operation.



The purposes were achieved with the exception of the second. The availability of only one LPH precluded the multi-platform test. However, *Princeton* (LPH 5), in her first major exercise, came through with flying colors. On D-Day, 1,118 troops, 109 vehicles, and 35 tons of cargo were helicopter-lifted ashore in 7 hours and 10 minutes. On D plus two, 62 short tons of supplies were helicopter-lifted ashore in 3 hours and 30 minutes.

The division's main effort during the summer months was in support of the Reserve Training Program. About 95 officers and 2,500 enlisted Marines assisted the reservists in the intense field training that they undergo in their annual visit to Camp Pendleton. Seven reserve units were "hosted" by six battalions of the division. In addition, two battalions of the division trained NROTC midshipmen in the PACNARMID exercises. The reserve program will probably involve greater division participation in the years to come.

In October, another provisional brigade HELILEX was scheduled—Operation EAGLE EYE. Commanded by Col R. B. Wilde, the brigade had as its basic unit the 7th Marines. The staff was formed about the divi-

sion secondary command post organization.

All embarked elements of the Landing Force were landed by helicopter. As part of the exercise, one BLT was air-lifted from MCAS El Toro to Camp Pendleton airfield. The objectives of EAGLE EYE were five-fold:

1) To provide training in all helicopter landing of embarked troops.

2) To provide training in the use of multiple helicopter platforms.

3) To provide training in air-transported operations.

4) To provide training in anti-guerrilla operations.

5) To evaluate the possibilities for simplification of the brigade structure and minimization of brigade headquarters and troop umpire control organization.

In November and December 1/9 held a cold weather landing at Kodiak (COWLEX). Concurrently, the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company conducted a cold weather RECONNEX in the Alaskan area.

Other Activities

A relatively new organization, known as the Exercise Control and Inspection Group (ECIG) was activated in the 1stMarDiv on 20 April, 1956. This unit organizes, plans and conducts the control of field exercises designated by the CG, 1stMar Div (Reinf).

In garrison, ECIG is a skeletal organization of five officers and eight enlisted. It is augmented from the division for the umpire organization of a particular exercise, and operates in the field under the officer designated as Maneuver Director. After each exercise, a report is submitted to the CG on assigned training objectives and control techniques.

Integrated training in the 1stMar Div is continuous at all levels. While the Recon Battalion is landing from a submarine, an infantry battalion may be engaged in a HELILEX. Infantry and artillery team up for a reinforced regimental firing exercise in the desert (DESFEX).

By constant teamwork, the "force in readiness" concept is practiced. The 1stMarDiv (Reinf) is ready.

USMC

REPORT FROM THE READY FORCES

PART TWO

PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE READINESS

By Staff, 1stMarDiv (Reinf)

THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE THE COMBAT readiness of the 1stMarDiv (Reinf) continues daily, with attention to details from the training of the rifleman to the organization of the Division Command Post. A few of these approaches are discussed here, under the headings Marksmanship Training, Communications, the M103A1 Tank, ORTEX, and Mobility and Command.

The first approach to combat readiness in the 1stMar Div (Reinf) is the training of the individual rifleman. This is not new, but unless the reader is an old team-shot, the process of training, evaluation, and selection of shooters may come as a surprise. Marksmanship training, both in the formal program and the live-fire, combat marksmanship courses, is vital.

The diagrams on this page and the next illustrate the point. Figure 1 depicts the 1stMarDiv's annual training cycle for the formal program. The solid black flow lines show how Marines are screened as they become more qualified and more selected at each stage. Broken lines show where non-selected shooters return to their parent organization. The first block is our base—all male Marines must fire the M-1 rifle, and all officers and certain enlisted personnel must fire the .45 caliber pistol annually for qualification.

Block two shows the recreational shooting program. All Marines are encouraged to take part. Block three represents the Division-directed Advanced Marksmanship School. This school consists of selected shooters who, for qualification, fire 230 or better with the M-1 rifle and 350 or better with the pistol and have never fired in a Division Match. After each class graduates, one to five of the top shooters are selected to fire with the 1stMarDiv team. The intramural program encourages all battalions to enter teams in the battalion, regimental, and Division intramural championships. Another source of outstanding shooters is thus tapped.

Tryouts for the Division team are held during March and early April. After about a month of school, instruction, and shooting practice, the better shooters are selected for the

Division Team. This group is made up of the top 20 per cent of the Advanced Marksmanship School, the best shooters from the Division tryouts, and a few distinguished shots held over from the previous year.

Every Marine who makes a Division team is taught how to run a rifle range, coaching and marksmanship. These Marines, upon return to their units, form the nucleus of the coaching and marksmanship instruction staffs.

The Division team fires in the Western Division matches against Marine units from within the western United States area. The winners of the Western Division Matches

compete in the Marine Corps Matches held in June. Winners of Marine Corps Matches plus members of the Marksmanship Training Unit make up the big team of the Marine Corps in the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. This, then, is the annual training cycle of individual and team marksmanship within the 1stMarDiv.

Complementing the formal marksmanship program are the vital live-fire, combat marksmanship training courses. Stemming from the broad annual requalification program directed by CMC are the advanced live-firing problems which fall just short of actual combat situations.




Figure 2 illustrates the infantry live fire combat ready training cycle used by the 1stMarDiv(Reinf).

After requalification, Marines from infantry units, and from other units at the discretion of the COs, are instructed, trained, and fire the individual combat ranges for the M-1 rifle and .45 caliber pistol. The pistol combat course and the Individual Combat Marksmanship Course for the M-1 rifle (ICMC) have pop-up and moving targets. These are electronically controlled and automatically score the number of hits. Block two indicates the requalification and familiarization firing of the most important weapon in the fire team, squad, and rifle platoon—the Browning Automatic Rifle. After this firing, the BAR men again fire the ICMC with the BAR. Block three shows that after annual individual requalification with the rifle, those Marines manning the crew-served infantry weapons (3.5" rockets, machine guns, mortars and 106mm recoilless rifle) fire requalification and familiarization on live firing ranges. These Marines may, with unit CO approval, fire the ICMC with the M-1 rifle.


As the known distance range is the basis of the annual requalification program, the ICMC is the beginning of the Marine's training to become a competent member of the fire

team, the squad, and the rifle platoon. This range introduces the Marine to conditions as close to combat as possible, short of actual warfare.

From the ICMC, the Marine rifle squad receives training as a unit, firing at electronically controlled, pop-up, moving and fixed targets similar to the targets of the ICMC. Here, with noise and confusion to simulate combat, the NCO leaders of the fire teams and squads must show leadership and make tactical decisions to accomplish the mission given by the platoon leader.

From the squad firing problems of ranges 219 and 309, the Marines go to platoon live firing problems (see

Block 6), conducted on range 408. Here the organic crew-served weapons of the company and battalion can provide support. After this problem, the rifle company (Block 7) conducts a live-firing problem on combat range 408 with battalion supporting weapons, the supporting arms of the Division (Block 8) and close air support from the 3d MAW for realism. This concludes the live-fire training cycle. The infantry unit is war combat ready in this aspect of its training. Firing problems conducted by the battalions as well as repetition of the various phases of the cycle, maintain the proficiency of the individual and the unit.



Communications: OE pick up of vital messages.

Communications


The Provisional series of T/O's substitute radio relay equipment for wire between the widely dispersed battalions and regiments. The success of this concept varies directly with the distances involved and the type of terrain over which the units operate. In actual practice, the tactics of the Division had to be modified to meet the capabilities of the present radio relay equipment. This meant, in effect, that the units could not be dispersed as far apart as conditions warranted. The AN/ARC 27 radio relay set has helped. The Division is now using six of these sets (a training allowance) for communications between regiments and battalions. They are used as much as possible in operator and technician training. Soon, the replacement

of some conventional, double sideband AM radio sets by the newer, single sideband AN/MRC 83 radio equipment is expected to fulfill the requirements of the dispersed landing concept. Among the tests of this new type radio set are distance checks between Camp Pendleton and the Marine Corps Base at 29 Palms, and between Camp Pendleton and Kodiak, Alaska. The latter is about 2,000 nautical miles. The eight-channel, super-high frequency, team pack radio relay set (AN/TRC 27), and the 1,000 watt, peak envelope power, single sideband radio set (AN/MRC 83) will help insure more rapid, reliable, and secure command and control communication in our modern doctrine of amphibious operations.

The M103A1 120mm Gun Heavy Tank

In November, 1958, the 1st Tank Bn was directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to test the M103A1 Heavy Tank. The test began upon receipt of the tanks in April 1959. Three broad areas of evaluation were considered:

- 1) The infantry support role.
- 2) Tactical, training, and logistical problems.
- 3) The desirability of organizing



Radio relay gear will replace wire in the dispersed landing concept.

a composite tank battalion consisting of heavy and medium tanks.

The conclusions generally favored the 62-ton heavy gun tank over the 49-ton M48A1 medium tank. For example, in the infantry support role, the heavy gun tank can provide better support for the infantry than any medium tank now in the Marine Corps. This is due mainly to the accurate, long range, high velocity, super-destructive 120mm gun in the anti-tank role. Tactical, training or logistical problems at

the tank battalion level can be solved by more gunnery training and a minor revision to the Table of Organization. More personnel are needed to handle the larger ammunition of the 120mm gun.

In amphibious operations in which the heavy tank was used, it met every requirement. Landing over causeways presented no difficulty. In Operation TWIN PEAKS it came ashore in a LVT-UX-2, the "Goliath"—an experimental, full tracked, amphibian vehicle with a capacity of 63 tons.



M103A1 Heavy Tank, with its lethal 120mm gun, is well-liked in anti-tank, infantry support roles.

ORTEX

To maintain operational readiness in mounting out, the 1stMarDiv periodically conducts Operational Readiness Test Exercises (ORTEX) on the reinforced rifle company and the BLT level.

What is an ORTEX? It is a surprise exercise designed to test operational readiness for mounting out reinforced rifle companies and BLT's of this Division on short notice.

Here's an example. Without notice a battalion or company commander is suddenly directed to mount out by air or sea for immediate employment at some distant spot. Just what does this mean? The commander must be briefed on his mission and make his plans for mounting out in order to execute the assigned mission. Confronting the commander and his staff is a mass of details, each of which needs immediate attention.

Personnel problems include: determining eligibility of personnel on rolls for mounting out; recalling those on leave; transferring those ineligible to go; submitting personnel requirements to higher echelon; joining new arrivals; insuring all records are up to date; issuing necessary orders; making out allotments; and providing for the manifold details involved in the personal affairs of each Marine, i.e. wills, powers of attorney, insurance, etc., *ad in-*

finitum.

Intelligence information, maps, photographs and data for the commander to execute his mission are needed.

Logistics problems at least equal those for personnel: supplies and equipment must be requisitioned and prepared for embarkation; weapons and vehicles must be inspected; baggage, supplies, vehicles and equipment must be assembled and staged; excess supplies, equipment and personal baggage must be disposed of; and once the target area is set, arrangements must be made for immunization of all hands.

Communications equipment and personnel must be obtained; move-

ment reports must be made and appropriate cryptographic material and the personnel to operate it must be obtained.

Each individual Marine is faced with a score of considerations: disposition of excess clothing and personal property including automobiles; allotment of pay to dependents; change of address cards; all outstanding obligations settled.

The dependents of each Marine involved in an ORTEX probably have as many details to consider as the Marine himself; decisions as to disposition of the family, if it is decided to move them; transportation arrangements; living quarters vacated; other quarters located; arrangements for school for children; shipment of household effects; and the myriad of details incident to the closing, moving and reopening of a household considered.

This program of ORTEX began in early 1958 on the reinforced rifle company level. Since then, ORTEX's have been conducted for BLT's. These early exercises showed a need for wider participation in planning by commanders, staff sections and Marines and their dependents. Each ORTEX has identified problems that need the attention of all concerned.

Division Operation, Administrative and Embarkation Plans issued for ORTEX's have been revised to correct existing deficiencies. In addition, a new Division Order includes a check-off list for each staff section to insure that problem areas are fully covered during the planning and conduct of all ORTEX's.



ORTEX: Immediate mounting out by Air or Sea . . .



. . . For immediate employment at some distant spot.

These lists are reviewed after each ORTEX.

During the past two years ORTEX's by air lift have been successfully conducted by reinforced rifle companies. This phase of training is being expanded to include units of BLT size. Because of limited fixed wing transport, current ORTEX mounting-out plans have been modified. All major problems including those of task organization, supplies and equipment to be em-

barked, and total air lift requirements, have been identified and explored. The basic planning has been completed and all that remains to be done is to implement such plans into ORTEX's by air lift at all levels up to RLT.


ORTEX's serve to improve the planning and execution techniques of mounting out by this Division and its component elements. All commanders, staff sections, Marines and their dependents must be pre-

pared to expect a mount out on short notice by surface or air means. ORTEX serves as a constant reminder that as a force in readiness we must always be prepared for mounting out quickly, efficiently and on short notice for a mission at some distant spot on the globe. As a result, all plans are kept current, all procedures are continually reviewed and thinking on the part of all hands is oriented towards rapid, efficient mounting out. This contributes to operational readiness.

Mobility and Command

The city of tents lies camouflaged in a well protected valley. Helicopters sit quietly on their landing pads. The functioning of the division command post continues smoothly. Suddenly the stillness is shattered by a large explosion. A cloud of black smoke marks the spot where the enemy artillery round struck. Will the next round have an atomic warhead? One cannot wait to find out. It is necessary to move and move fast. The command post becomes a beehive of activity. A small group of figures emerges and moves toward the helicopters—the CG and key members of his staff leaving for the alternate command post. As the helicopters depart, a small group of vehicles leaves the command post.

The general sits impatiently in the helicopter as it vibrates through the air. A few more minutes and he will be at the alternate command post from which he can control his division. Suddenly the helicopter receives a severe jolt. The pilot points off to the west, there, in the vicinity of the alternate CP rises a telltale mushroom of smoke. The general quickly consults with his G-3, then gives the pilot swift directions. A message is flashed as the helicopter turns to the north. In a matter of minutes, the general sees the small column of vehicles moving rapidly along the twisting country road beneath him. The helicopters circle a small field and land. The column of vehicles disperses in the shelter of a small adjoining grove and several jeeps bump across the unplowed field to the helicopter. The general descends and, as he climbs into the jeep, asks the usual, "What's the situation?" As the jeep moves to-



Main CP Tactical Party in a static situation.

ward the grove, he receives a quick briefing and in return, issues several orders which are rapidly sent to the concerned units.

We hope the above situation never happens. But we must be prepared to move and to move fast.

All Marine Divisions normally operate with a primary command post and secondary command post. This assures command control of the division during displacements and when the primary command post is under enemy attack. But two command posts, while they increase flexibility, do not increase mobility.

Many field exercises and CPX's showed a definite need for better mobility of the main command post. The command post had too many people, too many vehicles and too much equipment for rapid displacement. It took too long to dismantle

the CP, move, and reestablish it in a new location. Personnel and impedimenta had to be reduced and non-essential activity eliminated if mobility was to be increased.

The first step was an over-all study to determine the personnel and equipment to be included in each CP—primary, secondary, and administrative. From this study came a redistribution of personnel and equipment, generally from the main CP to the administrative CP. This move "lightened the load" of the Main CP. The study also showed that certain personnel and equipment in the main CP required for continuous round-the-clock operation were not necessary if operations were to be conducted for a relatively short time only.

This gave birth to another study which attacked the problem from a



Packaged CP operates from 1½-ton trailer equipped with black-out curtains, wiring and lighting fixtures.

new direction. What personnel and equipment were required for command control of the division? First, of course, was the Commanding General. With a small group of staff officers, in a matter of minutes, he could go by helicopter to the secondary CP and control the division. What additional personnel and equipment are essential? Communications, operators to man them, and certain staff personnel for basic operations and planning were a must. In addition to the general and his small group, tests showed that about 16 officers and 105 enlisted Marines could maintain command control. This party consisted primarily of members of the G-3 Section, G-2 Section, FSCC, the Communications Company, CEO, and the Provost Marshal. This party was called the Main CP Tactical Party. What communications equipment is needed for continuing control under all conditions and circumstances? The nets shown in Figure 3 were found essential:

Using jeep-mounted radios as much as possible, it was found that the communications vehicles needed were: 12 radio jeeps, a radio central trailer and a cryptographic van. Certain other communications equipment came in trailers, cargo jeeps, or by man pack.

The next problem was to organize for continuous operation of this Main CP Tactical Party in a static situation, in displacement, and independently of the main CP. The physical arrangement of this hard core of the main CP was easy but better mobility was required. As a result, arrangement and mobility were considered jointly.

In the search for new and different approaches to the problem, the several regiments and separate battalions were invited to display their respective CP arrangements to the other units of the division and members of the division staff. At a "County Fair" each of the units set up its CP, displaying any innovations. This procedure was quite successful. The units and members of the staff gained many ideas for their own CP's and CP functioning. A few of the better ideas concerned the packaging of equipment, installation of lighting systems, new ways of mounting map boards, and the use of trailers for working spaces.

Division Command #1
Division Command #2
Division Reconnaissance
Division NGF Tactical
Division NGF Support
Tactical Air Request
Division Tactical
Division Alert and Broadcast
Division Air Observation #1
Division Air Observation #2
Force (Naval) Command and Tactical nets (as required)
Artillery Regiment Command/Fire Direction

Figure 3

Particular interest was evidenced in a one and one-half ton cargo trailer that was equipped with a light tubular framework capable of extension to provide support for a working space of 20'x7'. A tailored canvas covering provided fully blacked-out space. This ingenious ar-

range was completely equipped—wiring and lighting fixtures installed, built-in fixtures for radios and other equipment. This trailer seems to be suitable, with modifications, for use as combat operations center in the Main CP Tactical Party. Two such trailers end to end provide a 40'x7' working space. The beds of the trailers are used for radio and clerical functions.

As a result of the studies, the ideas gained from the County Fair of CP's, and considerable experimentation, this division has organized and equipped a Main CP Tactical Party able to operate continuously in command control at a halt or on the move, as part of the main CP, or independently.

In its final organization, the Tactical Party has 16 officers and 105 enlisted personnel carried in 23 vehicles. The party can now completely dismantle its installation and be on the road to a new location in 30 minutes. It can function while on the move or from a temporary stop enroute to a new CP location. Because of its size and mobility, it can operate from places where the main CP cannot locate. It has been found that, with such a Tactical Party, command control of the 1st MarDiv is more flexible and mobile. This is a solution to the problem in the first part of this article.

The current arrangement and organization of the main CP Tactical Party is not the ultimate. The 1st MarDiv is constantly restudying the problem, searching for additional ideas, and trying to better the methods, organization, and equipment for the exercise of command control of the Division.

USMC

GOOD HEAD

LEFT IS RIGHT

I CERTAINLY HAD THE BUM DOPE ABOUT LEO JIL-lisky's accident. I had heard that after the other F8U pulled up into the bottom of Leo's airplane, Leo had subsequently wrecked his airplane while landing it and thus had hurt himself. This wasn't so. The other pilot was probably killed instantly from the violence of the collision. The force was so great that it broke Leo's back, primarily by bobbing his head down toward his chest. When Leo regained consciousness he found himself in the traffic pattern (where the accident occurred). He didn't know that his F8U had been jolted upwards by about 90 degrees, nor did he know exactly what had happened. He did know that his airplane was badly damaged. It's probably a good thing that he didn't know how bad things were, or he might have ejected. The force of the ejection seat would probably have finished the job on his broken back and we might have lost Leo. Typically, though, he decided to land the airplane. He raised the wing and brought it around, not daring to get too slow, because he had no idea what the stalling speed might be with his damaged wing. He landed at about 180 knots, but got it stopped with no strain, although he blew a tire on landing. He then pulled it off the runway, where he found that he couldn't talk and that he was partially paralyzed. He's in good shape now and we hope he'll soon be completely back with the program. The discovery of his name on the new Light Colonel's list probably didn't delay his recovery.

I think that it was Leo who first pointed out to me

**The Thinking Tiger
bestows his highest
accolade "Good Head"
for ideas that make good
Marine pilots better. Send
ideas c/o GAZETTE.**




that in our jet airplanes it is easier to make a left turn than it is to turn right. I'm sure that it was I who told him why this is true.

The jet engine can be likened to a giant gyroscope. All modern United States jet engines spin clockwise (viewed from astern). If such an engine is rotated while it is spinning, it will produce a torque which will be applied to the aircraft. For positive "g" turns, this torque will be a straight right yawing torque and its value is given by the angular momentum of the jet engine times the turn rate of the aircraft (in radians per second). For instance, if the F9F-8 is rotated at about 12 degrees per second, a right yawing torque of about 1,900 foot-pounds is generated. To compensate for this torque, a force of about 10 pounds is required on the left rudder. It's easy to see why left turns are easier to make than are right turns. It's also easy enough to see why a loft bombing pilot will drop his bombs to starboard if he doesn't use the left rudder during the pull-up. (It's theoretically possible to compensate for a yaw using aileron only, but it's much simpler to use left rudder.) It's also much easier to make a gunnery run in a left turn. When you're turning right, the nose just tends to drop because of the gyroscopic torque effect.

This yawing torque caused by turning out jets is the same in the Northern or Southern Hemisphere. There's another marvelous force which reverses depending upon what hemisphere you're in. Maybe the GAZETTE will let us discuss that sometime.

USMC



LEGISLATION

PAST, PRESENT and MAYBE

By LtCol J. R. Blandford, USMCR

PROBABLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT action of the first session of the 86th Congress, insofar as Marine Corps officers are concerned, was the enactment of Public Law 86-155, a bill "to provide improved opportunity for promotion for certain officers in the Naval service, and for other purposes," more commonly referred to as the "hump" legislation.

The "hump" consists of a large number of officers (more than 1/3 of all regular Marine officers) who were originally commissioned in WWII. They are all contemporaries from the view-point of age, years of service, and experience, and include 3/5 of the majors and practically all of the lieutenant colonels.

No single piece of personnel legislation in recent years has aroused as much interest, and controversy—and confusion—as the hump legislation.

The problem facing the Marine Corps prior to the enactment of the hump legislation was to fit 1,940 regular majors into 435 lieutenant colonel vacancies over the next five years and ultimately to fit 3,000 regular lieutenant colonels and majors into 580 colonels' billets.

Without enactment of the hump legislation the attrition rate from major to lieutenant colonel would have reached 75 per cent. Stated in a less delicate manner, 75 out of every 100 majors coming up for selection in the next few years would have failed of selection had the hump legislation not been enacted into law.

There were many suggested solutions to this problem. Extra numbers in grade were discarded early in the consideration of the matter as being indefensible. The hump legislation was "a" solution, and in the opinion of many was "the" only solution.

In the Marine Corps twice-passed-over colonels and lieutenant colonels made the sacrifice of years of active

duty provided by law in order that regular Marine Corps majors could be promoted with a reasonable attrition rate of only 30 per cent. Also, a reasonable attrition rate of approximately 40 per cent for promotion from lieutenant colonel to colonel could be maintained.

Prior to the enactment of the hump legislation, a Marine colonel, after having been selected to that grade, had every reason to anticipate 30 years of total commissioned service, while a lieutenant colonel had every reason to anticipate 26 years of total commissioned service.

The hump legislation in effect said that a colonel twice failed of selection to the next higher grade



would be retired within a year notwithstanding the provision of law which had previously stated that he could serve until he had completed 30 years of commissioned service. Not all twice-passed-over colonels, however, would be retired. Some would be retained. In the Marine Corps 20 per cent of the twice-passed-over colonels have been selected for retention. Once selected, these officers are not again subject to the proceedings of a retention board and will complete their 30 years of commissioned service, unless selected to a higher grade.

On the other hand, no twice-passed-over lieutenant colonels are being retained in the Marine Corps except those who have not yet completed 20 years of commissioned service.

The hump legislation also contained a special provision for Marine Corps majors which remains effective until December 31, 1964. In effect, the special provision permits

the Marine Corps to dispense with the creation of promotion zones in those years when it is not necessary to create vacancies in the grade of major or it is not possible to involuntarily retire those majors who have twice failed of selection with 20 years of commissioned service. Instead, zones of consideration will be established, in lieu of promotion zones. This permits a readjustment of seniority in lineal position for those selected to the next higher grade without assessing a legal pass-over penalty for those not selected.

Twice-passed-over Marine Corps officers who are now serving in the grade of colonel and who leave active duty involuntarily before completing 30 years of service will be paid a lump sum payment of \$2,000. In addition, lieutenant colonels who have twice failed of selection and who leave active duty before completing 26 years of active commissioned service will receive a similar lump sum payment. This payment, in the form of readjustment pay, is intended to compensate in part for the loss of active duty pay that accrues to officers who are retired prior to completing the years of service originally contemplated.

It is interesting to observe, however, that this payment *only* applies to colonels or lieutenant colonels now serving on active duty or those on promotion lists for promotion to one of these grades who are not thereafter recommended for promotion to a higher grade. In other words, the \$2,000 payment will not accrue to the benefit of an individual who is now serving as a major and who is hereafter promoted to the grade of lieutenant colonel and then fails twice of selection to the grade of colonel.

It must be remembered that these officers in all likelihood would not have been promoted to lieutenant colonel had it not been for the enactment of the hump legislation.

In spite of the complicated personnel features of the hump legislation, a Senate amendment to the bill as it passed the House undoubtedly created more controversy than any other feature of the hump legislation. This provision of the hump legislation, Section 9 of Public Law 86-155, repealed, effective 1 November 1959, the provision of law which

authorized the advancement to the next higher grade upon retirement of Navy and Marine Corps officers especially commended for performance of duty in combat prior to January 1, 1947. (This law did not apply to Army and Air Force officers.) This was the so-called "tombstone promotion" provision. As a result of its repeal, effective 1 November 1959, many officers applied for voluntary retirement in order to be advanced on the retired list to the next higher honorary grade.

The "hump" legislation is scheduled to expire on 1 July 1965. Whether or not it will be extended, modified, or whether the old 30 and 26 years' provisions of the Officer Personnel Act will be restored can not now be predicted.

Pending

Of possible future interest to a small number of Marine officers is a bill which has passed the House on previous occasions and is pending in the Senate, dealing with the number of officers who may serve in the grade of lieutenant general in time of peace in the Marine Corps. There are at present five lieutenant generals serving on active duty in the Marine Corps. Should the emergency be terminated by the President, the Marine Corps would be authorized to have only two lieutenant generals. The proposed legislation would authorize the Marine Corps to have five lieutenant generals serving on active duty at all times. The Department of Defense has recommended enactment of the proposed legislation, and the bill has passed the House. In the last Congress a similar bill passed the House but no action was taken in the Senate.

Pending in the House, on the other hand, is S. 1795 which has passed the Senate. This is a bill which would revise certain provisions of law relating to the promotion and involuntary retirement of officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

This bill, for practical purposes, is an Army-Air Force measure but it might well be of interest to Marine officers in the future. It will probably receive early consideration by the House. In effect, the bill permits the Secretaries of the military services to convene boards for the continuation on active duty of majors,

LtCol Blandford entered the US Marine Corps Reserve through the PLC program in 1937. Ordered to active duty in September '41, he was released to inactive duty in March '46. He served with the 11th Marines as a forward observer, and artillery LNO in the Guadalcanal and New Britain campaigns. A graduate of Hobart College and Yale Law School, he has been counsel for the House Committee on Armed Services since January, 1947.



lieutenant colonels, and colonels who have completed 20 years or more of active duty with a view toward selecting for involuntary retirement those who have twice failed of selection. The bill is intended to provide greater quality control for the armed services and could well become effective in the Marine Corps after the hump legislation expires on 30 June 1965.

Under this bill not more than 20 per cent of twice-passed-over colonels and lieutenant colonels could be involuntarily retired in any one year, but this would be an annual plucking operation. Officers once considered and retained would not ac-



quire immunity from consideration by succeeding retention boards. However, for the present, the measure, if enacted, is basically intended for use by the Army and Air Force.

UCMJ

Of final interest to Marines are pending amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee has been appointed under the chairmanship of the Honorable Paul Kilday of Texas, to consider these proposed amendments. A Department of Defense measure has been introduced which, if enacted into law, will bring about certain basic changes in the Code.

Briefly, the proposed legislation would increase the Commanding Officer's non-judicial punishment authority by authorizing the Commanding Officer to impose a forfeiture of one-half of two months' pay on an officer if such a punishment is

awarded by an officer with general court martial jurisdiction.

But of greater significance is a provision which would permit commanding officers in non-judicial punishment to impose a forfeiture of one-half of one month's pay upon enlisted personnel, providing the punishment is imposed by a field grade or general officer.

In addition, the proposed legislation will give to Commanding Officers the authority to confine for seven consecutive days as non-judicial punishment if the punishment is imposed by a field grade or general officer.

There is also a provision dealing with the creation of one-man special courts martial which could considerably expedite the administration of military justice. Such a single-officer special court martial must be a qualified lawyer and he must, in addition, be certified by the Judge Advocate General of his respective service as qualified.

There are many other technical changes recommended in the Department of Defense proposal, but the increased authority of the Commanding Officer in the awarding of non-judicial punishment is undoubtedly the most significant.

Appropriations

Of final interest to Marines is the annual Appropriation Act. Again, as in previous sessions, the Congress may provide funds for a larger Marine Corps than that approved by the Executive Branch. This year may see a more complete discussion of the constitutional prerogatives of executive and legislative branches of Government.

The second session of the 86th Congress will be a busy one, and it may be an extremely important session from the Marine Corps' viewpoint.

USMC



HOW CASTRO WON

By Dickey Chapelle

Photo illustrations by the author

✿ JUST WEST OF GUANTANAMO CITY lies a bend in the Central Highway which is a text-book ambush site—a horseshoe of asphalt almost a mile from end to end lined every yard on both sides by steep ridges thick with jungle growth. One hot morning early in December, 1958, the curve was ready for its fate. At each end, several 200-pound mines lay under the road surface and near them, a hidden *rebelde* rested with sweaty hands close to the plunger. Seven light machine guns were emplaced in the greenery of the rocky slope, the nearest 40 yards from the road and the most distant almost on top of the ridge. More than 200 riflemen, many with automatic weapons,



The eyewitness story of small unit actions.

were dug in, two and three to a hole, along the rise.

But the bearded officer, *Capitane* Jose Valla, who before the war had been a traffic clerk in an import firm, was not satisfied.

His people had been manning this ambush site now for thirteen days, and in that time they had eaten thirteen meals. So he did not think they were alert any more. As he walked his lines, he told them they could expect to be hit at any hour now by a column of Batista's troops many hundred strong. Other rebel forces were besieging one of the government's fortresses, that in the town of La Maya ten miles farther west, and he predicted a relief column would

be dispatched to them from the army garrison at Guantanamo City.

But the captain was increasingly aware that he had given these same troops this same word every other morning on the site, too.

So today he decided to change the disposition of his forces.

He sent 40 riflemen and an LMG with its crew two miles up the road. There was an ambush spot there, too, a bush-covered slope lining the left of the road for a thousand yards. His orders to this advance guard he repeated twice. They were to hide in the jungle grass, fire on the relief column when it was at the point nearest them, then leapfrog in three's and four's back through the cane fields to the main ambush area,

keeping the convoy under fire only as long as they could do it without exposing themselves.

"That will do no harm and make enough noise so everyone will be wide awake before we're really hit," he finished.

Just before noon, the enemy column did appear. There was a lead jeep, an armored car, a tank, three busses heavily loaded with troops, a rear-guard jeep—and one element the captain had not thought about, air cover. Two Cuban Air Force B-26's were flying wide figure 8's along the road at an altitude of about 1,000 feet.

The rebels of the advance guard, well concealed behind chunky bushes and wide-bladed grass, opened fire. The machine gunner accounted for the driver and the officer in the lead jeep and a burst from a BAR killed three soldiers in the front seat of the first bus. The convoy halted dead in the road. A handful of soldiers in the crowded busses wrestled their weapons into firing position but they could not see a target. Neither could the tank crew, slowly traversing their 75mm.

Nor could the men in the B-26's. But they knew the fire had come from the green hillside and they began to strafe it from end to end. They so persistently stitched back and forth that the rebels one by one looked quickly up, hesitated and then fell back behind their concealment. A half dozen began to empty their weapons at the planes. One B-26 gunner opened fire with his 20 mm. He hit downslope from the rebels, and most of them continued to empty clip after clip at the stalled convoy.

The men in the driverless bus panicked and fled back through the ditches to the cover of nearby cane fields; a score dropped their rifles as they ran and three fell wounded or dying. The drivers of the other two busses backed them for perhaps 50 yards, loaded the men who had been hit, then U-turned and jinked back. The tank and armored car drivers U-turned where they were to cover the busses. Then the whole column, leaving only the two wrecked vehicles, was grinding out, faster and faster, to the east.



It was all over in a matter of minutes—all over, that is, but for the verbal pyrotechnics of the rebel captain when the leader of his advance guard reported. The captain pulled him behind the deserted building of a *cantina* near the main ambush site.

"My orders were that you should fire and withdraw, *fire and withdraw!*" he shouted over and over at his red-faced junior.

"We would have, we would have, my captain, but that we had no cover from the B-26 and—" the lieutenant began.

"Your excuse shames our dead!" the captain interrupted. "If you had done what I told you to do, we would have captured the whole convoy," he went on, rocking on his toes. "This way, what do we have? Two wrecks and some blood on the Central Highway! And that is all there is to show—for 13 days of waiting!"

He opened his hands and put them over his bearded face. The lieutenant turned and walked slowly out of the yard of the deserted *cantina*.

Capt Valle probably stated the net tactical gain to the rebel campaign correctly. But to a looker-on and possibly to the historians, the action was more significant. It was almost a vignette of the Cuban revolution, an answer to the question: how did Castro's riflemen time and again turn back Batista's tanks and planes?

My own conclusion was that they earned all the real estate by making every mistake in the book—but *one*. They consistently delivered a high volume of fire. After they started shooting, they rarely let anything—the enemy's reaction or their own commander's orders—stop them from continuing to fire until there was nothing left to fire on.

They barely aimed and they did not conserve ammunition. But they unmistakably communicated their will to fight to an enemy whose superior equipment was unmatched by the will to use it.

Here is a report from the Cuban fighting:

Personnel

The forces of Castro at the time I knew them moved and fired as an army, not a band or mob. Fidel estimated there were 7300 in uniform (blue or green cotton drill fatigues) by the third week of December. They were directly supported by an equal number of personnel under military orders whose duties included work in towns still policed by Batista and who hence wore civilian clothing. One in ten of the fighters was a non-Cuban—Dominican, Mexican, Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, Argentinian. About one in twenty was a woman; except for one sniper platoon, the women in uniform were non-combatants who did housekeeping and supply assignments.

The basic unit of the rebel army

was a 40-man platoon commanded by a second lieutenant. The rebels insisted there were no differences in rate among the non-officer personnel; in practice, I noticed many "natural NCO's" with their own following of from six to a dozen men. The officer ranks were the same as US ranks up to major, or *comandante*, still the highest rank in the Cuban military forces. (The single star on the Cuban prime minister's epaulets today signifies this rank, as it did during the fighting.) In the field, I worked with the command groups of three majors beside the Castros. Each led about 500 men and 20-odd officers.

This simplified table of organization was reflected in the division of responsibilities. What we consider S-1 functions were almost entirely carried out by the senior officer or his top aides personally. The S-2 and S-4 work was done by men in mufti. This left the uniformed forces the single primary concern of operations.

The staffs had no problems of pay—no pay, hence no problem—or of recruitment, since there were more would-be *Fidelistas* than rifles with which to arm them. The sure method by which a volunteer became a *barbudo* was to disarm one of Batista's soldiers (by force or purchase) and hike into a Castro command post with his rifle, ammo and canteen. One boy of 15 had to be accepted when he reported with a BAR which he insisted he had gotten the hard way.

More than half the *rebelde* fighters I knew had been field hands in the cane fields or coffee plantations of Oriente Province. But a high proportion of the others had city backgrounds and white collar experience, so the over-all literacy rate was very high for Cuba. Probably the most capable battalion officer (now G-3 of the Cuban Rebel Army) was *Comandante* Antonio Lusson, whose family owns a large cane plantation near to the Castro family's own fields.

Most of the enlisted men I knew had undergone a basic training stint of from two to four months in the most remote reaches of the Sierra Maestre mountains. They had learned scouting and patrolling there (one had a copy of FM 21 75



Return of prisoners at border check-point near Santiago de Cuba.



Rebel camp on outskirts of La Maya. Chicken house used for shelter is thatched with jungle palms.

in his pack) but the primary purpose of the training obviously was to condition the men to extended periods of hunger and fatigue, to find out which would literally rather fight than eat. Not many had learned to use their weapons effectively nor to maintain them in the field; those who had became prized men. But the *barbudos* almost without exception had developed a genuine *esprit de corps*.

The wide dissimilarity of military capability among them was probably less significant than the one common motivation. All Castro's fighting men were terror victims to the extent that they believed they would be killed if they went back to their homes while Batista remained in power. I knew dozens who showed me what they said were marks of torture on their bodies, or who told me how they had buried the bullet-riddled bodies of their fathers, sons or brothers.

"I always knew Latins could hate that much, but not that they could hate that long," is a comment I have heard about them. One explanation is the conviction most of them expressed that they as individuals could not expect to live if they did

not destroy the *Batistianos* who were then still policing their home communities.

The other side of the coin—the personal motivation of government forces—was a particular target of psychological assault from the first.

Before I left the US, the Castro underground in New York briefed me on the tactics this way: "We return prisoners without even intimidating them. We do not exchange them, you understand; not one of ours has ever been returned in the field. But we just disarm our enemies when we capture them and send them back through the Cuban Red Cross."

I was cynical about this claim and once in Cuba, I remarked to a rebel officer that I would be much surprised to see unintimidated, unwounded prisoners being returned, not exchanged, in the middle of a shooting war. This remark was a mistake.

That same evening, I watched the surrender of hundreds of *Batistianos* from a small town garrison. They were gathered within a hollow square of rebel Tommy gunners and harangued by Raul Castro:

"We hope that you will stay with

us and fight against the master who so ill-used you. If you decide to refuse this invitation—and I am not going to repeat it—you will be delivered to the custody of the Cuban Red Cross tomorrow. Once you are under Batista's orders again, we hope that you will not take up arms against us. But, if you do, remember this—

"We took you this time. We can take you again. And when we do, we will not frighten or torture or kill you, any more than we are doing to you at this moment. If you are captured a second time or even a third by us, we will again return you exactly as we are doing now."

This expression of utter contempt for the fighting potential of the defeated had an almost physical impact on them. Some actually flinched as they listened.

The following day, I could not question that these men were returned unharmed. I counted 242 across a border check-point marked by two burned-out car wrecks overlooking Santiago de Cuba.

On the matter of casualty figures overall for the two years of active fighting, I came to accept Castro's estimate of 1,000 rebel dead because



Head bowed, Castro receives rebel casualty report.



Lt Cipriano—typical Fidelista platoon leader.

I was able to verify personally that the rebel dead announced for the actions I saw were correct. (But an even more important and still controversial casualty figure is the rebel total loss from terrorism in the cities rather than military operations in the country. This is believed to be more than 10,000 over a five-year period.)

Intelligence

The *Fidelista* combat intelligence was superb. The Batista command-

ers could not go to the head without a perspiring runner arriving a few minutes later to tell Castro about it. Most of the informants were volunteers—farmers or villagers.

While the bulk of such reports was hardly marked by accuracy, Fidel himself placed the greatest reliance on them. The night we met for the first time, he and his command group were standing within 600 yards of where a huge enemy patrol was searching for him. I assumed he was there to command an

action to hit the patrol or cut it off.

"Oh, no," he explained. "It's too big. They are coming through the woods in a body, with men in pairs on either side. When the nearest pair is a few hundred meters away, people will tell me and we will leave."

Enemy scouts did in fact come in ten minutes after his departure. In their asperity, they burned to the ground the farmer's house beside which he had been conferring. The farmer became a fighting *Fidelista*



Rebels nonchalantly strolling streets of La Maya after government defenders threw up their arms.



Dickey Chappelle left, with camera, is a woman reporter. She covered the battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa; since has covered four post-war revolutions. Her reports have appeared in *Life*, *SatEvePost*, *Pageant* and *Argosy*. Here is what she said about the accompanying article: "I watched the action I have described as a reporter for the *Reader's Digest* attached to Castro's forces between Thanksgiving and Christmas of 1958. Of the seven infantry columns operating in Cuba then, I eventually covered two in combat, the one commanded by Fidel south of the Central Highway and the other under his brother, Raul, to the north of the road. Before I left I was able to eyewitness five actions: the surrender at Alto Songo, the siege of La Maya, the burning of the San Luis *cuartel*, the mortar barrage at Maffo and the assault at Jiguani.

"I think it is material to point out that the Castro command did everything they could to help my work. They imposed no censorship.

"One handicap to an observer was the lack of communication between rebel units, notably front and rear. Most officers had been conspirators before they were infantrymen, and they did not expect or receive any more information than was absolutely necessary for their immediate missions. So I knew of *what* *who* and *where* was often accurate, and that about *how* or *why* largely rumor."

before the ashes of his house had cooled, bringing a Springfield rifle he had kept buried apparently for just this eventuality.

One tradition of the Castro forces had a special usefulness to their intelligence—the matter of the beards. The nucleus of the Castro forces grew them because there were no razors on Pico Turquino where they hid. But in time the beards served as an identification device. When you saw a man with a six-month growth of hair and whiskers, you could be sure he had not been in contact with the Batista soldiery for a long time, since to them a beard was cause for summary arrest.

Operations

During the early months of the fighting, the only military tactic used by the rebels was to ambush small government patrols for their weapons. As the patrols grew larger, the *rebelde* underground furnished mines, and the *Fidelistas* were able to turn back several punitive thrusts made at them in the mountains by ringing their strongholds with the mines.

Their experience in stopping movement along roads and trails led to the tactic by which they won much of Oriente Province. Its general objective was to isolate the government garrisons by halting *all* surface traffic. The rebels blew up the railroad bridges first, then mined the side roads and finally the main artery across Cuba, the Central Highway. They halted and burned every bus,

car and truck; even today, the wreckage of this phase of the campaign still litters the ditches. Non-combatants were walked at gunpoint back to wherever they came from—except for those abducted, including the US servicemen and technicians held for 27 days in July of 1958.


By early December, the roads and most of the countryside had come under rebel control after dark; by daylight, nothing moved but Batista's forces in not less than company strength and usually with tanks and air cover.

But most town and village *cuartels* were still fully garrisoned, and the

government controlled the built-up areas.

Against them, Castro's forces used three kinds of offensive action: combat patrols, assault and encirclement. But each of these terms is only correct in the most limited sense.

The patrols were night marches, off the roads, of one or two platoons with the objective of shaking up a garrison behind its concrete walls. Weapons included rifles, BARs, Tommy guns and one or two LMG. On one patrol, the men brought an 81mm mortar with five rounds for it. On another, they carried a 20mm cannon recovered from a wrecked



Outside La Maya, rebel commanders read answer to surrender demands.

Cuban Air Force plane. For it they had only notoriously undependable homemade ammo.

The patrols crept close to the *cuartel* walls (at Maffo, within 40 yards) and opened fire. They sustained it no matter what came back at them until their ammo ran low or, as happened twice, the garrison set fire to their little fortress and ran the rebel gamut in their trucks. At San Luis, the garrison resisted two such raids vigorously and the day after the second, withdrew in jeeps and a truck into the nearest larger *cuartel*. Their column tore by a rebel ambush which happened to be facing the wrong way and not a shot was fired.

The tactic which the rebels called an assault was not an assault at all as we use the word. It meant the rebel commanders would infiltrate their troops by dark to positions as close to an objective as they could find concealment. They would then keep it under uninterrupted small arms fire 24 hours a day. But they would not advance nor would they use demolitions.

In the fortress at La Maya, they so trapped 525 people, 125 of them the

wives and children of government soldiers, for seventeen days. In Maffo, there were 150 *Batistianos* who held out for fourteen days and then surrendered. The artillery available on either side was negligible. The rebels used one 20 mm cannon with comedy effect because of poor homemade ammo, and the garrison at Maffo one night expended nine mortar shells—presumably all it had—against a rebel sound truck that had been haranguing the troops to surrender. On this occasion, the accuracy was outstanding; four rebels were killed and 13 wounded.

In spite of the fact that small arms fire spattering concrete walls hardly sounds effective, these encirclements of the Batista *cuartels* were the decisive actions of the revolution. In the fight for Santa Clara, the final and largest action, it was a trainload of troops which the rebels encircled, not a fortress. And in this one case those who could fire from buildings had better cover than the troops opposing them.

However in the fighting which I saw, the rebels only sought out concealment and did almost without

dug-in or sandbagged positions. Often they exposed themselves deliberately for no logical military purpose. Once, when a whole platoon was disconsolate because their rifle grenades were misfiring, their battalion commander himself led a dozen in a charge out of their concealment. An enemy blockhouse lay 150 yards away and perhaps some of his men assumed that he planned to flank it. But without grenades, demolitions or mortar fire, he charged out 50 yards, then disposed his men behind the foot-high cover of the foundation of a wrecked building, and from there emptied several BAR magazines into the concrete blockhouse walls. He then ran his people back through a crescendo of incoming fire from the blockhouse to their concealed positions. But for skinned knees and elbows, no casualties resulted. The effect on morale was excellent. But the blockhouse was no less lethal than before.

Why were the government garrisons unable to break out of their *cuartels* and blockhouses?

Surely they could have broken the ring of besiegers. But there would have been casualties, and the countryside was actively hostile.

Why were the *cuartels* not reinforced? Or better resupplied?

Until the last weeks of the fighting, the larger were, in effect, reinforced by the fleeing garrisons from the smaller.

But as to why these in turn did not hold out, purely tactical answers are not enough. When the 525 people from the La Maya fortress surrendered, they still had food, water and ammo. There were seven wounded, two of them dying, in the group. Nine people had been killed and buried inside the walls (and seven of the rebels had been killed, two from the air). The Cuban Air Force had not been successful in its resupply efforts. But it had never tried drops directly within the *cuartel* walls, presumably because of the risk of hitting some of the people with falling packages.

Which raises what was to me a great mystery of the actions I observed: the astonishingly poor performance of the B-26's. True, they bombed and strafed the town of La Maya twice a day at least and the



Rebels used volley fire at 125-yard range in attacks against La Maya.



Bringing in supplies hijacked after airdrop.



Supply of homemade rifle grenades used by rebels.

roads around it at all hours. But they did this so badly that I was able to photograph them sometimes twice after they had begun their runs and then, usually leisurely, to move to shelter.

The Cuban Air Force B-26's—in pairs flying in echelon—usually committed in the adjoining county and then strafed from an altitude of 300 to 500 feet. They proved they knew how to do better when they were covering an unarmed DC-3 making a resupply drop; then they came in at right angles to each other and went up the streets with wingtips at housetop level.

I came to two conclusions about the curious B-26 performances:

First, the claims of the pilots at their subsequent trials that they did everything short of court-martial to avoid killing non-combatants are entirely valid. (You remember, Fidel set aside two trials acquitting flyers on this issue and ordered a third, after which came executions and prison sentences.)

Second, the psychological impact of the B-26 operations on the people of rural Cuba will be a major barrier to friendly US-Cuban relations for a generation to come. It is no use to point out that we sent Batista these planes for another purpose and stopped sending them at all in March of 1958. The planes, no matter how poorly flown, utterly terrorized the province and, moral judgments entirely aside, the fact is that we are heartily hated because they caused such fear.

At the time, incidentally, the

rebels, without aircraft or ack-ack, did not ignore the planes but emptied rifles and BARs up at them no matter what the range. I never saw a hit scored but the psychological effects were dramatic.

Supply

This was a controlling factor in the entire Castro offensive.

On the matter of food alone, the rebels' survival as a cohesive fighting unit was frequently in doubt. Being both guest and woman, I always had more to eat than anyone else, but at one point I lived on raw sugar cane for two days, and at another time I ate only one meal a day for five days in a row. The characteristic "hot chow" of the rebels in the field was a mush of rice with pieces of fresh-killed beef in it, served from a bucket hung on a pole which was carried by two runners from one foxhole to another.

Personal equipment was severely limited. Cotton drill shirts and pants were issued, but good footwear, canteens and blankets were not, and the *rebelde's* armbands, shoulder patches and insignia of rank were sewn and embroidered by his wife or one of the village women.

How Castro received his arms and ammunition was a subject of acrimonious international debate for a long time.

Before I went to Cuba, I was told that most weapons and ammo were smuggled in by air from the US, Mexico and Venezuela. Dictator Batista's secretary of state once gave me a personal interview on a holiday to

complain bitterly that American laxity in arresting the smugglers was the reason the government could not defeat the rebels.

But there is little evidence for this thesis. Recently I met a Cuban flier who had flown arms from the US to Cuba for months during the revolution. He said he had been told in Miami that US law enforcement agencies were alerted in early 1958 to look for a fleet of heavily-loaded station wagons and several DC-3's.

"So what we did was to fly the stuff in a pair of Cessna 182's. We got it out to landing strips near Key West in an outboard fishing boat loaded on a trailer. Once I was driving the trailer and I had a flat. The police helped me change the tire at the side of the highway without ever looking under the tarp which covered my boat. If they had folded it back, they would have found twelve Tommy guns and the ammo for them."

After I had been with the *Fidelistas* for a few weeks, I no longer questioned their on-the-spot insistence that only about 15 per cent of their weapons were so "imported." All the rest, they said, were captured.

The weapons which I saw were not new, and the great majority were of the type which we furnished to Batista—Springfields, M-1's, BARs and Tommy guns. And Colt .45 automatics, many of the latter demonstrably captured weapons with butt-plates still carrying the insignia of the Cuban Army.

In the case of .30 cal. ammo, I saw it being captured during the battle



Two wrecks and some blood—"... Your excuse shames our dead."

of La Maya. The action around the town involved more than 250 *rebeldes* actually firing on the line day and night for two and a half weeks. Yet when the battle was over, the rebel ammo inventory was fatter than when it began. Four times during the siege a government DC-3 had made an air drop (no parachute; they just pushed the packages out of the door) of ammo for the fortress, and four times the rebels had charged out under heavy fire and dragged the packages back behind their own lines. From these bundles the rebels also gained large quantities of medical supplies and some of the best cigarettes I ever smoked.

Two weapons widely used by the rebels were manufactured right in Cuba itself by the underground.

One was the 200-pound land mine, made at first from explosive salvaged out of unexploded aerial bombs that had been dropped by the Cuban Air Force. The mines usually were emplaced to be detonated electrically by a soldier on command.

The other homemade device was a rifle grenade which resembled no other grenade of which I've ever

heard. It was a firecracker shape about eight inches long with a conical cap on one end. It was detonated by a fuse of cotton string. To fire it, you affixed it to the end of a rifle, lit the fuse and pulled the trigger. In theory, the grenade exploded four seconds later. I watched more than a score of these fired. Each time something inhibited the clean get-away of the grenade from the rifle and it detonated within 50 yards of take-off.

A special logistic problem to the rebels was motor transport. Their few dozen vehicles were jeeps, either captured from the government or expropriated at gunpoint from oil and mining companies. (I remember there was a "duty ambulance" at the battle of Jiguani — a sky-blue enameled panel truck marked EAT STAR CANDIES.) Impulsive driving and no maintenance at all constantly reduced the availability of vehicles. But the limited mileage of roads and jeepable tracks in rural Cuba probably reduced the importance of motor transport to both sides in the fighting.

Summary

At the climax of the revolution, the personnel in the field under Fidel Castro's direct orders numbered about 15,000, half in uniform, including a high proportion of men mentally and physically superior. There was ultimate motivation throughout, and discipline within small units was good. The men were almost totally lacking in marksmanship ability, conventional military know-how, and experience in fighting as a cohesive force of any size. Their attitude toward their enemies was one of contempt leavened with compassion.

Their combat intelligence was unexcelled in quantity and of dependable accuracy. It was not organized on any military basis but originated in the civilian population which felt itself a direct participant in every action, and generally welcomed the rebels as liberators from terrorism.

The Castro defensive operations depended largely on this intelligence and on foot mobility; the rebels simply did not remain where they were sought.

Their offensive operations rested on tactics involving the highest degree of surprise, the fewest men, the lowest risk and the greatest freedom to disengage. These included road ambushes, raiding patrols, infiltration, and sustained siege by small arms fire. No dependence on artillery or motor transport was developed.

Their logistics were primitive and in other than the near-ideal weather and terrain conditions of Cuba would have been disastrous. Their food supply was not adequate by any ordinary standard. Their primary source of arms and ammunition was the enemy, although perhaps 15 per cent were smuggled into Cuba.

Their conspicuous military virtue was their ability to maintain a high volume of fire under conditions which would have discouraged less motivated fighters. This virtue fully exploited the major weakness of the well-equipped government forces, which was a near-paralysis of the will to fire at all. If there is any military lesson from the Cuban revolution for all Americans, in and out of uniform, I think this is it:

Machinery does not win wars. Men do. USMC



BGen W. T. Fairbourn
Director, MCR


I HAVE TALKED MUCH ABOUT THE professional approach. You will hear more, for in my opinion this is the only formula that will bring us the professional ability to meet the needs of the Fleet Marine Force. And, parenthetically speaking, this is the real meat of our coconut: *capability to meet the requirements of the Fleet Marine Force*. Any other requirement is purely incidental.

An adequate and flexible reserve force cannot spring up over night. It requires professional attitude, aptitude, organization, equipment and training—much training. The history of German military success against the French in WWII clearly reveals the overwhelming superiority of the professional force where arrayed against the quasi-amateur force. Germany did not conquer France with superiority of manpower, in numbers. Germany conquered by virtue of the superior capability of its military force (largely reserves), even when outnumbered. This is the type of capability essential to each and every Marine reserve unit and every member thereof.

Every organized reserve unit must be, not as good, but better than its counterpart in the Fleet Marine Force. You say this is impossible. I say there is no such word in a Marine's vocabulary. And what's more, why not? We now have the professional attitude, the aptitude is fast on the way; the organization and equipment we have meets the needs of each unit and more is available as and when the growth factor warrants same. So what do we need? Training—training—training—that's what we need, plus the will to accomplish our mission. Did you say money? Yes, we need some money. To be sure, we are still trying to maintain that precarious balance between present readiness and future capability in the face of level funding in an era when costs are rising

A monthly column written by the Director, MCR. This month's column was written by MajGen W. W. Stickney (inset below).

all along the line. BUT, this we can lick; the Marine Corps has never had enough money but has always done the job with whatever tools it has with which to work. Further, we have something greater than money—we have love. Love of country—love of the Marine Corps—and, what is more, love for those Marines on either side of us in combat. Never forget that—that is the Marine Corps!



Now, let's look at the other side of this coin. All of our Commanding Officers are screened and selected on the basis of leadership and, as a rule, combat experience. The Inspector-Instructors are the best the Marine Corps can produce and our Inspector-Instructor NCO staffs are the cream of the crop. How about our enlisted men? Their IQ not only runs from three to five per cent higher than the average recruit, but as well, they receive the identical basic training as all members of the Fleet Marine Force. Do you still say we can't do it? The hell we can't!

USMC



Today the Marine Air Reserve Training Command seeks perfection in training and leadership.

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In recognition, the Marine Air Reserve Trophy is awarded each year to the two outstanding squadrons in the Command: one, a VMA or VMF; the other, a MACS.

Selection of the winners is based on each squadron's accomplishments in training, administration and their drill attendance—the main tests for overall combat readiness.

VMF 511, Willow Grove, Pa., (Major Frank L. Moister, USMCR), and MACS 19, Grosse Ile, Mich., (LtCol James R. Mallon, USMCR), won the 1959 trophies.



BGen F. E. Leek
Commander, MART



Marine Air Reserve Trophy
... test for combat readiness

GO FOR THE MAXIMUM



By MSgt Ward H. Foster

IF THE MASTER SERGEANTS OF today's Corps ("acting" or otherwise) were lined up in two columns, the 30-year men in one and the 20-year men in the other, which do you think would be the longer?

The answer is obvious, and largely ill-considered.

The idea of being a professional Marine used to mean 30 years of active service, followed by a chicken farm near Quantico, or a civil service job at Parris Island. But the popular idea today seems to be to get in "19 and 6" and get away from it all.

Very little is being done to encourage any service past 20 years, and you can talk to very few men who have given it more than a passing thought. The average man knows he can submit his letter when he reaches "19 and 6," and that is about the extent of his planning.

I would not venture to suggest what the Commandant of the Marine Corps should or should not do to encourage men to remain in service past 20 years, as was suggested at the last Staff NCO symposium. I honestly believe that nothing needs to be done.

But I have given more than a few "passing" thoughts to why I intend to stay in for 30 years, if permitted to do so.

As a Marine recruiter, I have lived in a civilian community for three years now. I have met many people in the semi-professional trades, in radio, TV, and newspaper business, salesmen, and junior executive types. I have met school teachers and school principals, farmers, and lots of small businessmen; also, sales clerks, postal clerks, and Federal and State government employees.

I found very few of these people who were better off income-wise than the average E-7 to E-9, or who had better living conditions, or a better future.

Granted, perhaps most of them had a more settled home life; but one acquaintance of mine, a sales manager in a meat packing firm, had to sell his home and pack up his family and move to another city, 900 miles away, because his firm had transferred him—just like I will be transferred in a few more months.

The more successful they are, the more they worry about losing the security of their current position. They can't afford to get sick themselves, to have large hospital bills for their families, or to have their outfit go out on strike.

And, getting down to hard cash facts, an E-7, E-8, or E-9 makes *more* money than *most* of them, and Uncle Sam is building up *his* retirement fund with no contribution on his part.



I've heard too many times the statement that a man who stays past 20 is only working for half-pay. As usually expressed, it goes something like: "I could be out now, drawing half of what the Marine Corps is paying me, for doing nothing; therefore, I'm only working for half-pay." I don't hold with that theory at all. A Marine is supposed to be working for what he earns. The pay he gets is not supposed to be a God-given right. And if he goes into the Fleet after "19 and 6," his monthly retainer pay will be exactly half of his active duty *base* pay only. To the married man with two children this means also the loss of BAQ and com-

muted rations. To others, it may mean the loss of hazard pay.

Certainly, he can get another job. Undoubtedly, he'll be forced to. Or he'll want to, simply to keep busy. But think of this, too. When a man goes out on "half-pay," as he puts it, and steps into that high-paying civilian cinch job (if he gets it), he's still got that old worry about security, but in a different fashion.

What if something happens to that civilian job, or he has to turn in to a Veterans' Administration or Naval Hospital? Now that they are counting on his civilian income, how is his family going to get along on that "half-pay" remaining when his civilian salary is stopped?

I've hefted a few brews with a number of men in the Fleet who wished they *had* stayed for 30. The

man who goes to work as a civilian for \$300 a month, after 20 years experience, prestige, and respect in the Marine Corps, is necessarily working in a job with less dignity. He will probably be starting anew with men much younger than himself, and competing against youth. He is certainly not bettering himself.

Civilians working in jobs with comparable prestige and dignity to that of an E-7 to E-9, are working for salaries and benefits equal to, or higher than, what we get. But they have *also* devoted a goodly number of years to attaining those positions. They didn't just step into them at age 40.

You hear some men say, "I'll be my own boss. I'll be able to quit when I want to, or work when I want to." This doesn't hold true, either. You have always got a "boss," even if it is just the need to make a buck.

Perhaps he has given some thought to starting a small business of his own. O. K. But this is going to take a sizable chunk of cash. The US Department of Commerce has estimated that the average small business owner should have from \$8,000 to \$50,000 in ready cash before he hangs out his shingle. Needless to say, this type of operation cannot be financed out of retainer pay.

I have always appreciated the good living and security the service gives me, but I'm more aware of it now than ever. I'd like to have a buck for every former Marine, WW II vintage, who has said to me, "Sarge, I sure wish I had stayed in that outfit; I'd almost have my 20 in now." Some of them were men who would be considered quite successful by most standards. But all they faced now was the prospect of working for the same concern, or in the same job and place, until they were eligible for Social Security. If they can quit then!

Perhaps this is beginning to sound like I'm afraid to face the outside, scared of losing the security the Marine Corps gives me. I do appreciate the security the service offers, over the insecurity of civilian life. But I'm also appreciating the advantages the Marine Corps has to offer the 30-year man. I'm not postponing that loss of security for ten years, so to speak. I realize I'll still have to face some of the same problems then. However, simple examination of any pay scale will show that a man will get more retirement pay at 30—even as an E-7—than he will at 20.

An Acting Master Sergeant, going out today on 19½ to 20 years, would receive a gross of \$175 a month. Even if he stayed an E-7 until he had his 30 in, it would jump to \$262.50. But any thinking man should be able to see that in ten years time the odds favor his making at least E-8, and probably E-9, before he retires. Particularly is this so if he is passed by a local screening board and permitted to stay past 20. An E-9 going out on 30 grosses \$330 a month retire-

MSgt Foster is one of the crop of '41-'42 NCOs who will soon be making "the big decision." At one time he considered retiring with 19½ years of service. A look at what the added 10 years could mean changed his mind. His conclusion: "After devoting nearly 20 years to what I believe is an honorable and worthy profession, why should I toss it away now? From here on everything is a gain—retirement pay, advancement, a good service life."



ment pay. This is only a little less than the unmarried Acting Master Sergeant with over 18 years service is making on active duty. And with the economy of this country booming the way it is, we're liable to have a couple more pay raises in the next nine or ten years.

There is more than just the idea of possible future advancement. The average career Marine doesn't start planning early enough for retirement. It is not until they get almost close enough to knock on that Fleet Reserve door that the horrible thought dawns on them. They aren't going to have a darn thing to fall back on, or a place they can call home, when they get ready to quit. If we had all started saving back when we were Pfc's, with Savings Bonds or regular deposits in the Ma-

ings. If a man had a home paid for by the time he went out, with no rent to pay, he could live on \$262.50 to \$330 a month. I doubt if many can do it on \$175.

I've mentioned several reasons why I plan to stay in for 30, if possible. But the clincher, I believe, is this.

A man with better than 18 years in the Marine Corps is entering the "Golden Years," so to speak. He's learned and grown (and groaned) with the Marine Corps. He's got the age and experience behind him now, and, in a way, those last ten years or so he should be able to attain the status of "Elder Statesman."

Don't get me wrong—I don't think any man should go past 20 with the idea he can coast it out the rest of the way. Definitely not! "Elder Statesman" and "Short-timer" do not mean the same thing. In fact, I think the Marine Corps' policy of bringing a man before a local board, when he is eligible for transfer to the Fleet, is an excellent and necessary means of weeding out the "coasters"—men who don't have the personal integrity to continue to do their jobs in the best manner possible and to the best of their ability.

But the ones who are permitted to stay can contribute a lot to the good of the Marine Corps, as well as to their own good. And I don't believe the Marine Corps needs any special programs or inducements to get men to stay past 20. The opportunity to do his job, and attain possible advancements, should be encouragement enough.

What it all boils down to is that by staying the full route, a man has everything to gain. He has an awful lot to lose by quitting too soon. A man is selling himself short if he has the opportunity and doesn't give serious consideration to staying in for the maximum in retirement pay.

USMC



rine Corps Deposit Account, and increased it a little bit each time we got promoted or picked up longevity, or got a pay raise, we'd be in a much better position to anticipate retirement.

But let's face it: we've all considered it, or talked about what we *should* have done. How many of us have actually done something about it?

However, if we start now, when we're earning more money than we ever have before, we'll still have time to accumulate a nest-egg by 30. And be better able to afford the sav-

The Extension School's CHALLENGE

BASIC SCHOOL LEVEL

- 1 Which of the following are missions of a combat outpost? (Select those applicable).
 - a. To provide early warning of enemy advance.
 - b. To engage in close combat.
 - c. To provide a counterreconnaissance screen.
 - d. To deny the enemy long-range observation of the battle area.
- 2 An oriented sketch of a sector of fire showing predetermined data which will facilitate the accurate delivery of fire, especially during periods of poor visibility and at night, is known as
 - a. a range fan.
 - b. an M-10 plotting board.
 - c. a range card.
 - d. the visibility, temperature, and humidity firing ballistics overlay.
- 3 Which of the below is organic to the Marine tank battalion?
 - a. Flail tank.
 - b. Rocket launching tank.
 - c. Bridge laying tank.
 - d. Flamethrowing tank.



JUNIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 4 Radio relay communications, as employed in the Marine division, can best be described as a communications system
 - a. for relaying radio transmissions, via aircraft, from one ground position to another.
 - b. by which radio messages from reconnaissance patrols may be relayed by radio jeep to distant points.
 - c. utilizing special radio equipment to provide telephone and teletype circuits between command posts.
 - d. whereby messages sent to division headquarters will be relayed automatically to the action addressees.
- 5 Which if any of the following is a counterintelligence activity?
 - a. Raids into enemy positions designed to capture POW's.
 - b. Aerial observation missions over enemy held ter-

ritory to search out profitable targets.

c. Aerial observation missions over friendly territory to check effectiveness of camouflage measures.

d. Aerial observation missions over friendly territory to determine most likely avenue of approach for enemy attack.

- 6 A staff officer may issue orders to subordinate unit commanders
 - a. in his own name when the orders involve the staff officer's special functions.
 - b. in the name of the commander and in matters specifically authorized by the commander.
 - c. in his own name during emergency combat situations only.
 - d. in the name of the commander during normal garrison duty only.
- 7 Artillery units should be attached to an infantry unit whenever the tactical situation permits.
 - a. True.
 - b. False.
- 8 The ability to conduct post-assault pathfinder missions in support of a landing force is within the capabilities of which of the following?
 - a. The Division G-2 Section.
 - b. The Division Reconnaissance Battalion.
 - c. The Force Reconnaissance Company, FMF.
 - d. Counterintelligence Specialist Teams, FMF.
 - e. Helicopter Support Teams.
 - f. The Marine Air Wing VMCJ.

SENIOR SCHOOL LEVEL

- 9 A form of government wherein the authority of the military commander is limited by an agreement entered into by governments of the countries concerned is called a
 - a. civil legislative government.
 - b. military government.
 - c. civil affairs government.
 - d. martial law government.
- 10 Under what circumstances does a commander normally employ an "axis of advance"?
 - a. When the situation is fluid and the commander desires to provide for flexibility.
 - b. During night attacks and counterattacks.
 - c. When the commander desires to restrict the area in which the unit on an exposed flank may maneuver.
 - d. When a specific route must be cleared far enough on each side to permit its later use by the remainder of the force.



(Answers on page 68)

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
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Car Year	Make	Model	Body Type	Pass. Cap.	Serial Number	Motor No.	No. Cyls.
Cost	Purchase Date	New/Used	Current Car License Year State		Name in which car legally registered		

Is the automobile required by, or customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation? _____

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work? _____

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way? _____

How many male operators (including insured) are under age of 25? _____

Age of each: _____ Relationship: _____

Are any of the male operators under 25 owners, or principal operators, of the automobile? _____ Are all male operators under 25 married? _____

Does your car have extra equipment? _____

☐ Air Conditioner ☐ 2-Way Telephone ☐ Radio Comm. System ☐ Other: _____

Name _____ Rank _____ Serial No. _____

Military Address _____

If car not at above address, give location of car _____

☐ Active - Regular ☐ Retired - Regular ☐ Retired - Reserve ☐ Extended active duty
☐ Inactive, but retaining commission ☐ Widow of eligible officer

SOMEONE INSPECTS YOU EVERY DAY

By CWO G. J. DeCaro



☛ TO THE UNINITIATED, AND THOSE new to the profession of arms, our seeming preoccupation with the minutiae attendant on the wearing of the military uniform may appear to be a squandering of time and effort that might better be put to other more remunerative pursuits. But the experienced military commander has long recognized that any deviation in military dress, which is condoned, opens the way to destruction of all military uniformity and unity within the command. Further, those troops who consistently exhibit an outstanding and irreproachable military appearance, in most instances also have the high morale, discipline, efficiency, and esprit de corps for successful combat performance.

Since the end of WWII it has often been alleged that today's Marine does not toe-up to the tradi-

tional smart military appearance of his forebears. This is not entirely without merit, as many an IG report will attest. So it is incumbent upon all military commanders to insure that our men will present the outstanding military appearance and bearing which in the mind of the public has always been synonymous with the word Marine.

What are the steps which the military leader takes to develop the desired standards in military dress and demeanor? Here they are:

a) *Personal example*

This is a moral and military obligation. The young Marine is impressionable. As he tends to imitate his military leader in speech, action, and deportment, so will he tend to imitate his manner of dress. Men look for patterns of conduct which they may emulate, or use as an ex-

cuse for their own shortcomings. There is no room for the "Do as I say, not as I do" type leader.

b) *Inspection*

Inspection means careful and critical examination. Don't limit inspection of personnel to the formal Saturday morning parade. Develop your powers of observation so that noting the appearance of men becomes second nature. The technique of inspection is not a skill which we learn from a book. It is an art which we acquire by doing, and then evaluating the results of our efforts.

Don't overlook, or treat with leniency, a slovenly appearance during the week, hoping for better things on Saturday morning. The military leader who tolerates slackness in the dress of his men soon ceases to tend to his own appearance. If not called

to account, his careless habits will in time infect the entire outfit. To paraphrase an old Italian epigram: "The first time a man is out of uniform, it's the man's fault; the second time, it's his leader's fault."

The object of all inspections is the correction of noted discrepancies, and insistence that prescribed standards be met at all times. Of course we're remiss if we fail to give a verbal pat on the back to the Marine who is well turned out for inspection. Praise, given where due, often gets results.

At the platoon level of command, daily observation and detailed inspection of troops should occur most frequently, and corrective action engender the best results.

The following are submitted for consideration by the new Platoon Commander:

a) A checkoff list on uniform regulations from the detailed data contained in Chapter 49 of the *Marine Corps Manual* and Marine Corps Orders of the 1020 series is strongly recommended. Such a list will systematize your observations. You will also be pleasantly surprised at the knowledge you gain on uniform regulations during its preparation. Once the list is completed, provide each of your men with a copy for ready reference. Keep your check-off list up to date. As new items of uniform are introduced into the system, and modifications to the proper wearing of the uniform promulgated, revise your list and those in the hands of the troops.

b) You will find that providing the local tailor(s) with detailed information on authorized alterations, placement of chevrons and service stripes, length of trousers and sleeves, etc., will pay big dividends in the long run. As an example, at a recent inspection it was noted that a considerable number of men had the hem on the bottom of their green trousers put in with a stitch which was visible on the outside of the trousers. Investigation revealed that the local tailor had never been informed that the hem on the bottom of all wool trousers must be put in with a stitch which is not visible

on the exterior portion of the trouser leg.

c) When you inspect, pay particular attention to the following details. Some may seem minor, but they are all part and parcel of our military dress. Once your men have mastered the small particulars of military dress, the major items will also start reflecting infinite care.

1) Shoes

Insist that the edges of the soles and heels, and the welt, reflect the same degree of polish as the toe and the rest of the uppers. An old tooth brush and some polish will work



wonders on the appearance of the welt of the shoes. An approved sole dressing applied to the edges of the soles and heels will enhance their appearance, as well as the appearance of the entire shoe. The end result must be a completely shined pair of shoes. Nothing less should be accepted.

2) Trousers

Make certain that the trousers are of sufficient size in the waist to permit buttoning of the waist and fly without a resultant bulging out of the front pockets. Contrary to what you might have heard, the food in Marine Corps messhalls is such that most men put on weight in the serv-

ice, especially after boot camp. The trousers must then be altered. If the occasion is a formal inspection, or other important formation, train your men to avoid wrinkling their trousers after they have put them on. There is nothing which detracts more from the appearance of a platoon in formation than several men with accordion-like creases running across the lower portion of the waist and behind the knees.

3) Unserviceable items

Uniform items with patches, spots that cannot be removed by cleaning, material which shows undue signs of wear, and articles worn beyond economical repair, are unserviceable. Have them disposed of forthwith. If you don't, they will appear again at the next inspection, the one after that, and will still be there to haunt you the day the "Old Man" picks up that one article of uniform from a clothing display to determine if all items in the hands of your troops are serviceable.

4) Ribbons and badges

Before inspecting the ribbons and badges worn by your men it would be well to review the sequence in which these items are worn. It will be found that many who wear ribbons do not know that the seniority of colors requires that blue, the senior color, be worn up and in-board on the ribbons. Stars worn on ribbons should be checked to insure that one ray is pointing down. When you notice that the ribbons are dirty, frayed, or faded, have them discarded and a new set purchased.

5) Bronze emblems

In addition to noting if the emblem is positioned properly, look for those on which the black coating has worn off in spots. These must be replaced with new ones, or re-coated with a Marine Corps approved product sold in the Marine Exchange specifically for this purpose.

6) Brass buckles and belt tips

These items come with a protective coating on them often referred to as "Quartermaster shine." Once in the hands of troops this protective coating must be removed if a



CWO De Caro has been a private, corporal, and sergeant. He was commissioned in the field after the Guadalcanal campaign, rose to the rank of major. In 1954, he resigned his Reserve commission to reenlist as a master sergeant. He became a WO two years later. Presently a guard officer at MB, USFA, Sasebo, he wrote this article to focus attention on the increasing trend of many Marines to lose their military smartness.

high mirror-like polish is to be achieved. Removing the protective coating will not injure the metal; however, it does require that the item be polished regularly to prevent pitting or oxidation of the metal. (The insignia of rank worn by second lieutenants usually comes with this "Quartermaster shine" on the bars. The same rules as listed above apply here.)

7) Buttons

Bronze metal, brown plastic, and gold or gilt metal buttons all come with the Marine Corps Eagle and anchor embossed on them. These buttons are worn with the eagle up. The look of astonishment you will see on the faces of your men when you correct this discrepancy is but an indication of the lack of attention which this particular detail of military dress normally receives.

8) Caps

In inspecting the cap note if the visor and chin strap are polished in the approved shade, and are free of fingerprints. The chin strap should be pulled up taut, and the cap cover be free of wrinkles. The so-called "sea-going" dip in the top of the cap is non-regulation and is not permitted. The service cap will be worn square on the head.

9) Personal grooming

The development of good habits of personal grooming is of paramount importance in the service. The following must be insisted upon:

a) Shaving

In garrison the men will shave every morning. If the afternoon schedule calls for a formal inspection, or perhaps an honor guard, those with dark or heavy beards must be required to shave again. Only those capable of growing and properly maintaining a neat mustache should be permitted to do so. The young man who can at best only sprout a few straggly bits of fuzz on the upper lip should be dissuaded from attempting to sprout a mustache. It will add nothing to his appearance as a Marine.

b) Fingernails

Only short and clean fingernails, neatly trimmed, are acceptable. Nothing further need be said on this point.

c) Haircuts

The habit of a minimum of one haircut per week should be developed by all. Formal inspections, parades, honor guards, and other special events, require that a fresh haircut be acquired by all those partici-

pating. Haircuts must be of the approved military type. Eccentric hair styles should not be tolerated. Three inches is the maximum length permissible. However, a crewcut is much easier to keep clean in the field, and presents a desirable military appearance. I recall the battery commander who conducted his Friday morning inspections with a shortened match stick in his hand. Those whose hair exceeded the length of his match stick found their names conspicuously missing from the week-end liberty roster. Although there was some grumbling at first, we soon had one of the few artillery batteries in which each man sported a crewcut. This was 18 years ago when the crewcut was not the popular hair style for men that it is today. Once we became familiar with the advantages of short hair, his point had been made, and the match stick disappeared.

10) Regulation articles of uniform

Only Marine Corps issue, or Marine Corps approved articles of uniform may be worn. If you counsel your men to purchase uniform items only through Marine Corps supply outlets, the Marine Corps Exchange, or reputable civilian uniform shops, the problem of non-regulation items can be avoided.

As you become proficient in the art of inspection you will develop other points which can be added to those topics listed above. The day a new man joins your platoon and you immediately perceive several points in his military appearance which he will have to correct post-haste, you are over the hump. Your insistence that each man who wears the uniform present an appearance that reflects credit on our Corps will produce results. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

That Other Captain

☛ SHORTLY AFTER WWII, I SERVED as CO of the Marine detachment aboard the *Franklin D. Roosevelt*.

One Saturday morning in port the skipper, Capt "Blackie" Regan (now a retired rear admiral) was inspecting my men. He stopped halfway down the front rank before a young private who had recently joined from sea school.

"Lad, what is the captain's name?" he asked.

The private replied smartly, "Capt Callender, sir."

"No, I mean the captain of the ship," said the skipper.

"Sir, he's the only captain I know."

Capt Regan gave me a withering look and replied, "Son, there is *another* captain around here, and you had better find out who he is."

LtCol J. M. Callender

Marine Corps Gazette • February 1960

THE SALTY SKIPPER

SAYS

*Loyalty goes up—
And down.*



OFFICE HOURS WERE BUSY LAST SATURDAY. THIS I expect after the holiday period. One case I want to talk about. Sgt Brady was run up for disobeying direct orders of one of my platoon sergeants. Here was a good one. I had been working hard to get my senior NCOs to take the initiative on Sunday and holidays to keep the company area in good police. This looked like a real chance to set an example. I looked up as the First Sergeant marched PltSgt Miner and the man on report, Sgt Brady, into my office. They halted at attention.

"Brady," I said, "PltSgt Miner has charged you with disobedience of orders in that you failed to police up the 3d Platoon squad bay yesterday morning prior to noon as he ordered you to do. This is the charge. Now, before answering, do you fully understand Article 31, UCMJ, as read and explained to you by the First Sergeant and all rights under the article?"

"Yes, sir, I do."

"What do you have to say for yourself?"

"Sir, I am a member of the 2d Platoon and I had policed my area with some of the squad so that we looked shipshape. I felt it unfair of Sgt Miner to order my squad to clean up his platoon area just because his platoon was all missing."

"Well, Brady, were you ordered to do this or not?"

"Yes, sir, I was ordered."

"Yet you failed to obey, and you consider yourself an NCO, correct?"

"Yes, sir, but I figured I was being pushed around. My squad had not made the mess in that area and it was not our platoon area."

"Brady, I agree it was not your area, but you were ordered to police the area by your senior NCO who was representing me, and you disobeyed. I can't stand for that in this outfit. If you thought it unjust, you should have still carried out PltSgt Miner's order and then reported the incident to me. But, you must carry out the orders of your senior NCOs in this Company. Stand by to see the Colonel tomorrow at office hours."

"About face," sounded off the First Sergeant. "Forward march." Brady's heels clicked as he about-faced and marched out.

I looked over to PltSgt Miner. "Miner, what kind of a deal were you pulling on Brady and his squad yesterday?"

"No deal, Captain, just trying to get the barracks cleaned up before noon. I couldn't find any of my squad leaders at the time so I nominated Brady. Guess I should have used the Duty NCO, now that I think about it. Brady had cleaned up his squad bay before."

"You're right, Miner. Your judgment was questionable. However, you were carrying out my order to clean up before noon on Sunday and holidays, so you did right. Junior NCOs must learn to obey—then question. Next time, though, use the Duty NCO when possible, if it's in another platoon."

I saw the First Sergeant nod, just a bit. "That's all. You're both excused."

After Miner and the Top had left, I leaned back in my chair, put my feet up on the desk and lit my pipe for a short breather before heading for the 1,000-inch range.

Well, that was office hours for this day. How did I do? Was I right to support Miner when it was not too fair for Brady to clean up another platoon area? I thought about it.

First, I was right to support a senior NCO. You must have obedience in battle at all levels, even though you don't agree with the order. You must execute; you can't always have all the facts.

Second, both parties had a fair hearing. Miner's judgment was doubtful. Still, in combat, a small unit leader can't stand on his assigned duties.

Third, I stressed judgment with Miner. He admitted doubt and learned from experience. I was a bit lax myself. I must watch Miner, help him, and talk with him again soon.

That's my yarn for this time. Tomorrow, I'll see the "Old Man" early before office hours and give him the full story on Brady.

After all: loyalty in a good outfit, especially a Marine outfit, must go both ways, up and down. USMC

"What of the enemy? . . . He appears as hardly more than a fleeting shadow in his brief forays across the surface before he returns to earth. . . Red Chinese operations were a vanishing act on the grand scale. . . I recall one 24-hour period in May, 1953, when only 37 persons were observed along the enemy front by the whole Eighth Army."

—BGen S. L. A. Marshall,
PORK CHOP HILL,
MORROW, 1956.



SUPPORT BY FIRE: PART VIII

TARGETS: THE ETERNAL

By LtCol T. N. Greene

✿ IT IS UNKIND TO STEP UP TO A MAN who has a bear by the tail to tell him that his house is on fire. However, he should be told. Marines well know that target acquisition is a major requirement of modern doctrine and are busy wrestling with the problem. The fact is, however, that grave problems will remain when and if we get that "more, better, and faster intelligence" which is now the standardized recommendation in post-exercise reports. To be exact, there will remain the problem of hitting the target.

The problem of hitting and destroying any target is three-sided; it is a triangle. Target acquisition is one of the angles and, admittedly, an acute one. However, the problem of position location is equally great on the fast-moving, widely-dispersed modern battlefield. The positions which must be located comprise more than mortar, gun, rocket and missile batteries; they

also include electronic aids to navigation of ships and aircraft and electronic target acquisition devices, to say nothing of friendly troops. The third part of the triangle is the need for surveillance of fire. Against a moving target, and we can surely predict a more mobile enemy, actual adjustment of fires is required. For fixed or semi-fixed targets, even with excellent target and position location there's still a great need to register artillery-type weapons.

Let's examine just a few figures. Assume an enemy atomic launcher located 20,000 yards away from the friendly firing unit. At this range a 10-mil error in compass direction will cause a miss by 200 yards. So will a one per cent error in the map, caused by distortion, paper shrinkage or expansion, or improper joining of map sheets. A 200-yard error could also be caused by a 100-yard error in target location and a 100-yard error in position location. No

allowance has been made for firing error or the effects of weather on such a long trajectory. The effect of a 200-yard error in limited war using conventional weapons is obvious. What is not so obvious is that such an error, added to other errors existing in atomic weapons delivery systems, can be extremely significant. Atomic effects may extend for miles. Other atomic effects, which may be keys to certain targets, may reach only a few hundred yards.

This three-sided problem of hitting targets, now and in the future, can best be discussed one side at a time. Accordingly, let's examine first the problem of straight target acquisition, then the connected problem of surveillance and adjustment of fires, and, finally, the technical problems of position location.

Much print and paper has been used to extol the capabilities of Force Reconnaissance and the new Marine division Reconnaissance Bat-

TRIANGLE

away!"

Perhaps we can learn a lesson for the modern doctrine from Guadalcanal. One of the techniques used to defeat the lack of observation was to send out patrols for the primary purpose of escorting artillery FO teams and naval gunfire spot teams to points from which they could observe (and attack) the enemy. The one TACP organic to the division recon battalion can be so used, but it is not enough. We should consider beefing up the organization with organic observers and communications, trained to work with artillery, naval gunfire, or air. In the meantime, a suitable task organization can be jury-rigged for maneuvers. A primary source would be the three FO teams organic to the Intermediate Support battalion of each artillery regiment. SFCP are in short supply, but can be detached from inland units for coastal recon operations. Airborne automatic or manual radio retransmission can assist such missions and serve to conceal from the enemy the method of adjusting fires.

The above measures are proposed for the prime reconnaissance mission, that of going deep to get information, a mission which does not preclude calling long-range fires upon targets observed. Beefing up our reconnaissance with supporting arms would be even more applicable in the case of a screening mission. It's generally recognized that recon units are not and should not be equipped for sustained ground combat. They must avoid full engagement. Certainly providing supporting arms doesn't change this, any more than major use of supporting arms makes a general outpost engage in decisive combat. In all reconnaissance it is unrealistic to hope for such accurate target acquisition as to allow immediate fire for effect. Many targets must be attacked by observed, ground-adjusted fire. Such fires should help, rather than hamper the primary recon mission of observing,

moving, and staying alive to report what has been found. (See *Employment of Recon*, GAZETTE: Dec '59)

Patrols, helicopter-borne or otherwise, are one way of acquiring targets and then doing something about them. A second way is by air observation. We have for support of each Marine division one VMO with 12 OE aircraft. In the Division G-2 shop are nine Tactical Air Observers (TAO) and in the artillery regiment are nine air observers (AO). Each Force artillery battery which might be attached also has organic AO. Both the G-2 TAOs and the artillery AOs are to be trained in each other's jobs; also, in spotting naval gunfire. They are supposedly qualified to observe not only from the OE, but from high-performance jets. Further, it has been found useful in helicopter operations to have them qualified to direct air strikes. In their spare time they take photographs, operate two or three radios, execute message drop and pickup, and do various odd jobs. If this seems like a rather broad training requirement for a second lieutenant, it is. The number of tasks also poses a heavy commitment for VMO, especially since it no longer has the HOK. For a one-division, one-wing Landing Force the simultaneous requirement for a normal daytime situation might normally include one OE for each committed RLT and helicopter-landed BLT, one with division reconnaissance, one for each general support artillery battalion or group, and probably one each for special missions by division and Landing Force G-2. This would commit eight or nine of the 12 available aircraft. An RLT-MAG brigade is surrounded by the same amount of terrain and can easily commit five to six aircraft simultaneously. Such employments visualize dual use between naval gunfire and artillery and between artillery and G-2, so far as possible. It appears that as communications and training permit

**"It's tough to fight an enemy you cannot find.
It would be tragic to find an enemy we could not
effectively attack."**

tion to provide information to the harried G-2. This is well and good. The supporting arms, however, require more exact data than such a report as "2 miles southwest of Milltown." Likewise, a report that 3,000 Aggressors passed RJ101 four hours ago cannot be used directly to aim a gun. The supporting arms must question both the exactitude and the timeliness of many reconnaissance reports. All bits and pieces of enemy information, however fragmentary, are useful. The problem is that a freewheeling reconnaissance effort which does not report actual, timely targets tends to clutter the impact area. The technique of sending two-man teams of "Buffalo Scouts" behind enemy lines may have great possibilities. However, without very special training and communications, such an effort may fail to provide any more useful target information than the classic old-time scout report: "They went that-

greater unit separation the battlefield will enlarge to a point where serious thought should be given to adding aircraft to VMO. Remember increased artillery requirements for registration. With a 180-degree front, artillery must register around the front about every 5,000 yards at various ranges and charges to give accurate fires. One AO can well be employed throughout daylight in registering division and Force artillery, without firing on any targets. Such time-and-ammunition consuming multiple registrations are always desirable. They are mandatory when excellent maps or good survey cannot be had. Clearly, both the AO and the TAO are needed. The basic problems are these: Can the Marine Corps afford more aircraft? Can one observer be properly trained in all the skills required? How much can we use the low-performance OE in combat?

The problem needs and is getting considerable study. From any such study should come a realistic assignment of aircraft to missions as a part of the T/O. As a basis for such assignment, first consider that targets of concern to a Marine division will be within such range as to recommend prompt attack. Good attack takes a well-trained observer and communications to a firing unit. AOs assigned to general support artillery units will meet this requirement. In the case of RLT, helicopter-borne BLT, or a BLT effecting juncture, an AO operating on an artillery net manned in the unit FSCC would be better than having the Air Liaison officer divert his radios or operators from the TAR or TAD nets to man the TAO or

DAO nets. As a general rule, all air observers in the division zone of action should be trained and in a communications position to adjust fire. Perhaps greater use could be made of VMO pilots to meet the general information requirements of G-2. By greater integration of division G-2 and VMO S-2, pilots and observers could be carefully briefed and de-briefed. Additional information could come from giving a greater photographic capability to VMO, such as an aircraft-mounted camera, preferably one with self-developing film. Consider also mounting photo-flash cartridge equipment on OE, both for night photography and as an atomic simulator for training.

New Job For AO's

If an amicable arrangement along such lines could be reached to meet the requirements of both G-2 and the FSCC, perhaps half the present T/O aerial observers could be excess. These observers should be organized, trained, and equipped for high-performance observation. Intelligence would be their primary mission, adjustment of fire only secondary. They would normally take station with the wing at an airstrip or aboard a carrier. They should be specially trained to assist in briefing and de-briefing, on behalf of the ground elements, pilots flying ground-requested missions. Such a group could aid liaison between ground and aviation intelligence, expedite urgent photo interpretation, and insure rapid dissemination of information. Both Landing Force and division G-2 would require such deep observation in most situations. High-performance observation is

needed for supporting arms work on special occasions, such as temporary loss of air superiority, or early on D-Day.

There is a third way to find deep targets and then do something about them. It's the primary method used by Communist artillery, that of triangulation. Without going into the intricacies of artillery survey, most of us remember that in geometry we can solve for the unknown sides of a triangle when we know the length of one side and two of the angles. The method simply requires two or more OPs with good observation of the same area. The distance between the two OPs is measured and angle-measuring instruments are oriented. When both OPs can identify a target, its exact distance and direction from either OP can be found accurately and quickly, using a special slide rule or plotting table. If fire for effect misses the target, it can often be spotted on with only one shift, by the same methods. Such surprise fire is, naturally, far more effective than slow, bracketing adjustment by an FO. Because of terrain, it is not always possible, but at Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms, maneuver targets have been very accurately acquired in large numbers at ranges of 10,000 to 14,000 yards. The same method can also carry position location survey over equal distances.

Arty Loses Eyes And Ears

Before reorganization, the artillery regiment contained a sound-ranging section, a flash-ranging section, and a fairly large survey section. The flash-ranging section used triangulation to locate hostile artillery. Reorganization increased the number of surveyors in each artillery battalion and battery, but reduced the number in the regimental headquarters to five. The problem of hostile battery location, particularly in atomic war, can scarcely be overstated. It is vital, but the Marine Landing Force no longer has an acquisition capability organized and trained as such. Electronic means are promised, but not yet on hand. The only solution now is to use the close support battalion and battery survey teams to form flash bases, whenever their primary mission permits. However, if this is in-



tended, improved instruments, communications, and plotting tables should be provided. The only real capability of the 5-man regimental survey team is to provide survey control points, primarily by astronomical observation. To provide even a few such points, they'd need helicopters, such as the HOK. Employment of HOK now in HMR(C), should consider the need for long-range and accurate ground observation. For example, triangulation stations at 29 Palms carried control 15,000 yards in six hours, mainly spent climbing to the top of Mt. Hidalgo. With one HOK, the survey could have been done in 30 minutes. Besides carrying survey crews, helicopters can also be sighted on by triangulation or radar to carry control forward in difficult terrain with fair accuracy. Helicopter-mounted inertial navigation systems or electronic devices may, in time, solve the position location requirement.

Critical Problem Areas

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps Landing Force lacks adequate means in terms of organization, equipment, missions, and doctrine to solve these crucial and inter-related problems:

- 1) Pinpoint location of friendly atomic and conventional artillery units.
- 2) Pinpoint location of friendly electronic aids to air and naval gunfire.
- 3) Pinpoint location of friendly electronic and/or infrared target acquisition devices located with artillery, infantry, or reconnaissance elements.
- 4) Accurate long-range ground observation to cover forward areas and gaps between dispersed units day and night.
- 5) Any specific hostile battery detection means (except for useful, but neglected Shell Reports).
- 6) Adequate means for integrating existing partial surveys in order to mass not only artillery, but all supporting arms.

Note that in Army organization such problems have long been a corps-level function. The Army corps observation battalion has recently been reorganized to cope with the dispersed formation. In the Ma-

rine Corps, a similar target acquisition and position location *battery* is urgently required to support the division. It could logically be placed either with the artillery regiment or with the Force artillery Field Artillery Group headquarters. If it is intended to do the job within present division T/O for surveyors, then better equipment, formal training, and standardized doctrine are immediate essentials. In any case, continued, assured availability of some of the HOK from HMR(C) will be required.

Within the Marine air-ground team, we have so far examined primarily the ground means, although both reconnaissance and long-range



ground observation and survey control require a helicopter assist, while air observation depends entirely on a low or high-performance ride. The air component alone can provide visual, electronic, and photographic surveillance.

From a supporting arms standpoint, aerial photography is an excellent tool, when you can get it in time. It is useful for planning fires and for the neglected, but important art of post-strike analysis. Electronic developments will be similarly useful. Visual target acquisition by high performance aircraft is becoming increasingly difficult and is a matter of some concern throughout the Marine Corps. Electronics may be harnessed to assist the pilot here. And let's not forget air support's ability to attack a relatively large area, such as a patch of forest. This is reconnaissance by fire. A "Search and Attack" mission directed against a suspicious large area may strip camouflage, start fires, or stir up activity which a pilot can

then identify. Needless to say, air support is seldom troubled by position location, although accurate location by survey of the ASRT radar is necessary. As the equipment improves, greater use might be made of this radar not only to vector strike aircraft, but to assist pinpoint aerial photography.

There is no doubt that we need to emphasize target acquisition to allay BGen Masters' "Three Headed Spook" (GAZETTE: Jun '58). We must not, however, become so bemused with finding targets that we fail to report them accurately enough for attack. We must also provide accurate position location for all delivery and acquisition means. And for some targets, particularly mobile targets, we must provide surveillance or adjusted fire.

If we're going to ask the reconnaissance agencies to go out in the impact area, let's give them the gear to call for (and to stop) long-range fires. If we are to ask VMO to fly low, slow, unarmed and unafraid over hostile targets, let's be sure they can direct attack on those targets. And let's back them up with a real high-performance observation capability. We must have, and soon, the means to tie together our scattered fire support means, radars, and OPs by accurate survey. Primary targets for such a massed acquisition and attack effort will remain hostile artillery in conventional war and will surely be atomic cannon and launchers under atomic threat. We must give very high priority to welding the organization, the tools, and the doctrine to meet this threat. Finally, as we refine the air-ground team, we must make maximum use of the air component for both acquisition and attack.

It's tough to fight an enemy you cannot find. It would be tragic to find an enemy we could not effectively attack.

USMC

THE COMMANDANT'S POLICIES



Printed here in full is the HQMC
release on the Commandant's
speech to his staff on 4 January.



WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 7—IN A MAJOR POLICY talk delivered here 4 January, three days after assuming duties as the 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen David M. Shoup spelled out his "views, designs, and policies" for the future conduct of Marine Corps affairs.

Gen Shoup's statement, although it was addressed to his Headquarters staff, has been distributed to commands throughout the Corps for dissemination to Marines of all ranks.

Stressing repeatedly that combat readiness is the Corps' most important single objective, the new Commandant expressed his views on virtually every phase of Marine Corps activity.

These were some of the highlights:

1) The Commandant will take action to reduce the present 15-month duty tour for Marines assigned to FMF units in the Far East, although he favors continuation of the policy against permitting dependents to accompany FMF Marines stationed in that area.

2) Non-combat uniform changes now being processed will be the last such changes considered for some time unless otherwise directed by higher authority than the Commandant.

3) Closer integration of staff functions will be achieved at Headquarters Marine Corps, to include consolidation of personnel management functions in a single department.

4) Better recreational facilities will be provided for the individual Marine, with less emphasis on "big time" athletic teams of "questionable spectator interest."

5) Ideally, the Marine Corps needs more than 175,000 Marines, but we must all strive to get as much "fight from our plight" as possible.

6) The Marine Corps came of age as a military service many years ago, and all Marines must guard against a "minority group" philosophy inherent in the term, "They're sniping at us."

On the subject of FMF overseas duty tours, the Commandant had this to say: "I continue to be firmly convinced that our Fleet Marine Force units in the Western Pacific are properly there, and properly without dependents. I am even more firmly convinced that a tour of 15 months is too long. I am going to take every action open to me to reduce the length of this tour and still maintain our posture of determined readiness."

Gen Shoup spoke out against continuing changes in non-combat type uniforms. "In general," he said, "I feel that a clean, neat, well-fitted uniform with the Marine Corps emblem is tops. There is no need for gimmicks and gadgets."

He emphasized, however, that development of improved combat clothing and equipment will continue to be given "high priority action."

Calling for closer integration of staff functions at Headquarters Marine Corps, the Commandant noted that during his last tour of duty at Headquarters, "we had seven distinct personnel departments and a few fuzzy ones."

"Today," he went on to say, "I conclude that we have somewhere between one and one-half to two and one-half. Soon, I expect to have but one."

Gen Shoup said he believes we now have "the best special services program in the history of the Marine Corps." He cited one "inconsistency," however.



Gen Randolph McC. Pate (left), passes colors to his successor, LtGen David M. Shoup on 31 December, 1959. Traditional change-of-command ceremonies were held at MB, Eighth and Eye.



New CMC takes the oath of office from RAdm Chester Ward (right), Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Secretary of the Navy, William B. Franke, witnesses the event taking place in his office.

"It has been difficult for me to reconcile the fact," he said, "that we may at some posts and stations spend several thousand dollars on a few men for a big athletic team, with questionable spectator interest, and at the same station there are few places where a man can write a letter or read without leaving his home barracks or squadroom. He should not have to sit on the edge of his bunk with improper lighting. Let's all take a resounding whack at improving this inadequacy."

Referring to the FY 1961 budget estimate of funds to support a 175,000-man Marine Corps, the Commandant used these words:

"The percentage of our three division-wing teams that may simultaneously be committed to combat, and the location, intensity, and duration of the conflict could be such as to properly require a ready Marine Corps of 200,000; 215,000; 235,000 or even more.

"Nevertheless, our most important job is always to think and work hard to get as much fight from our plight as we possibly can."

Gen Shoup said it seems to him "the Marine Corps has within recent years operated too much within the philosophy of a minority group."

"The Corps came of age many years ago," he reminded. "Let us unshackle our minds from the stifling psychology inherent in the slogan, 'They're sniping at us.' This has hampered and hamstrung our thinking for too long.

"Let us make it impossible for anyone to doubt our complete readiness. Let us sell our own product, but without belittling or degrading the other services by thought or speech or deed. Let us have an explicit faith that those responsible for selecting the combat forces to do each particular job will call upon those most likely to succeed. Thus, I am sure that in the years

ahead the American public will continue to extol our Corps."

In other major phases of his 4 January policy statement, the new Commandant called for:

- Increased decentralization of authority to field commanders and less interference with staff officers in carrying out their assigned tasks.

- Increased emphasis on individual Marine and small unit training.

- Upgrading of commanding general billets at MCSC, Albany, Ga., and MCSC, Barstow, Calif., from brigadier general to major general.

- Elimination of "inconsistencies" in personnel management policies dealing with professional and physical examination of officers and NCO's.

- More equitable distribution of manpower by exercising firmer HQMC control over personnel assignment to individual commands, with less deference to the desires and requests of individual commands and more emphasis on local training programs.

- An Information Services program designed to keep the public and individual Marines fully informed of Marine Corps plans, policies, programs, and developments, insofar as military security permits.

- An R&D program aimed at effectively implementing modern Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine, including vertical assault.

- Continuing emphasis on a strong Marine Corps Reserve.

- Provision and maintenance of adequate, safe, and suitable housing for Marine and essential civilian personnel at Marine Corps installations.

- Continuing review of the composition, equipping, and organization of the FMF, security forces, and the training base to insure optimum readiness for today's combat missions and those of the future.

- Establishment at all levels of command of "Inspector General" type inspections.


Gen Shoup opened his 4 January talk with this statement:

"A few days ago, by taking the oath of office, I accepted the challenge inherent in the title of '22d Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.' I personally assume every responsibility connected therewith. I am mindful of this great burden and I know that I cannot properly discharge these responsibilities alone. I am indeed grateful for the highly professional character of our Marine Corps. It is upon this staff and my field commanders that I shall lean most heavily in the future to insure that the policies of my administration are intelligently implemented, effectively executed, and consistently maintained in force."

The Commandant ended his talk with these words:

"It is good to feel the grips of the plow in my hands. I have every confidence that with both the regular establishment and the reserve forces in direct support, the furrow will be straight and true and the years ahead for the Marine Corps will be ones of progress and accomplishment."

USMC



passing in review

Book Reviews of
professional interest.



THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET

GEN MAXWELL D. TAYLOR USA (Ret).
Harper & Brothers, New York. 203 pages, \$4.00

Bookshop Code #FF-1

This third full-scale valedictory in as many years by a Chief or near Chief of Staff attests the continued vitality—for which the nation must be grateful—of the Army staff and leadership. Were the staffs of the individual services to lose their vigor the damage could well be irreparable.

Like Gens Ridgway and Gavin, Gen Taylor is unsparing in criticism of his civil superiors: the Secretary of Defense and the President. Like Gavin (but not Ridgway) Taylor's antidote to indecision, and to decisions he does not like, is to take real power of decision away from civil authority and give it to a military man.

His military man with decisive power—the Chief of Staff—would hand the civil authorities ready-made decisions—without annoying alternatives.

Paradoxically, in respect to this thesis, Gen Taylor is his own most damaging witness. His account of the protracted conflict between the air power advocates of Massive Retaliation as an exclusive strategy and the advocates of a strategy of Flexible Response in which massive retaliation is only one element of a spectrum of possible responses, is the most effective argument for the present system of strategic planning and direction.

Judging from the composition of our forces and the distribution of the defense dollar, both very concrete, our strategy has always been far more flexible than Gen Taylor implies.

Had we had the system for strategic planning built around a single military Chief of Staff, supported

by a unitary Staff which he dominates and controls, it is likely that the pendulum would have swung much farther in the direction of the air power doctrine of strategic bombardment. Such a system is conducive to and characterized by orthodoxy, emphasizing one decisive military arm, one absolute weapon, one infallible strategic plan.

Adherence to the strategy whatever it is becomes the measure of one's loyalty to the Chief. There are no dissenting views (such as Gen Taylor's) to disturb the narcotic of over-confidence.

But under the JCS system, experts on the several types of warfare are free—without domination—to express and advocate their views on military strategy and to present the capabilities of their respective arms and weapons. Indeed, the members of the JCS are encouraged to carry to politically accountable civil authority their strongly-held minority views.

Equally important, ideas on strategy must be able to withstand the searching analysis of sharp-eyed competitors. By way of illustration, according to his own story, no one has been more assiduous than Gen Taylor in ferreting out and exposing the defects of the air doctrine of massive retaliation.

Gen Taylor protests that Chairmen Radford and Twining, contrary to the intent of Congress and the theory of the JCS system, have dominated the JCS. And he further charges that they have almost unfailingly identified themselves with and supported the views of the service of their origin. Illogically, Gen Taylor's response is to advocate giving the chairman decisive power, establishing him in law as a single Chief of Staff.

As for Gen Taylor's ideas on organization, they do not emerge too clearly—probably because he is trying to ride two horses at once—a feat that involves him in apparent inconsistencies.

Taylor notes with approval that naval forces are functionally balanced for sustained combat in a naval environment. He thinks Army forces should be similarly organized for sustained combat on land. That is: that tactical air, field mobile air defense and surface-to-surface missiles, including IRBM, should be organic to the Army. (The Air Force would retain continental air defense, immobile air defense installations, and the ICBM functions as well as its interests in space).

So far so good. He would have naval forces functionally balanced for naval combat; army forces functionally balanced for combat on land. At the same time, however, Gen Taylor advocates another so-called functional organization which would destroy this symmetry. Setting aside the more or less discrete military tasks of strategic bombardment and continental air defense, he would organize the forces remaining (sometimes styled limited-war forces) as deployed forces, antisubmarine forces, and a unified brushfire force. This plan denies the unity of naval operations within an ocean area and the indivisibility of the mutually supporting and multi-purpose tools of naval warfare. It would fragment the functionally balanced fleet—identifying parts of it with overseas deployments of land forces and other parts with a land-power-oriented brushfire force.

When naval power is dominated by land warfare considerations, naval power fails to develop its full potential. This may not be incompatible with the strategic situation of the

small, largely land-locked countries of continental Europe, but naval forces attenuated and fragmented and capable of no more than a supporting role do not meet the strategic needs of the US and the free world. Command of the seas is to the US and its overseas allies a strategic asset of transcendent importance. It is not to be hazarded by fragmenting the instrument by which it is gained and maintained—the functionally balanced fleet—in order to parcel out ineffective segments to various land power commands.

Apart from this, Gen Taylor's organization in the form of deployed forces and a unified brushfire force would be less responsive to brushfire contingencies, less flexible, less rapid—and more costly—than the present organization.

The keystone of the present organization is the system of unified commands in areas of strategic importance. Assigned to these commands are forces—land, naval and air—with which Unified Commanders can respond immediately and flexibly to brushfire situations within or adjacent to their strategic areas.

Virtually all our naval forces are so assigned—to the two great ocean areas which flank the American continents on the east and west and the land mass of Eurasia on the west and east. Similarly, substantial Army units are assigned to the Pacific and to Europe. And, as Lebanon demon-

strated, when Army units are needed in a hurry they are brought (using to best effect the air means of strategic mobility) from the nearest source. That source is the deployed forces—not a central reserve in the United States. Moreover, when reinforcements are needed they are needed not in the form of an additional fully organized unified command but in the form of flexible augmentation by specific types of air, land and naval units to reinforce forces already committed.

In sum, Gen Taylor's unified brushfire command would duplicate and conflict with the functions of the existing unified commands in strategic areas. It would use deployed troops at less than maximum effectiveness, requiring greater numbers of so-called spearhead troops within the centrally-located reserves.

As a critic of defense policies, Gen Taylor unwittingly reveals the strengths of the JCS system: full participation by the responsible military experts and provision for resolution of their differences—resolution by politically accountable civil officials. Such officials bring to the task a wider view and the qualities of impartial judgment and statesmanship rather than more military expertise.

As a would-be architect of defense policies, Gen Taylor reveals some of the defects of the system which vests the power of decision in one military man.

Reviewed by Col J. C. Murray



Joint Chiefs of Staff, January, 1960

LOGISTICS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

RAdm H. E. ECCLES, USN (Ret). The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pa. \$5.00

Bookshop Code #FF-38

The author is one of the few qualified who can close the gap between the few books on logistics and the many on strategy and tactics. This book does not read like a novel, but rather like a text book. Like a text, it teaches some sound lessons.

Part I, "The Basic Considerations," shows how logistics bridge the national economy and the combat forces. During Caesar's time it cost 75¢ to kill a man; in Napoleon's, \$3,000; WWI, \$21,000; and WWII, \$200,000. A good point is the author's *principle of information*: Exercise of authority gravitates toward the person who has the most accurate grasp of significant information.

It is pointed out that sometimes reducing combat force to increase logistic force can improve total combat effectiveness. Logistic discipline comes only through self control on the part of command. One way to get discipline is to attack the logistic snowball at its source by stripping the supply system of all but its essential items.

Conclusion: Adm Eccles states that modern war is too complex for one mind to master all of the details. Therefore, a commander should rise above technical details.

Reviewed by LtCol J. H. Papurca

ALLIANCE POLICY IN THE COLD WAR

EDITED BY ARNOLD WOLFERS. The Johns Hopkins Press. \$6.00

Bookshop Code #FF-39

This is a compilation of essays by ten authors of note and is most timely because of the continuing reliance of the United States on international organization and coalition as the basis of our foreign (and thus, military) policy.

One is unable to appraise the validity of this policy without a background of considerable study of this subject. Here is the value of this book to the Marine, for it appears to provide such background.

In a comprehensive introduction Editor Wolfers presents an excellent foundation for these studies.

Reviewed by LtCol C. H. LeClaire



Marines attacking pill boxes on Tarawa

THE BARREN BEACHES OF HELL

BOYD COCHRELL. 379 pages, Henry Holt and Company, New York. \$4.95

Bookshop Code #FF-36

Despite its Hollywood title, this novel of the Pacific War is interesting reading. Refreshingly free from phony *gung-ho*, it is the story of a raggedy-pants Marine who never became a hero.

Private Andrew Willy, a pretty ordinary young man, joined the Marines in time to make the assault on Tarawa. Like thousands of others who never became heroes, he was a pretty ordinary Marine. It was, as the author points out, the ordinary Marines who won the battles of the Pacific beaches.

The story carries Willy through the campaigns of Saipan and Okinawa, and on to occupation duty in Japan. Drawing largely on his own experiences as a Marine, the author is particularly effective in his handling of the combat scenes. There is a realistic and unglamorous honesty about Pvt Willy's kind of war. It is the kind of war that most Marines who were there remember.

Reviewed by LtCol P. N. Pierce

THE FROZEN REVOLUTION

FRANK GIBNEY. 269 pages. Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, N. Y. \$4.75

Bookshop Code #FF-37

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, reached the consciousness—and fired the imagination—of the peoples of the West much more than the “frozen” Polish uprising which preceded it by a few days. In Hungary the issue seemed to be clear-cut: A straight fight between freedom and oppression, in which evil prevailed. The Russian action

was brutally open. The tale was spread through the world by 200,000 embittered refugees.

By contrast the events in Poland looked murky. They lacked onstage drama (although there was plenty backstage). The issues appeared cloudy; the results unsatisfactory.

In actual fact, the Polish revolt went “far beyond the Hungarian in [its] destructive effect on the imperial Communist regime.” Al-

though it has remained “frozen” in midstream, it has brought long-lasting benefits to the Poles. By being a “pilot study in Communist decay,” it is a sample of doing the possible for other Soviet captives to follow.

The meaning of the events of October '56, and their impact on Poland and on the world, are brought out with remarkable skill and great insight by this book.

The author's analysis of why a downtrodden and desperate people keeps groping for a better—and a freer future—is brilliant. This is particularly true in Chapter Five, in which he discusses the influence of the Church on Polish life. For in troubled Poland the Church is not only the peaceful, spiritual haven that it is in the West, but also “the living conscience of the country, and the repository of its history.”

Dark as Poland's recent past has been, and as dim as is her present, the last impression left by Frank Gibney's book is one of hope.

Reviewed by WCdr John Gellner
RCAF (Ret)

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OBSERVATION POST



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A Division Afloat

By 1stLts J. F. O'Connor and A. G. Simonetti

SINCE ITS BIRTH, THE MARINE CORPS has rightfully enjoyed being our country's force in readiness.

On short notice, Marines have traveled the globe to defend our nation's interests.

Leathernecks have fought in many places, in every clime.

Our readiness has become a byword to the American people.

A Marine division and an air wing afloat can best wield the maximum in mobile striking power. Such a force could quell small disturbances and aggression throughout a troubled world. For example: the Lebanese incident. If an entire division afloat had been hovering in that area, the situation might never have erupted. At the least, it might have been handled with even greater dispatch.

By its very existence, the division afloat would serve to deter potential aggression. In crucial situations, the appearance of an elite combined arms team nearby would bolster the morale of a worried populace.

Let's examine the advantages to be enjoyed within the Corps itself by a floating division. Morale-wise, the latter would have a conscious pride in being a highly trained, ultra-versatile, and capable amphibious unit.

Admittedly, a comprehensive, high level, staff study would be necessary to explore the complete practicability of a floating division. Here all we need recognize is that the basic concept is feasible.

Under our present land-based system, training is difficult. Many factors militate against frequent division problems. Extensive field areas are always scarce.


To even conduct its annual Phibex operation, the 2dMarDiv needs both private and state lands. The division gets the necessary real estate only after agreeing to stringent restrictions.

There is no variety in climate or ter-

rain. Only a battalion at a time functions under varied training conditions in the Mediterranean. And, even there, the same areas are used time and time again, year in, year out. Infrequently, an entire regiment tramps up and down the hills of much-used Vieques Island.

Operating with a division afloat, the G-3 might constantly negotiate to afford our Marines diverse training areas. The division might storm ashore on the snow covered beaches of Alaska or the islands of the Aleutian chain. Shortly thereafter, it might plunge into the steaming jungles of Panama. Marines could improve their unique versatility.

Constantly working as a single entity, no longer would the division have to submit to piecemeal training. Frequent



and varied operations present opportunity for cooperation on all staff levels, thereby improving coordination. In short, the organization would prepare in the manner in which it would be used.

Training and working together produces a uniformity of preparedness.

Since individual commanders place varying emphasis on different types of training, the degree of readiness differs from outfit to outfit. One battalion participates in more field exercises than the next. One regiment keeps troops in better physical condition than another. A third unit is obsessed with night training.

With the introduction of division level training and operations, a uniform

A TIP TO TIPSTERS

Observation Post needs practical "how-to-do-it" tips from the field. Sketches or pictures of field expedients are desired, with brief explanations of 500 words or less. Payment at regular rates. Published ideas will be noted by the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center.

LFDC wants ideas, from regulars and reserves, on tactics, techniques and equipment. They should be submitted in accord with Para 17, MCO 3900.2A.

degree of fitness and training becomes a reality. Working together, the components of the division would be equally adept, whether in garrison or in the field.

Training together constantly, a floating division and an air wing would be a more thoroughly coordinated combination punch. Only practice can produce the desired integration of air-ground offense.

Undoubtedly, many will raise important fiscal objections. These do not stand well. To begin with, division scale employment would obviate the costly succession of minor, divorced, small unit operations. The heavy maintenance expense of vast, but nonetheless inadequate, training areas and installations would be eliminated.

Moving from finance to manpower, consider the saving in personnel. Many of the thousands of men involved in base maintenance would be freed to train as fighting Marines. The number liberated from onerous, but necessary, maintenance tasks would probably constitute an additional regiment.

Finally, all-too-costly time would be

Extinction of the Mastodon

By William Wiseley

THE CHANGED POWER STRUCTURE OF the world dictates radical modifications in tank design which have not yet been recognized. Europe is no longer paramount in geopolitical importance as it was in 1939.

In 1959, a mere 20 years later, strategic planners must worry about the cold of the northern ice cap, the most direct avenue of approach to a newly powerful USSR.

China has become a major power for the first time in modern history—and the predominant power in the Far East, where for centuries the nations of the western world held sway.

The Middle East, with its vast underground reserves of oil, now has a headlock on the industrial complex of Western Europe. Africa and Southeast Asia, exceedingly vulnerable to attack from within or without, hold the last great untapped reservoirs of the world's raw materials.

Can the armored forces of this country continue adequately to fulfill their assigned roles if warfare should break out in any of these areas? The answer is obviously no, for in almost all the regions involved our existing types cannot be used.

The new M-60 tanks, the first of which were delivered in October 1959, can go only where ground is like that of Western Europe or US proving grounds. But roles are constants, creating demands which must be met regardless of terrain. They cannot be ignored if we are to equip and maintain forces for combat, rather than parade.

If a tank or tank-like system is to respond to these changed conditions of warfare, drastic modifications must be

made. The weapon itself must be light, while retaining adequate firepower and a minimum of armor protection. It must be able to maintain mobility and tactical agility despite mountains, forests, jungles and swamps. The system must be simply organized, highly flexible, and equipped to provide logistic support over distances and with a rapidity heretofore unknown.

Present tank types, and the system now existing, cannot meet these demands. A successor must be devised.

Those who design weapons and determine doctrine should remember the tank was first conceived as a device for crossing man-made obstacles, then developed to a degree quite new to warfare. Because it succeeded in this limited purpose, it later was used as a primary weapon by giving it mobility and agility.

In much the same way, its successor, viewed now only as a concept, must be a vehicle which can cope with natural obstacles new to modern warfare on a major scale. Merely marginal improvements upon existing tank types will not meet these requirements.

Nuclear and missile weapons have also altered the character of warfare—and hence design requirements—in a pronounced way. The most commonly accepted answer to these conditions calls for the dispersion of forces. But this multiplies in such a marked manner the problems of control that existing communication facilities have become totally inadequate. Moreover, means must be found to concentrate dispersed forces so rapidly in terms of time and space that they can be used to strike a

decisive blow before an enemy can destroy the massive target presented to his own nuclear weapons.

Doctrine may produce tactical innovations which can improve tactical tank use. Proper training and staff planning can help achieve the surprise needed for such attacks. However, only design can provide extreme mobility and agility—the primary requirements.

Col E. D. Swinton, officially recognized by the British as the "father" of the tank, first sought a weapon that could maintain a shock assault under heavy fire by providing armored protection for guns, crew and means of movement. With such an aim certain present-day *gadgets* may not seem so suspect. Where armor plate met the requirement for protection in the years 1914-1918, and 1939-1945, a flight capability (known as *hopping* by some) will provide the answer for the future.

The weapon itself will weigh no more than a few tons, will carry a crew of two or three, protected by armor only against small arms fire. Armament will be rockets or recoilless guns. The chassis and motor, designed for vertical envelopment, have as present prototypes the helicopter and the flying platform, both really still in the *gadget* stage of development.

The weapon must be self-sustaining for a period of at least 24 hours. It must be air transportable. Its signal equipment must communicate several hundred miles, reliably, through any barriers of terrain or electronic counter-measures.

Quite obviously, the doctrine for employing this weapon, and the system constructed to support it, must radically differ from anything now in existence. Once again, mere marginal improvements will not do.

USMC

Operations Research Group
Engineering Experiment Station
Ohio State University

'AFLOAT

saved. Leave could be granted during times at which repairs would normally be effected on the ships bearing the division personnel.

There are those in the navy who are considering removing the old battlewagons from moth balls for use, after modification, as ultra-fast troop carriers, ammo and fuel ships. They bolster our theory.

One could easily house a reinforced battalion aboard a single ship. Since the old battle wagons can make 30 or more knots, deployment could be greatly speeded.

Presently, the moth-balled battleships

are in a better state of repair than the overworked APA's. In place of their old heavy guns, the larger vessels could mount exclusively anti-aircraft armament. The AAA weapons might range from the conventional guns to rockets or missiles. After converting ammo, fuel storage, and gun crew living spaces into troop berthing areas, battleships could comfortably house combat equipped Marines. A battlewagon already has the necessary service and accommodation spaces to handle large numbers of men. Floating cities are readily adaptable to troop use.

Advantages accruing to a division

and an air wing afloat are many. High morale, combat effectiveness, long range economy, coordination and versatility belong to the force itself. The free world would receive an addition to its repertoire of punches. Psychological benefits rank high among the advantages.

Now is the time for the Corps to assert itself. More than ever, we, the Minute Men, are needed. When deeds, not words, are needed, the American people will look, once again, to the United States Marine Corps. We must be ready.

USMC

Elmhurst, N.Y.



Junk on the Bunk Debunked

By ASSgt Leland E. Dye, Jr.

ONE OF THE STRONGEST ATTRactions of a Marine Corps career is the pride of belonging to an elite military service ready on a moment's notice for a war or a parade. As a Marine, one *knows* what he is supposed to be and be prepared to do. A good Marine not only has a sense of dedication, he possesses another valuable asset in this chaotic, fast-moving age—a sense of direction. And we can do a great deal to intensify this sense of direction, of mission.

As always, this goal is accomplished by strong leadership on all levels. To understand the role of command in inspiring Marines to move proudly along a well-defined route, imagine the kinds of organizations which might result from these kinds of leadership:

1) War-inspired leadership bent on attaining maximum combat effectiveness.

2) Spit-and-polish leadership determined to outshine other units.

3) "Other-directed" leadership which looks mostly toward seniors to ascertain what is expected with regard to training objectives, standards of inspection, procedural methods, morale and welfare of troops.

Of course, each of these emphasizes an important aspect of Marine Corps leadership:

Commander No. 1 (inspired by the importance of his training mission) gives his men a *sense of direction*.

Commander No. 2 (inspired by the pride of belonging to an elite military organization) emphasizes *pride of organization*.

Commander No. 3, who looks to others for guidance, reminds us that *obedience* and *cooperation* are necessary to any good leader.

Higher commanders can do tremendous good by placing inspections in proper perspective. Fortunately, a great deal of emphasis is placed on combat readiness. But at the same time perfection in all types of inspections is emphasized. As a result, energy is spent in most FMF units on achieving a diffuse, heterogeneous excellence which often distracts and, at times, seriously impedes accomplishing the primary training objectives.

Of course, I am not recommending that the Marine Corps lower its standards. I do believe too many inspections of the garrison type tend to cut into division training schedules and weary both leaders and troops with nagging minutiae. The greatest offenders are clothing and equipment layouts, sometimes conducted three or more times in lower echelons prior to inspection by a higher echelon commander.

For FMF units, at any rate, an SOP should be established for maintaining equipment. For example, individual



field equipment would last longer if not washed frequently with soap and water.

Higher-level inspections in FMF units should emphasize combat effectiveness, training and physical condition of troops.

The words in *sufficient quantity* and *serviceability* should be the criteria for awarding a "satisfactory" in inspecting clothing and equipment. Unit commanders should be discouraged from spending an inordinate amount of time preparing for and conducting such inspections. If categories other than *satisfactory* and *unsatisfactory* were eliminated in these inspections, the temptation to indulge in a great deal of waste motion would be avoided.

Pushing the panic button three months in advance of IG inspections is an annual soul-searing phenomenon

known to all Marines. I believe that the time and effort spent in preparing for these inspections are major obstacles to achieving our primary mission. A possible remedy for this might be surprise inspections by the Inspector-General and his staff, with the primary emphasis placed, of course, on combat readiness.

Unfortunately, physical conditioning—a most important part of training—now gets only half-hearted support in many organizations. Too many Marines are exempted from physical training and testing. Too often, an existing program of physical training is the first to be shelved in favor of a staff meeting or preliminary inspection. Considering our emphasis on wide dispersal of forces in nuclear-age combat, it seems likely that good physical condition will continue to prove indispensably valuable to Marines in the field. We cannot afford to dispense with physical training.

I recommend that all hands below the rank of first sergeant be required to exercise no less than three quarters of an hour every other day. An hour a day would be preferable. If this program were put into effect, we would see a tremendous increase in pride and morale, as well as fitness. We would have more Marines physically prepared for any of the eventualities we may expect to face.

To give Marines a stronger sense of direction, we should repeatedly affirm our force-in-readiness mission verbally and with action. Doing this, we would give leaders and troops a greater appreciation of the service and its goals, and striving for an over-all perfection would be subordinate to combat training.

By working harder for combat efficiency, we would feel that we were accomplishing something positive—heading in a definite direction. By giving our troops a stronger sense of direction we would give our reenlistment program a shot in the arm by making a service career doubly attractive to those who feel they must have a wider vision, a sense of dedication, and a better knowledge of where they are going. Most important, such a program would materially increase our military efficiency and enhance our ability to wage war successfully. USMC

HqSec, MB
Navy #3423
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Pencil Practice

By Carl H. Strandberg

PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT—IN PISTOL shooting, as well as many other things. But there are a few drawbacks to live-fire pistol practice away from the range. It's noisy, dangerous and expensive—not recommended for the home, BOQ or barracks. This is especially true with the .45. There is a way, however, that live-fire practice can be simulated with none of these drawbacks.

The only training aids needed are a long, sharp pencil, a magazine, and a sheet of white paper for a target. (In addition to a pistol, of course.)

Using the magazine as a target board, fasten the target to a firm backing at about eye level. Draw a circle—about 1/8 inch across—on the paper as an aiming point.



Drop the pencil into the barrel, eraser down. The pencil should be long enough so that its point protrudes slightly from the barrel when the eraser rests against the firing pin. Cock the weapon and aim at the black dot, from a range of about two inches.

When the trigger is squeezed, the firing pin hitting the eraser will throw the pencil out against the paper, making a mark.

Many well-known pistol shooters have used this method of practice. CWO John Scarborough, USMC, who is distinguished with the pistol, developed the method. He told me that he expected to be first in line for the last leather medal for the rest of his life ("Black Buster" slang for lowly high-expert) before he developed the method. This was back in 1952, prior to the Western Division Matches. After less than two weeks of practice, he won a Silver Medal and came up with two more medals in quick succession.

All the rules of pistol accuracy—grip, sight alignment, breathing and trigger squeeze—are just as important as in live-fire practice. The pencil will follow a remarkably consistent course. The "group" should form about an inch below the aiming point. Several hits in the same spot are not uncommon, with practice.

This type practice also helps to cure flinching. There's no noise or recoil.

USMC

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THE GAZETTE GLOSSARY

ASE—Automatic Stabilization Equipment
ASRT—Air Support Radar Team
BAR—Browning automatic rifle
BAQ—Basic allowance for quarters
CPX—Command Post Exercise
CVS—Carrier, anti-submarine
COWLEX—Cold Weather Exercise
CEO—Communications-Electronics Officer
DAO—Division Air Officer
DEFEX—Desert Firing Exercise
ECIG—Exercise Control and Inspection Group
FIREX—Live Firing Exercise
FM—Field Manual
GMTU—Guided Missile Test Unit
HELILEX—Helicopter Landing Exercise
HOK—Observation helicopter (Kaman)
HMR(C)—Helicopter Transport Squadron (Composite)
IG—Inspector General
ITR—Infantry Training Regiment
ICMC—Individual Combat Markmanship Course
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
LFTU—Landing Force Training Unit
LPH—Amphibious Transport, Helicopter
LVT-UX—Landing vehicle, tracked (prototype)
LSD—Landing Ship, dock
LMG—Light machine gun
LPD—Amphibious transport, dock
MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron
MD—Marine Detachment
MB—Marine Barracks
MAG—Marine Aircraft Group
OE—Observation plane (Cessna)
ORTEX—Operational Readiness Test Exercise
PHIBLEX—Amphibious Landing Exercise
PLC—Platoon Leader's Class
POW—Prisoner of war
RLT—Regimental Landing Team
SATS—Short Airfield for Tactical Support
SFCP—Shore Fire Control Party
TAO—Tactical Air Observer
TAR—Tactical Air Request
TAD—Tactical Air Direction
USFA—United States Fleet Activities
USNEES—Navy Engineering Experiment Station
UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice
VTU—Volunteer Training Unit
VMA—Marine Attack Squadron
VMF—Marine Fighter Squadron
VMO—Marine Observation Squadron
VMCJ—Marine Photo and Composite Squadron

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 49)

1 (a and c) Reference: TIP(J)4, paragraph 34c(2). Combat outposts are not to engage in close combat. A mission is to deny the enemy *short* range observation of the battle area, thus answer (d) is not a mission.

2 (c) Reference: MCS 2-29, paragraph 147. A range card is an oriented sketch of a sector of fire showing predetermined data which will facilitate the accurate delivery of fire, especially at night and during periods of poor visibility.

3 (d) Flamethrowing tanks are the only special tanks presently authorized by current T/E's.

4 (c) Reference: MCS 2-104, paragraph 92; SM-78, paragraph 23; TIP(COS)2, paragraph 9. Radio relay is the means of communication which utilizes special radio equipment to provide multi-channel telephone and teletype communication between command posts. Automatic retransmission is the name of the system used to automatically relay radio transmissions, via aircraft or ground stations, from one point to another, over distances too great for the equipment used or over intervening land masses.

5 (c) Reference: FM 30-5, paragraph 155. Counterintelligence consists of measures designed to conceal from the enemy our intentions and activities, and to neutralize the effectiveness for enemy intelligence activities. Answers (a) and (b) are rejected because they represent efforts to gain information about the enemy; answer (d) is rejected because it seeks to gain information about the terrain. Answer (c) qualifies as a counterintelligence mission.

6 (b) Reference: TIP(EC)2, paragraph 4c(1). No staff officer has any authority in his own right over any subordinate unit of the command. Within the authority delegated by the commander, staff officers may issue orders to subordinate commanders, and may request and disseminate informa-

tion from and to higher, subordinate, and adjacent commanders.

7 (b) Reference: TIP(ARM)2, paragraph 25b(1). Artillery commanders should be permitted to retain centralized control of their subordinate units whenever the tactical situation permits.

8 (c) Reference: TIP(J)1, paragraph 36. The Force Reconnaissance Company is the only listed unit possessing this capability.

9 (c) Reference MCS 1-1, paragraph 100c. "Civil affairs" is a form of government wherein the authority of the military commander is limited by agreements entered into by the governments of the countries concerned.

10 (a) Reference: TIP(J)4, paragraph 16f(5)(b). (b) pertains to "direction of attack." (c) pertains to nothing in particular. (d) pertains to a "route of advance."

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Marine Corps 1960

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★ General Officers ★

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Fr 06
To 07
Miller, J. C. Jan
Fr 06
To 07
Robertshaw, L. B. Jan
Fr 06
To 07

Reserve, Temporary Promotions

Klenke, W. H. Jan
Fr 06
To 07
Lyon, H. N. Jan
Fr 06
To 07

Retired

Gulick, R. M. 1Jan
Hogaboom, R. E. 1Jan
Pate, R. McC. 1Jan

✶ Colonels ✶

Temporary Promotions

Hammond, B. B. Jan
Ingle, S. C. Jan
Schlesinger, F. R. Jan
Sherman, D. W. Jan

Transfers

Hurst, E. H. 9906
Fr CInCPac EDWDFeb
To MCB, CampPen
Miller, W. M. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv 7Jan
To HQMC
Wellman, H. M. 9906
Fr FMFPac By27Jan
To HQMC

Released from Active Duty

Wert, T. R. 9906
HQMC ED1Feb

Retired

Hayden, R. H. 9906
MCB, CampPen ED31Jan
Memphill, B. T. 9906
ForTrps, FMFPac ED31Jan
King, H. E. 9907
HQMC ED29Feb

Retired, Reserve

Desantis, F. C. 1Jan

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Beeman, T. F., G-3 3dMarDiv
Boyd, R. W., RTC, SDiego
Hines, O. M., Asst Director, Division of Reserve, HQMC
Llette, J. R., 8thMCRD
Rouse, H. S., 7th Marines, 1stMar Div
Walker, A., 1st Marines, 1stMarDiv
Wyczawski, R. W., Deputy Director, Division of Reserve, HQMC

✶ Lieutenant Colonels ✶

Permanent Promotions

Landis, W. P. Dec
Senton, J. B. Jan

Temporary Promotions

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Anderson, E. A. Dec

Anderson, R. L. Dec
Bjorson, R. A. Jan
Blatt, W. D. Dec
Brown, C. S. Dec
Carver, N. H. Dec
Casey, T. P. Jan
Challacombe, A. D. Jan
Cleeland, D. Jan
Daniels, E. R. Dec
Danowitz, E. F. Jan
Deweese, R. Jan
Dressin, S. A. Jan
Dyer, P. G. Dec
Farish, G. B. Jan
Gibson, B. P. Jan
Harmon, L. G. Jan
House, C. A. Dec
Howe, O. E. Jan
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Johnston, J. C. Jan
Kelly, G. E. Jan
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MacQuarrie, W. L. Jan
Mawyer, R. P. Jan
McBarron, A. Dec
McDaniel, J. Jan
McManus, J. Jan
Melin, E. I. Dec
Mickelson, L. M. Dec
Miller, E. J. Dec
Morrison, G. W. Dec
Kushlow, R. D. Dec
Simmons, R. L. Dec
Smith, R. B. Jan
Stanford, N. R. Jan
Sullivan, J. B. Jan
Thorne, N. G. Jan
Truesdale, M. G. Jan
Vance, J. C. Jan
Wilker, D. Jan
Wilson, J. E. Jan
Wilson, R. Dec
Witt, W. T. Jan

Transfers

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Fr HQMC EDWDFeb
To 3dMarDiv
Clarke, F. T. 7335
Fr 1stMAW EDWDFeb
To 2dMAW
Cline, R. C. 7307
Fr 3dMAW EDWDFeb
To MCAS, El Toro
Giebler, B. W. 0802
Fr CInCEur EDWDFeb
To MCS, Quant
Myking, B. G. 7335
Fr 1stMAW EDWDFeb
To 2dMAW
Pickle, K. B. 0302
Fr NAG, Korea EDWDFeb
To MCRD, SDiego
Spuhler, R. H. 0302
Fr FMFPac By5Feb
To AFSC, NorVa
Thomas, F. C. 7302
Fr AFSC, NorVa By22Feb
To ColoSprings, Colo
Winchester, E. H. By24Feb
Fr 2dMAW
To MarPac

Retired

Becker, P. E. 0302
2dMarDiv ED31Jan
Fletcher, S. H. 1Jan
Frank, W. F. 0302
1Jan
Lockwood, R. S. 0302
MarPac ED29Feb
Lynch, J. K. 3502
FMFLant ED29Feb

Retired, Reserve

Downs, J. E. 1Jan
Gillespie, S. W. 1Jan
Oakley, W. H. 1Jan

Deaths

Boggs, C. W. 20Dec
MCAS, CherPt
Roach, S. C. 12Dec
2dMAW

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Gomes, H., VMF(AW)-513, 3dMAW
McCardle, P. H., 4th Mar, 1stMar-
Brig
Munson, S. C., G-1, SDiego
Pounds, J. A., 12thMar, 3dMarDiv
Price, D. W., SDT, MCS, Quant

✶ Majors ✶

Temporary Promotions

Smith, L. J. Dec

Transfers

Adams, N. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv EDWDFeb
To PhibTraComLantFit
Caswell, D. 7305
Fr 2dMAW By5Feb
To MarPac
Dowdell, J. T. 7302
Fr 1stMAW EDWDFeb
To MCS, Quant
Fly, J. D. 0802
Fr MCRD, SDiego EDWDFeb
To AirFMFPac
Geddes, D. G. 7302
Fr AirFMFPac By1Feb
To HQMC
Harris, F. W. 1302
Fr MCSA, Phila 8Feb
To Univ Pa
Hill, A. T. 3002
Fr HQMC 8Feb
To MCSA, Phila
Pullin, M. E. 2502
Fr MCRD, SDiego By15Feb
To NAG, Korea
Stamps, C. H. 6602
Fr AirFMFPac 1Feb
To 3dMAW

Selected for Promotion to LtCol, Reserve

Anderson, G. L.
Andre, E. L.
Anton, A. D.
Armstrong, W. I.
Ashbaugh, J. I.
Ashe, F.
Bade, R. D.
Babb, J. M.
Bailey, A. J.
Baker, R. W.
Ballew, W. W.
Bamerick, R. F.
Barnes, A. D.
Bauer, A. W.
Bearlund, H. J.
Beck, J. D.
Belt, T. J.
Benelli, J. A.
Benton, E. T.
Benton, R. E.
Bickerstaff, G. A.
Bordignon, R.
Borellini, D.
Boyden, H. P.
Brandon, H. F.
Brazeal, D. O.
Breymaier, R. S.
Brooks, J. B.
Bruce, V. W.
Buchser, E.
Bushong, H. L.
Cage, J. G.
Calamari, J. J.
Campbell, J. J.
Campbell, J. W.
Campo, F. E.
Candelas, J.
Cartoski, E. J.
Champagne, E. A.
Chandler, J. B.
Chase, H.
Christensen, D. W.
Churchill, J.

Clarkson, V.
Cohen, M.
Combs, J. M.
Conlon, T. W.
Connelly, T. D.
Cook, H. D.
Cooley, W. E.
Cooper, C.
Corpening, C. D.
Crawford, J.
Crawley, L. N.
Daigle, B. J.
Dantimo, D.
Dartler, D.
Davidson, F. E.
Deal, O. E.
Dean, M. L.
Dean, J. L.
Decker, J.
Dee, D. J.
Deitz, J. A.
Deland, W. P.
Denney, R. V.
Dennis, P. E.
Desmond, J. P.
Detmering, C. S.
Dickerman, E. J.
Dixon, J. E.
Donnelly, W. J.
Donoghue, T. J.
Donovan, W. J.
Dougherty, P. W.
Downes, L. J.
Dufford, J. M.
Eberlein, B. L.
Ennen, J. H.
Fagnan, G. Q.
Famigletti, G. W.
Farfan, M. E.
Farrell, J. I.
Faught, R. T.
Field, D. F.
Fisher, D. B.
Fitzgerald, E. A.
Fitzgerald, J. P.
Foley, J. F.
Forrest, S. M.
Forward, W. A.
Foster, F. A.
Fritz, H. H.
Frohe, L. F.
Fulek, J. L.
Geuss, J. J.
Gills, R. F.
Gilmour, R. E.
Givens, J. E.
Glaese, D. P.
Godwin, M. R.
Gooch, R. M.
Graham, B.
Grandy, B. R.
Gregory, A.
Griffin, W. W.
Gross, H.
Guldry, S.
Hagan, W. C.
Hamburg, W. K.
Hanbey, B. R.
Harrington, J. G.
Hart, G. C.
Hartman, H. J.
Hawn, H. C.
Hayde, J. C.
Heath, H. H.
Heintz, E. J.
Henderson, R. C.
Hertzog, A. S.
Holiday, R. C.
Hollowell, F. M.
Hoops, D. A.
Hopkins, T. D.
Horn, T. H.
Horsley, F.
Hunchar, R.
Jensen, L. D.
Johnson, B. M.
Jones, E. E.
Joy, R. B.
Judy, J. W.
Justice, W. G.
Kass, W. W.
Kehoe, P. M.
Kennedy, J. N.
Kern, P. W.
Kidd, D. S.

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Dec	Steffey, R. G.	Jan	Wright, H. L.	7335	Buerk, G. S.	Dec	Hale, W. H.	Dec
Dec	Stevens, J. E.	Dec	Fr Ft Holabird, Md	ED26Feb	Burke, J. P.	Dec	Haley, R. A.	Dec
Dec	Stevenson, C. H.	Dec	To 3dMarDiv		Burleson, E. B.	Dec	Hanley, M. J.	Dec
Jan	Stewart, A. L.	Dec	Yingling, F. H.	7335	Buss, R. H.	Dec	Hanselman, A. C.	Dec
Jan	Sullivan, F. T.	Dec	Fr 2dMAW	ED1Feb	Butchart, E. W.	Dec	Hanson, R. A.	Dec
Jan	Sweeney, R. M.	Dec	To MCAAS, Beaufort		Butler, F. H.	Dec	Hardgrove, W. R.	Dec
Dec	Symm, B. M.	Dec			Byrne, W. A.	Dec	Harper, H. J.	Dec
Dec	Taylor, J. R.	Dec			Byrnes, R. E.	Dec	Harris, J. E.	Dec
Dec	Thomas, D. J.	Dec			Cady, T. C.	Dec	Harwood, A. E.	Dec
Dec	Thorson, A. G.	Dec			Campanella, F. B.	Dec	Hatton, G. A.	Dec
Jan	Turner, D. C.	Dec			Capek, R. C.	Dec	Haws, W. E.	Dec
Dec	Varner, D. K.	Dec			Carlin, R. J.	Dec	Hayward, B. N.	Dec
Dec	Warczakowski, A. I.	Dec			Carr, B. H.	Dec	Held, A. E.	Dec
Dec	Waters, R. T.	Dec			Carswell, D. A.	Dec	Hemingway, J. W.	Dec
Jan	Way, J. D.	Dec			Carty, J. J.	Dec	Henry, J. W.	Dec
Jan	Webb, D. E.	Dec			Cassidy, M. D.	Dec	Herlocker, J. E.	Dec
Jan	Weir, R. K.	Dec			Caswell, R. J.	Dec	Hewitt, R. D.	Dec
Jan	Weiss, R. J.	Dec			Chambliss, J. C.	Dec	Higgs, J. R.	Dec
Dec	White, F. V.	Dec			Chappell, J. F.	Dec	Hicks, R. E.	Dec
Dec	Whitman, F. T.	Dec			Cheek, F. E.	Dec	Himmerich, R. T.	Dec
Dec	Widlek, L. D.	Dec			Clark, W. F.	Dec	Hodge, G. D.	Dec
Dec	Wilde, D. E.	Dec			Clark, R. L.	Dec	Hofland, R. M.	Dec
Dec	Williams, M. J.	Dec			Clay, J. P.	Dec	Hogaboom, P. L.	Dec
Dec	Williams, C. P.	Dec			Clinton, J. R.	Dec	Horton, T. R.	Dec
Dec	Willkomm, J. W.	Dec			Clites, D. D.	Dec	Houseman, W. B.	Dec
Dec	Wilson, P. A.	Dec			Close, R. L.	Dec	House, E. L.	Dec
Dec	Wilson, R. H.	Dec			Cobb, J. L.	Dec	Howley, W. C.	Dec
Dec	Wood, R. F.	Dec			Cohan, L.	Dec	Hudson, J. E.	Dec
Dec	Worden, P. R.	Dec			Coleman, D. A.	Dec	Huff, E. L.	Dec
Dec	Yanochik, W. N.	Dec			Collins, P. G.	Dec	Huffcut, W. H.	Dec
Dec	Yeckel, D. G.	Dec			Collins, L. M.	Dec	Hughes, J. R.	Dec
Dec	Zimmerman, K. A.	Dec			Cooper, H. D.	Dec	Hulme, M. E.	Dec
Dec					Cooper, S. W.	Dec	Hunt, G. T.	Dec
Dec					Cooper, M. T.	Dec	Hurley, R. B.	Dec
Dec					Corn, C. P.	Dec	Iles, J. E.	Dec
Dec					Corr, E. G.	Dec	Iliff, W. J.	Dec
Dec					Cowley, E. L.	Dec	Imbus, R. J.	Dec
Dec					Crabtree, R. G.	Dec	Irish, J. A.	Dec
Dec					Criger, F. R.	Dec	Isherwood, G. B.	Dec
Dec					Cross, R. L.	Dec	Jacobson, R. H.	Dec
Dec					Cullen, R. J.	Dec	James, R. K.	Dec
Dec					Cullen, R. F.	Dec	Jenkins, J. H.	Dec
Dec					Culver, R. O.	Dec	Jespersen, R. R.	Dec
Dec					Cunningham, D. M.	Dec	Johnston, J. C.	Dec
Dec					Cunningham, F. J.	Dec	Jones, T. L.	Dec
Dec					Curd, J. H.	Dec	Jordan, L. W.	Dec
Dec					Cuthrell, D. W.	Dec	Kaapu, K. D.	Dec
Dec					Dalberg, J. E.	Dec	Kammeler, F. A.	Dec
Dec					Daly, P. H.	Dec	Kandra, M. J.	Dec
Dec					Damuth, D. R.	Dec	Kane, J. M.	Dec
Dec					Daniels, C.	Dec	Kazalunas, J.	Dec
Dec					Davis, R. W.	Dec	Keane, M. F.	Dec
Dec					Davis, C. E.	Dec	Keating, D. J.	Dec
Dec					Day, B. C.	Dec	Kelley, P. S.	Dec
Dec					Dean, A. J.	Dec	Kelley, J. D.	Dec
Dec					Dean, B. R.	Dec	Kirkham, J. H.	Dec
Dec					Deatrick, G. B.	Dec	Klinkenberg, A. L.	Dec
Dec					Debrine, R. A.	Dec	Knapper, R. E.	Dec
Dec					Deegan, G. A.	Dec	Komar, J. T.	Dec
Dec					Denthorne, W. J.	Dec	Krages, B. P.	Dec
Dec					Dennis, C. H.	Dec	Kreicker, G. H.	Dec
Dec					Deutsch, D. J.	Dec	Kretschmar, E. T.	Dec
Dec					Dieffenbach, C. T.	Dec	Kupper, G. T.	Dec
Dec					Dillen, T. S.	Dec	Labin, L. E.	Dec
Dec					Donnelly, J. L.	Dec	Lakes, J. B.	Dec
Dec					Donnelly, W. A.	Dec	Lammerding, R. L.	Dec
Dec					Dooley, G. F.	Dec	Landraf, J. E.	Dec
Dec					Dorman, D. D.	Dec	Landy, B. A.	Dec
Dec					Dougherty, P. K.	Dec	Lane, J. A.	Dec
Dec					Douse, G. H.	Dec	Langton, R. E.	Dec
Dec					Doyle, L. E.	Dec	Lanigan, J. D.	Dec
Dec					Drew, L. G.	Dec	Larson, R. D.	Dec
Dec					Driscoll, E. J.	Dec	Lawe, R. C.	Dec
Dec					Dube, M. J.	Dec	Lawler, T. F.	Dec
Dec					Dulaney, R. L.	Dec	Leary, D. F.	Dec
Dec					Dunn, E. D.	Dec	Lee, W. F.	Dec
Dec					Dusek, L. M.	Dec	Leftwich, R. F.	Dec
Dec					Dwyre, M. D.	Dec	Lengauer, G. T.	Dec
Dec					Dyer, C. R.	Dec	Lentscher, M. G.	Dec
Dec					Ebanks, W. J.	Dec	Lewis, S. R.	Dec
Dec					Edwards, E. C.	Dec	Lindseth, C. D.	Dec
Dec					Elofson, R. H.	Dec	Lindstrom, R. E.	Dec
Dec					Endries, R. N.	Dec	Lisa, A. J.	Dec
Dec					Evans, R. V.	Dec	Little, J. C.	Dec
Dec					Evieth, W. R.	Dec	Lloyd, J. S.	Dec
Dec					Featherston, R. K.	Dec	Logan, A. S.	Dec
Dec					Felix, W. D.	Dec	Longdon, A. P.	Dec
Dec					Ferguson, R. A.	Dec	Loper, J. H.	Dec
Dec					Field, L. D.	Dec	Lott, J. D.	Dec
Dec					Forrester, R. H.	Dec	Love, J. R.	Dec
Dec					Foster, R. G.	Dec	Luft, R. S.	Dec
Dec					Foster, E. B.	Dec	Lummis, C. D.	Dec
Dec					Frazier, T. J.	Dec	MacCarthy, A. W.	Dec
Dec					Fredericks, W. B.	Dec	Mackay, M. L.	Dec
Dec					French, L. H.	Dec	Mackin, P. M.	Dec
Dec					Friedland, A. S.	Dec	Magee, J. T.	Dec
Dec					Fry, D. E.	Dec	Maguire, R. J.	Dec
Dec					Fuchs, L. M.	Dec	Maher, D. J.	Dec
Dec					Garner, J. T.	Dec	Mahoney, J. M.	Dec
Dec					Gelpi, G. T.	Dec	Maillet, D. W.	Dec
Dec					Gilbert, G. F.	Dec	Maley, F. W.	Dec
Dec					Ging, E. D.	Dec	Maloy, K. A.	Dec
Dec					Gleason, M. N.	Dec	Manazir, C. H.	Dec
Dec					Goldberg, M. A.	Dec	Mannis, D. C.	Dec
Dec					Golden, G.	Dec	Marks, J. A.	Dec
Dec					Goode, K. N.	Dec	Marlow, J. B.	Dec
Dec					Gordon, R. H.	Dec	Martin, A. C.	Dec
Dec					Goutell, C. R.	Dec	Martin, T. B.	Dec
Dec					Gratto, J. M.	Dec	Martin, W. L.	Dec
Dec					Green, J. M.	Dec	Martin, E. C.	Dec
Dec					Griepentrog, D. C.	Dec	Masin, R. H.	Dec
Dec					Hafner, B. D.	Dec	Massey, G. J.	Dec
Dec					Halbleib, J. A.	Dec	Mayberry, W. B.	Dec
Dec					Hale, H. W.	Dec	Mayers, K. E.	Dec
Dec							McCabe, J. G.	Dec
Dec							McElroy, T. R.	Dec
Dec							McNelly, J. F.	Dec
Dec							McNutt, K. A.	Dec

McCormick, R. C.
McDonald, J. F.
McFadden, J. D.
McGowan, M. N.
McGuinn, J. M.
McGuire, J. S.
McKinney, R. D.
McKittrick, R. O.
McNamara, W. J.
McRaney, C. D.
Mead, C. P.
Means, H. N.
Meinecke, D. N.
Merriam, W. D.
Milkowski, A. H.
Miller, A. D.
Miller, J. S.
Millemann, S. E.
Milner, T. R.
Mituski, J. J.
Mitts, C. S.
Mixson, M. E.
Mock, G. D.
Mohler, R. E.
Molineaux, J. F.
Molsbee, N.
Montgomery, E. A.
Mooney, W. A.
Morris, P. D.
Mosher, D. K.
Muir, E. R.
Mulkey, J. G.
Mulken, T. R.
Murdick, P. H.
Murphy, J. R.
Naugle, D. G.
Navadel, G. D.
Nettles, C. W.
Newman, G. L.
Nichols, C. H.
Nicol, A. E.
Nielsen, B. S.
Noble, R. E.
Norman, E. H.
Norrington, G. R.
Nourse, L. E.
Nugent, W. R.
Oakley, C. E.
Oblinger, D. H.
O'Brien, J. J.
Obye, J. R.
Ohayre, J. J.
Olson, R. H.
Oravits, J. J.
Orsburn, L. M.
Orzech, J. E.
Ovelgonne, W. E.
Paige, R. B.
Parks, H. L.
Pasquale, F. J.
Pastrelli, D. K.
Patrick, J. L.
Patrick, R. H.
Peltier, W. H.
Penland, R. B.
Peterson, D. B.
Phenegar, W. R.
Philbrick, E. H.
Phillips, B. G.
Pierce, J. S.
Polk, L. J.
Polyak, G. R.
Pope, E. T.
Powell, D. A.
Power, T. J.
Powers, J. A.
Pratt, T. M.
Prewitt, R. C.
Quarud, R. B.
Radcliffe, E. T.
Raines, R. C.
Ramsay, C. J.
Rasavage, J. R.
Rathborne, J. C.
Ratzlaff, J. W.
Rausch, R. C.
Reddick, W. G.
Reeves, T. L.
Regan, C. D.
Relly, J. W.
Reno, R. J.
Reynolds, R. C.
Rhinesmith, G. B.
Rivera, J. C.
Roberson, J. C.
Robinson, C. N.
Robinson, D. M.
Rodewald, W. O.
Rodwell, R. O.
Rohde, J. A.
Rollins, J. K.
Rosenberg, J. F.
Rondebush, T.
Rountree, L. C.
Rozman, J. J.
Rushing, C. L.
Russell, F. P.
Russo, A. R.
Ryder, J. K.
Sabin, F. H.
Sallis, J. E.
Salmon, M. D.
Sanborn, W. E.
Scamehorn, R. C.
Schalk, J. D.
Schenck, K. I.
Schermerhorn, D. W.

Dec Schmidt, J. E.
Dec Schreiber, G. A.
Dec Scott, J. F.
Dec Scott, J. W.
Dec Seaver, R. L.
Dec Seward, E. E.
Dec Shannahan, J. K.
Dec Sharp, R. C.
Dec Shaw, J. B.
Dec Shoptaw, R. D.
Dec Shroyer, D. K.
Dec Sikes, M. D.
Dec Silver, T. J.
Dec Silver, T. A.
Dec Simon, F.
Dec Simpson, F. D.
Dec Simpson, J. F.
Dec Sinnott, W. T.
Dec Smaldone, R. A.
Dec Small, C. D.
Dec Smith, E. F.
Dec Smith, G. L.
Dec Smith, R. E.
Dec Smith, W. G.
Dec Smyth, T. J.
Dec Sooy, D. K.
Dec Sotsky, G. R.
Dec Spiegel, F. H.
Dec Sprick, D. R.
Dec Sprott, C. W.
Dec Stang, K. R.
Dec Starnes, J. J.
Dec Steffen, A. J.
Dec Stehr, F. W.
Dec Stein, W. L.
Dec Stevens, R. A.
Dec Stevenson, S. H.
Dec Stewart, D. K.
Dec Stoloski, W. J.
Dec Stone, M. E.
Dec Stremic, A. W.
Dec Studer, E. A.
Dec Sudmeyer, P. T.
Dec Suedekum, N. F.
Dec Sullivan, J. F.
Dec Sutherland, A. A.
Dec Sutton, R. A.
Dec Swenson, W. R.
Dec Swigart, R. W.
Dec Szili, W. A.
Dec Tatum, R. P.
Dec Taylor, F. D.
Dec Taylor, B. C.
Dec Taylor, R. H.
Dec Tebow, W. J.
Dec Telford, J. W.
Dec Thames, S. E.
Dec Thomas, G. A.
Dec Thomas, W. L.
Dec Thomas, W. Y.
Dec Thompson, A. D.
Dec Thompson, C. B.
Dec Tilton, R. C.
Dec Tinker, A.
Dec Toelle, A. D.
Dec Toler, A. E.
Dec Toth, J. E.
Dec Trant, W. M.
Dec Trensli, D. F.
Dec Tucker, G. B.
Dec Tutterow, H. W.
Dec Ulises, R. J.
Dec Uram, E. T.
Dec Vanantwerp, W. M.
Dec Vanniman, J. H.
Dec Vantassel, G. L.
Dec Vasko, G. E.
Dec Vaughn, C. S.
Dec Vaughn, R. F.
Dec Vest, D. G.
Dec Vorreyer, R. W.
Dec Vowell, D. E.
Dec Wakefield, R. H.
Dec Wall, C. N.
Dec Wallace, H. R.
Dec Wallace, J. W.
Dec Walters, W. S.
Dec Ward, C. L.
Dec Warnicke, E. A.
Dec Washington, J.
Dec Wasik, H. J.
Dec Watson, J. B.
Dec Wedemeyer, R. H.
Dec Wells, J. W.
Dec Wells, R.
Dec Weltin, W. L.
Dec Werner, R. G.
Dec Wescott, W. J.
Dec Wescott, W. F.
Dec West, J. H.
Dec West, R. L.
Dec Westphal, F. E.
Dec Whipple, O. M.
Dec White, G. M.
Dec White, J. S.
Dec Whitting, E. R.
Dec Whittlesey, J. T.
Dec Wier, D. A.
Dec Wile, W. A.
Dec Williams, L. T.
Dec Williams, R. A.
Dec Williams, S. E.
Dec Williams, W. L.
Dec Willmarth, J. M.
Dec Wilson, D. R.
Dec Wilson, R. B.

Dec Wood, H. C.
Dec Woodward, R. L.
Dec Wright, R. W.
Dec Yandell, W. H.
Dec Yenerall, G. L.
Dec Yon, D. H.
Dec York, G. A.
Dec Yusup, F. D.

Transfers

Barney, D. G. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv EDWDFeb
To USS Vermillion
Bigham, F. E. 6502
Fr 1stMAW EDWDFeb
To 2dMAW
Blanton, R. D. 7335
Fr 2dMAW ED15Jan
To 1stMAW
Boyd, E. H. 0302
Fr USS Helena EDWDFeb
To MCRD, SDiego
Buckley, J. W. 7335
Fr 2dMAW EDWDFeb
To MAG-26
Capwell, G. L. 0802
Fr MCS, Quant EDWDFeb
To FortTrps FMFPac
Clayes, A. I. 7302
Fr 2dMAW By5Feb
To MarPac
Donahue, J. J. 6709
Fr 2dMAW By24Feb
To MarPac
Duke, H. A. 7335
Fr 2dMAW ED15Jan
To 1stMAW
Earle, J. M. 7333
Fr NAS, Pncla ED1Feb
To MCS, Quant
Eggers, R. F. 0302
Fr Bridgeport, Calif EDWDFeb
To 1stMarDiv
Ellison, G. V. 0302
Fr MCS, Quant EDWDFeb
To 1stMarDiv
Fiel, M. A. 0302
Fr MCS, Quant By10Feb
To NABTC, Pncla
Gilson, R. H. 9901
Fr 1stMAW EDWDFeb
To MCB, CamLej
Long, B. M. 0702
Fr MCS, Quant EDWDFeb
To MCB, CamLej
McFadden, J. D. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv ED12Feb
To USS Helena
McGurn, W. A. 2502
Fr MCS, Quant
To 3dMarDiv
Moore, R. E. 0802
Fr MCS, Quant ED26Feb
To MCB, 29Palms
Parrish, L. J. 2502
Fr MCS, Quant ED26Feb
To FortTrps FMFLant
Peacock, M. E. 7335
Fr 2dMAW EDWDFeb
To MAG-26
Shaw, P. G. 2502
Fr 2dMarDiv By10Feb
To NABTC, Pncla
Silver, T. A. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv EDWDFeb
To USS Toledo
Smith, W. D. 3010
Fr FMFPac EDWDFeb
To NAG, Korea
Strawther, D. 0702
Fr FortTrps FMFPac By1Feb
To MCRD, SDiego
Swartwood, R. E. 2502
Fr MCS, Quant ED26Feb
To FMFPac
Troxell, J. M. 7333
Fr MAD, CorpC By25Jan
To MCS, Quant
Yoakum, T. A. 7335
Fr 2dMAW ED15Jan
To 1stMAW

Released from Active Duty

Allen, L. J. 7333
MCAAS Yuma ED1Feb
Bacik, V. H. 7333
3dMAW ED1Feb
Bailes, R. R. 7304
3dMAW ED1Feb
Brennan, C. P. 7335
3dMAW ED1Feb
Deinema, W. G. 7305
2dMAW ED1Feb
Graft, D. H. 3010
MCB, CamLej ED1Feb
Horton, F. T. 7333
3dMAW ED1Feb
Reynolds, C. J. 7331
2dMAW ED1Feb
Rich, T. W. 0302
2dMarDiv ED1Feb
Varner, D. K. 7304
3dMAW ED1Jan
Warner, R. A. 7335
2dMAW ED1Feb

Retired

Bracey, M. L. 6602
1Jan
Marlowe, C. H. 7304
1Jan

Reserve Temporary Promotions

Walsh, J. E. Dec
Buchanan, J. H. Jan
Cramer, R. M. Jan
Crane, W. B. Jan
Mitchell, R. L. Jan
Schultze, B. R. Jan

Deaths

Stephens, C. M. 22Dec

2d Lieutenants

Commissioned

Bowen, K. S. 21Dec
Brown, H. C. 30Dec
Calkins, R. L. 31Dec
Campbell, D. B. 22Dec
Dowling, R. D. 18Dec
Drum, D. S. 16Nov
Dunlap, C. R. 18Dec
Fare, J. V. 24Dec
Gregor, R. C. 21Dec
Hansen, D. P. 16Dec
Helman, L. F. 18Dec
Hendricks, D. D. 30Dec
Laying, M. W. 24Dec
Ranta, R. J. 21Dec
Richardson, J. H. 21Dec
Robinson, B. B. 22Dec
Rohr, S. M. 17Nov
Smith, R. H. 21Dec
Snedeker, M. R. 2Dec
Strickland, J. D. 30Dec
Swain, R. 17Dec
Workmon, D. G. 30Dec

Transfers

Goss, D. C. Fr 2dMAW By24Feb
To MarPac
Prior, W. A. Fr 2dMAW By24Feb
To MarPac
Sammon, A. B. Fr 2dMAW 2502
To MarPac By5Feb

To Active Duty

Pirnie, D. M. 7335
East Lansing, Mich ED8Feb

Retired

Arrant, E. E. 2010
1Jan
Brittain, E. W. 2502
31Jan
Coleman, J. D. 2710
1Jan
Dyer, R. R. 3102
31Jan
Hawks, H. 3030
1Jan
Plusnis, F. J. 0302
1Jan
Ritter, J. L. 2502
9Feb
Schmidt, E. G. 1320
31Jan
Swanson, W. D. 9901
1Jan

Warrant Officers

Reserve Permanent Promotions

Pearson, N. C. Dec
Fr W3
To W4

Commissioned

Becker, R. P. 31Dec
Fletcher, C. H. 29Dec
Imman, R. L. 21Dec
Reilly, J. 29Dec
Vaughn, E. 31Dec
Work, R. G. 31Dec

Transfers

Starks, H. A. 0202
Fr 2dMarDiv ED15Feb
To 1stMarDiv

6602
1Jan
7304
1Jan

Dec
Jan
Jan
Jan
Jan
Jan

2Dec

1Dec
0Dec
1Dec
2Dec
8Dec
6Nov
8Dec
4Dec
1Dec
6Dec
8Dec
0Dec
4Dec
1Dec
1Dec
2Dec
7Nov
1Dec
2Dec
0Dec
7Dec
0Dec

4Feb

4Feb
2502
5Feb

7335
08Feb

2010
1Jan
2502
31Jan
2710
1Jan
3102
31Jan
3030
1Jan
0502
1Jan
2502
9Feb
1320
31Jan
9901
1Jan

Dec

31Dec
29Dec
21Dec
29Dec
31Dec
31Dec

0202
15Feb

1960


Photo courtesy 20th Century Fox




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